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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the long and entangled relationship of farmers, miners and the state in 
Southern Rhodesia from 1895 when the Mines and Minerals Act was promulgated to promote 
the growth of the country’s mining industry. The study ends in 1961 when an amendment to 
this same Act was crafted after the incorporation of considerations from the country’s farmers 
and miners. The country’s mining law, devised by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) 
to further its commercial interests, became a subject of controversy around 1907 when 
agriculture, which had been hitherto neglected, started developing – spurred by disillusioned 
fortune seekers who had turned from prospecting for gold to pursue farming. The BSAC laws 
favoured mining and this was challenged by the growing settler farmer community. This laid 
the basis for the interaction of farmers, miners and the state throughout the study period. The 
thesis thus explores the protean nature of state policies in dealing with the country’s farmers 
and miners. Mining and agriculture were the country’s leading primary industries, with mining 
contributing more towards the country’s revenue until 1945 when it was replaced by agriculture 
on the apex position. Therefore, state policies on the two sectors had a direct impact on the 
overall country’s economy. The thesis engages broader historiographical conversations on 
agriculture, mining, conservation and intra-settler relations, law and taxation in Southern 
Rhodesia. It fills a historiographical gap in existing studies on intra-settler studies in Southern 
Rhodesia by providing a broader analysis of state-farmer-miner relations incorporating 
economic, political and conservation concerns. It shows the various shifts in state policies from 
Company administration into Responsible Government and highlights how different national 
and international economic developments impacted on state policies and in turn on miner-
farmer interactions. The study also demonstrates how the adoption of a formal conservation 
policy by the G. Huggins government provided a new context for the regulation of miner-
farmer relations by the state. It argues that, miner-farmer relations during the period under 
review impacted heavily on state policy and the country’s economy. 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 iv 
 
Opsomming 
 
Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die lang en verweefde verhouding tussen boere, mynwerkers en 
die staat in Suid-Rhodesië vanaf 1895 toe die Myne en Minerale Wet gepromulgeer is ten einde 
die land se mynbou te bevorder. Die studie eindig in 1961 toe ‘n amendement  tot dieselfde 
wet bygevoeg is om die veranderende belange van die boere en mynwerkers te akkommodeer. 
Die land se mynwet wat oorspronklik deur die” British South African Company” (BSAC)  
ontwerp is om sy kommersiële belange te bevorder, het omstreeks 1907  omstrede begin raak 
toe landbou wat tot dan verwaarloos was, toenemend vooruit gegaan het. Dié verwikkeling het 
momentum begin kry toe ontnugterde goudprospekteerders eerder hulle tot boerdery gewend 
het. Die BSAC se mynwetgewing het die goudbedryf bevoordeel en die bedeling is toenemend 
deur die groeiende setlaar boerdery gemeeneenskap bevraagteken. Dit het die basis gevorm vir 
die interaksie tussen boere, mynwerkers en die staat gedurende die periode wat hier onder die 
loep geneem word. Die proefskrif ondersoek die  vloeibare aard van staatsbeleid ten opsigte 
van die land se boere en mynwerkers. Mynbou en landbou was die land se toonaangewende 
primêre bedrywe met mynbou wat tot 1945 die meeste tot die algehele staatsinkomste bygedra 
het voordat dit deur lanbou oortref is. Staatbeleid het derhalwe ten opsigte van die twee sektore 
‘n direkte impak op die algemene landsekonomie gehad. Die proefskrif vind aansluiting by 
breëre historiografiese diskoerse rondom landbou, mynbou, bewaring, onderlinge setlaar 
verhoudings, wette en belasting in Suid-Rhodesië. Dit vul ‘n historigrafiese gaping in 
bestaande studies oor die onderlinge verhousing tussen setlaars in Suid-Rhodesië deur’n breër 
ontleding van staat, boerdery en mynboubelange op ekonomiese, politieke vlak asook en 
bewaringsaspekte.Die verskeie beleidsaanpassings vanaf Kompanjiesbewind tot 
Verantwoordelike Bestuur word nagespeur en die wyse hoe verskillende nasionale en 
internasionale ekonomiese verwikkelinge staatsbeleid beinvloed het wat weer ‘n uitwerking op 
die verhouding tussen mynwerker en boer gehad het. Die studie demonstreer ook hoe die 
aanvaarding van ‘n formele bewaringsbeleid deur die regering van G Huggins ‘n nuwe konteks 
vir die regulering van die verhouding tussen mynwerker en boer daargestel het. Daar word 
geredeneer dat die verhouding tussen boer en mynwerker gedurende die tersaaklike periode ‘n 
betekenisvolle uitwerking op die staatsbeleid en die land se ekonomie gehad het.                         
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction, Literature Review and Methodology 
 
The subject of state-miner-farmer relations and the state has re-emerged in the wake of 
Zimbabwe’s controversial Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) from 2000. 
Moreover, the recent spate of mineral discoveries in the country (mainly diamonds, platinum 
and uranium) has raised enduring questions about the ownership of natural resources and how 
best to utilise them. Land has maintained its economic but also its political significance from 
the colonial era, even as the post-colonial government has ostensibly tried to redress the 
inequities of the colonial land tenure system. Aspirations for an agricultural and mineral 
revolution in Zimbabwe have resurfaced (much in the same manner they did in the early 1900s, 
as this thesis will show) pitting the same protagonists (famers and miners) against each other 
and the state. 
   
The discovery of vast deposits of alluvial diamonds in the Chiadzwa area of Marange district 
in Southeast Zimbabwe in 2006 was followed by a ‘diamond rush’ as thousands of fortune 
seekers thronged the Manicaland district. A few months after the discovery, the diamond fields 
in Chiadzwa became a talking point in international news as they were reported to contain 
diamond deposits valued at US$800 billion.1 This was a major boost to the country’s mining 
sector which had registered significant decline since 2000.2 Expectations were high that a 
discovery of this magnitude, coming as it did in the midst of an economic crisis in Zimbabwe, 
was going to pull the country back from the edge of an abyss. Controversy has however 
surrounded the revenue declared by Marange diamond mining companies. It came in very small 
proportions not congruent to the massive diamond mining operations undertaken by these 
companies. Finance Minister during the inclusive Government period (Government of National 
Unity)3 complained repeatedly that, although diamond mining in Marange was registering 
impressive growth, tax collection had dropped significantly. Responding to a question raised 
                                                            
1 http://www.zimeye.com/marange-diamonds-are-finished-lied-chinamasa-playing-animal-farm/  
2 See S. Mawowa, ‘The political economy of artisanal and small scale gold mining in central Zimbabwe’, Journal 
of Southern African Studies, 39, 4 (2013), 921-936. He notes that official figures show that, except for platinum 
and diamonds, Zimbabwe’s mining sector experienced a general decline between 2000 and 2008. 
3 During his budget presentation statements for the period 2009-2012, Tendai Biti appealed to the then Minister 
of Mines, Obert Mpofu to ensure that revenue from the Marange mines was directed to Treasury. 
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regarding this anomaly in the House of Assembly, the current Finance Minister, Patrick 
Chinamasa’s reply was that: 
Alluvial diamonds are finished and most of the companies we gave the right to mine 
there have no capacity to engage in further exploitation. Just one company has the 
capacity to do so and it is discovered that we still have the kimberlite which requires 
more capital.4 
 
This revelation by Chinamasa came as a huge surprise and left a lot of unanswered questions 
as to what really had happened to the Marange diamond mining in which the state is also a 
significant player. Viewed differently, this failure by the diamond companies to declare tax to 
treasury might be used to confirm suspicions that diamond money has been appropriated by 
very few powerful government officials and their foreign partners who hold stakes in the 
diamond mining companies.  
 
Diamond mining in Chiadzwa provides a lens into how the state adopted shifting and ad hoc 
policies to deal with the mining companies, artisanal diamond miners as well as the 
predominantly peasant villagers residing in Chiadzwa. Mining in Chiadzwa started as a ‘free 
for all’5 affair, which saw many people from all over the country flooding the area to seek the 
elusive Eldorado. What emerged was an informal exploitation of the mineral resource which 
was at first supported by the ruling ZANU PF party and government officials for political, 
rather than economic, reasons.6 When the diamonds were discovered, the country was in the 
midst of economic crisis characterised by a soaring inflation rate, deprecation of the country’s 
currency and massive food shortages. Many people who were struggling to put food on the 
table in this high inflationary environment descended on Chiadzwa, trying to escape the 
dangerous levels of poverty the majority of ordinary Zimbabweans experienced during this 
period.7 ZANU PF and government officials encouraged the informal mining activities as a 
way of trying to win popular support in the forthcoming harmonised election that was 
                                                            
4 ‘No more cash from Chiadzwa’, Daily News, 6 March 2015. 
5 T. Nyamunda and P. Mukwambo, ‘The state and the bloody diamond rush in Chiadzwa: Unpacking the 
contesting interests in the development of illicit mining and trading, c.2006 to 2009’, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 38, 1 (2012), 145-166. 
6 T. Nyamunda et al, ‘Negotiating the hills and voluntary confinement: Magweja and socio-economic and political 
negotiation for space in the diamond mining landscape of Chiadzwa in Zimbabwe, 2006 to 2009’, New Contree, 
63 (2012), 111-138. 
7 For more on Zimbabwe’s economic crisis, see P. Bond and M. Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge: Exhausted 
nationalism, neoliberalism and the Search for social justice (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2002); 
B. Raftopoulos, ‘The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008’, in B. Raftopoulos and A. S. Mlambo (eds), Becoming 
Zimbabwe (Harare, Weaver Press, 2009); J. L. Jones, ‘Nothing is straight in Zimbabwe: The Rise of the Kukiya 
– kiya economy, 2000 to 2008’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 36, 2 (2010), 285-299. 
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scheduled for 2008.8 These influential party and government officials also had their agents, so 
they stood to benefit more from a continuation of the informal diamond mining activities. 
Circumstances changed after ZANU PF was defeated in the March 2008 election by the 
opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. The government resorted to the 
use of brute force to drive away the informal miners who, by this time were being referred to 
as ‘illegal diamond miners’ (Magweja). The military was deployed in the district to drive away 
the suddenly illegal miners. There are reports of several deaths and other brutal punishments 
meted on those who defied the order to leave Chiadzwa.9 With a measure of irony, the security 
personnel deployed in the area then ended up engaging in both the illicit mining and trading of 
diamonds. 
 
Meanwhile, this development of a survivalist form of livelihood was not confined to diamond 
mining in Chiadzwa. C. Mabhena (2012) discusses the expansion of small scale and artisanal 
gold mining activities as an alternative source of livelihood in the wake of declining 
agricultural yields in southern Matebeleland.10 Mawowa’s study on artisanal gold mining in 
central Zimbabwe challenges earlier notions which viewed artisanal gold mining as a survival 
strategy during the crisis period. He argued that “Artisanal small scale mining should be 
conceptualised as part of the development, sustenance and reproduction of a patronage system 
controlled by those with state and/or party positions.”11 Artisanal gold and diamond mining 
shared more similarities as the two “represent a similar anatomy of criminalisation, patronage 
and accumulation.”12 The state’s response to the expansion of artisanal mining activities was 
dictated by the political environment prevailing in the country at a given time. The state 
succeeded in eliminating the survival economy in Marange but the same still exists in gold 
mining. 
 
                                                            
8 In Zimbabwe’s electoral system, a harmonised election is a scenario where the presidential and parliamentary 
elections are conducted concurrently. 
9 For a detailed discussion on the government’s use of force to stop illegal diamond mining in Chiadzwa, see M. 
Hove et al, ‘Violent state operations at Chiadzwa (Zimbabwe) diamond fields, 2006-2009’, Journal of Aggression, 
Conflict and Peace Research, 6, 1 (2014), 56-75. 
10 C. Mabhena, ‘Mining with a vuvuzela: Reconfiguring artisanal mining in southern Zimbabwe and its 
implications on rural livelihoods’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 30, 2 (2012), 219-233. 
11 Mawowa, The political economy of artisanal and small scale gold mining’, 921. See also J. Alexander and J. 
McGregor, ‘Introduction: Politics, patronage and violence in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
34, 9 (2013), 749-763; D. Towriss, ‘Buying loyalty: Zimbabwe’s Marange diamonds’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 39, 1 (2013), 99–107 and D. Moore, ‘Progress, power and violent accumulation in Zimbabwe’, 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 30, 1 (2012), 1–9. 
12 S. Mawowa, ‘The political economy of artisanal and small scale gold mining’, 23. 
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As this thesis will show, mining had contributed to the country’s economy since the colonial 
era and continued to be a crucial sector after independence. Together with agriculture, the two 
sectors were the driving force behind the country’s economy. The situation, however, changed 
towards the turn of the century when the government of Zimbabwe embarked on the FTLRP 
to settle landless Zimbabweans on land previously owned by white commercial farmers. The 
idea, as many of the war veterans argue was to complete the objectives of the war of liberation 
by transferring land to black Zimbabweans from the former colonisers. This discourse was part 
of the anti-west rhetoric employed by the ruling ZANU PF party after the founding of the MDC, 
which posed a formidable challenge to the ruling party. The FTLRP13 thus marked the genesis 
of the indigenisation programme meant to empower Zimbabweans who have been marginalised 
from the main economic arena. The land reform exercise, however, resulted in further 
deterioration of the country’s economy, characterised in the post 2000 era by hyper-inflation 
and massive food shortages. This indigenisation drive was further entrenched by the enactment 
of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act in 2007, which brought manufacturing 
and mining into the fold. The government did not draw lessons from the FTLRP which had 
caused more harm to the country’s economy. The Chamber of Mines estimated that the country 
lost 54 percent of its production potential between 2000 and 2010 after the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) fell from US$8.7 billion in 1996/97 to US$4 billion in 2010.14 The 
Finance Minister stated that in 2010 “the agricultural sector recorded a sustained cumulative 
decline of 85 percent between 2002 and 2009.”15 In light of this, the indigenisation of other 
sectors of the country’s economy was even criticised by the former Central Bank Governor, G. 
                                                            
13 For more on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, see T. K. Chitiyo, ‘Land violence and compensation: 
Reconceptualising Zimbabwe’s war veterans’ debate’, Fast Track Two, 9, 1 (2000), 
http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/9_1/zimbabwe.html; S. Moyo, ‘The political economy of land acquisition 
and redistribution in Zimbabwe, 1990-1999’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 26, 1 (2000), 5-28; D. Moore, 
‘Is the land the economy and the economy the land? Primitive accumulation in Zimbabwe’, Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, 19, 2 (2001), 253-266; J. McGregor, ‘The politics of disruption: War veterans and 
the state in Zimbabwe’, African Affairs, 101 (2002), 9-37; J. Chaumba, ‘New politics, new Livelihoods: Agrarian 
change in Zimbabwe’, Review of African Political Economy, 30, 98 (2003), 585-608; W. H. Shaw, ‘They stole 
our land’: debating the expropriation of white farms in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 41, 1 
(2003), 75-89; E. Chitando, ‘‘In the beginning was the land’: The appropriation of religious themes in political 
discourses in Zimbabwe’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 75, 2 (2005), 220-239; J. 
Muzondidya, ‘Jambanja: Ideological ambiguities in the politics of land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 33, 2 (2007), 325-341; N. Sibanda, ‘Where Zimbabwe got it wrong – lessons 
for South Africa: A comparative analysis of the politics of land reform in Zimbabwe and South Africa,’ MA 
(International Studies), Stellenbosch University, 2010; W. Z. Sadomba, War veterans in Zimbabwe’s land 
occupations: Complexities of a liberation movement in an African post-colonial settler society, (London: James 
Currey, 2011).   
14 Chamber of Mines Annual Report, 2010. 
15 Government of Zimbabwe, National Budget Statement, December 2010. 
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Gono who, all along had been a staunch supporter of government policies. Overall as argued 
by B. Magure:  
whilst there is a felt need for Zimbabwe to redress colonially induced injustices and 
racial imbalances in the ownership of the means of production, a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach to indigenisation of the economy is fundamentally flawed as it deters 
investors and may further damage the country’s already extensively fragile economy.16 
 
The indigenisation debate in relation to the mining industry was resuscitated in 2010 and since 
then there have been numerous clashes between huge mining concerns such as Murowa 
Diamond, Pan American Mining, Zimplats, Blanket Mine, Mimosa Holdings and Duration 
Gold Mine.17 The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Ministry has been battling to 
force these companies, which are foreign owned, to come up with plans to transfer 51 percent 
share ownership to indigenous Zimbabweans. This move has greatly affected the country’s 
reputation amongst potential investors and resulted in uncertainty for the affected companies. 
Agriculture and mining have thus been significantly affected by the drive to foster 
indigenisation of the country’s economy. Although the indigenisation drive is good for the 
country’s economy, the manner in which it has been conducted by the ZANU PF government 
triggered contestations over property rights as the white commercial farmers and miners whose 
property was taken away could not resist. The current government thus arrogated to itself power 
through constitutional amendments in the same manner as the colonial regimes had done.  
 
Scope of the study 
This thesis explores the long and entangled relationship between miners, farmers and the state. 
As will become clear, the unfolding of current dynamics in Zimbabwe is a result of what 
transpired from the colonial period. The thesis does not start from any teleological assumptions 
about a static, synchronic state of relations; instead it demonstrates a diachronic, shifting set of 
relationships, showing that those groups were heterogeneous, changeable and diverse. It thus 
engages the protean nature of colonial state policies, exploring how they influenced the 
interaction of settler farmers and miners from 1895 to 1961, and how the sectors reacted. Using 
a chronological survey of miner-farmer relations in Southern Rhodesia, the study contributes 
to the understanding of colonial economies that were mainly predicated on mining and 
agriculture. It is therefore intended as a detailed and nuanced study of the interaction of farmers, 
                                                            
16 B. Magure, ‘Foreign investment, black economic empowerment and militarised patronage politics in 
Zimbabwe’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 30, 1 (2012), 67-87. 
17 http://www.zimplats.com/history-of-pgm-mining 
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miners and the state, highlighting the shifting and often fractured nature of colonial policies 
towards the two industries and their reaction and agency in resisting or complying. The study 
also explores the spin-off effects of this relationship of the triad on African labour supplies 
during the period under study. Both farmers and miners required adequate supplies of African 
labour which was not usually readily available. The state on the other hand took keen interest 
in the labour issue to promote uninterrupted growth of the colonial economy.  
 
The thesis will explore the changes which characterised succeeding colonial governments, 
highlighting reasons that influenced the adoption of specific policies regulating agriculture and 
mining. The country’s first administrative system, led by the British South Africa Company 
(BSAC) laid the foundation of a policy framework which dictated miner-farmer relations for 
six decades from the occupation date. Such relationships were always shifting and mainly 
characterised by friction. As shall be demonstrated in Chapter Three, state-farmer-miner 
relations impacted on the country’s politics culminating in the birth of Responsible 
Government in 1923. Through an analysis of the nexus of representation (in the Legislative 
Council), administration and taxation in Southern Rhodesia, the thesis intends to demonstrate 
the centrality of taxation in sparking settler agitation against Company rule. This shall be 
elaborated in Chapter Four by an analysis of how the levying of a special tax on gold miners 
impacted on the sector’s performance as well as its relationship to farmers and the state. 
 
The study demonstrates that miner-farmer relations were uneasy and usually confrontational 
especially in the first three decades of colonial rule. During this period the Company 
administration was preoccupied with making profits for its shareholders and made no attempts 
to end the dispute. It was the farmers who suffered most as a result of the pro-mining legislation 
and policies that were promoted by the BSAC. These, as stated earlier, were the major cause 
of the farmer-miner disputes. As a result of this state of affairs during the period of Company 
administration, farmers organised themselves in an attempt to challenge miners and the state.18 
By 1918, the sector was highly organised and the farmers’ representative body, Rhodesia 
Agricultural Union (RAU), had amassed political power. This success can be demonstrated by 
the successful lobbying by RAU for Responsible Government. In the post-1923 period this 
factor worked to the advantage of farmers. They constituted a significant political constituency 
                                                            
18 See M. E. Lee, ‘Politics and pressure groups in Southern Rhodesia, 1898 to 1923’, PhD Thesis, University of 
London, 1974. 
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which could not be ignored by the settler government. As a result, government extended 
various subsidies at a time of great economic stress instanced by the international economic 
recession in the 1930s. Despite this enhanced political clout, the thesis demonstrates that the 
farming constituency was not homogeneous but was fissured mainly through ethnic, cultural 
as well as regional differences. Meanwhile, the mining sector, especially gold mining, 
registered success during the same period and it contributed significantly towards the country’s 
revenue, making up for the losses made by farmers.  The government proceeded to levy the 
country’s gold producers a Gold Premium Tax (GPT) from 1931 to 1937 and then during World 
War II. Chapter 4 will illustrate how this further complicated state-miner-farmer relations 
during the period and ultimately led to a significant decline in gold production by 1945. 
  
The thesis will also explore how, after 1941, the colonial state played the role of regulator 
regarding property rights issues between farmers and miners. This marked a major shift in 
government policy from one based on limited intervention to one characterised by direct 
involvement in the settlement of farmer-miner disputes. This was rooted in the formal 
conservation policy adopted after the promulgation of the 1941 Natural Resources Act, which 
made provisions for a Forest Act (1949). The latter created useful agents through which the 
government played the role of arbiter between farmers and miners who clashed over the 
utilisation of natural resources. The thesis explores how different laws and state policies 
provided a platform of engagement between settlers and the colonial state. The study 
commences in 1895. This was the date when the Mines and Minerals Act was enacted by the 
Company administration. It ends in 1961 mainly because the government passed an amendment 
to the country’s mining law which was a product of discussion and compromise by farmers and 
miners. It therefore lessened the incidence of conflicts between the two groups. Previous 
amendments to the Mines and Minerals Act did not reflect the desires of the two sides but were 
crafted by the government. This time frame is long enough to explore big shifts in government 
policies towards the miners and farmers and it also makes it easier to delineate any changes in 
the manner the two groups interacted. 
 
Literature Review 
This thesis focuses on intra-settler relations in Southern Rhodesia. It will engage with different 
groups of historiographical approaches that are related to the subject matter. This aspect has 
largely been neglected in many historical studies on politics, land, agriculture and mining in 
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Africa and Southern Rhodesia. However some scholars19 have emphasised the argument that 
settler communities were characterised by conflicts and that these were crucial in the making 
of colonial societies.  
 
Complexity has long been flattened historiographically. C. Leys’ (1959) book tremendously 
influenced the subject of intra-settler relations in Southern Rhodesia.20 Leys’ study discussed 
the foundations of the country’s politics, structure of the government, interest and pressure 
groups, political parties and the Rhodesia Labour Party. His argument on politics in Rhodesia 
was predicated on the notion of a homogeneous settler society. He noted that “In the absence 
of traditional and ethnic barriers, and in the economic context which has been described, a 
white community has been built up which is remarkable for its political solidarity.”21 For him 
settlers lived and acted in harmony but they feared African competition. This view by Leys 
was subjected to criticism by scholars who were bent on disproving this claim. For example, 
D. J. Murray22 demonstrated in his 1970 piece that different interest groups in Southern 
Rhodesia competed for government support in the creation of best conditions for the conduct 
of business.  These opposing views by Leys and Murray laid the basis and influenced future 
historiography on Southern Rhodesia’s intra-settler history.  
 
Shortly after the publication of Murray’s book, Lee23 produced a PhD Thesis (1974) which also 
challenged Leys’ argument. Lee’s study focused on the development of settler politics during 
the period of the BSAC administration. Just like Murray, Lee disaggregated Southern 
Rhodesia’s settler community into various interest groups which constantly lobbied the 
administration to effect various changes in the administrative system. She highlighted how the 
RAU was always confronting the administration demanding reforms. Lee’s study however 
ends in 1923 and therefore failed to capture changes that occurred over time. This thesis 
contributes to this historical conversation by making a detailed study of state-miner-farmer 
relations. It provides a broader analysis which details the farmer-miner contestations 
highlighting the state’s role in sparking this dispute. It provides a fresh analysis of the pre-1923 
period by analysing the desire by elected members of the Legislative Council to have 
                                                            
19 F. Cooper and A. L. Stoler, ‘Between metropole and colony: Rethinking a research agenda’ in F. Cooper and 
A. L. Stoler (eds), Tensions of empire: Colonial cultures in a bourgeois world, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997). 
20 C. Leys, European politics in Southern Rhodesia, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959). 
21 Leys, European politics. 
22 D. J. Murray, The governmental system in Southern Rhodesia, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970). 
23 Lee, ‘Politics and pressure groups.’ 
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administrative authority handed over to the tax paying settlers. Chapter Three makes extensive 
use of Legislative Council debates on important matters such as the BSAC’s claim to land 
ownership and the dispute over the use of collected revenue, either for administrative or for 
commercial purposes. As will become clear in the thesis, these debates revealed the settler 
representatives’ desire for self-rule.  
 
R. Hodder-Williams24 (1983) had all along been the only historian to attempt a sector-specific 
intra-settler history of Southern Rhodesia. His study on the interaction of settler farmers and 
the government noted differences and points of conflict between the state and settler farmers. 
A new generation of a triumvirate of historians in this historiographical clade has analysed the 
role of white farmers in Zimbabwe’s history (colonial and post-colonial). Influenced by 
Murray’s study, J. A. McKenzie’s (1989) doctoral thesis examined commercial farmers’ 
lobbying constituted in the two major representative organisations, the Rhodesia National 
Farmers Union (RNFU) and the Rhodesia Tobacco Association (RTA).25 He laid the 
foundation for his study by giving a historical account of settler commercial agriculture in 
Rhodesia and how farmer representatives merged to form the RNFU. His study, which 
commences in 1963, discussed issues which include the farm labour supply situation, the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and how it affected settler agricultural 
production in view of the sanctions that followed it.26 Agricultural leaders and the government 
formed a symbiotic relationship in the face of economic sanctions, McKenzie noted that: 
The political preferences of agricultural leaders were clearly significant in their dealings 
with the government particularly in the early years of sanctions, most RNFU and RTA 
presidents saw maximum advantage in cooperating with a cabinet which they regarded 
as being basically sympathetic to farmers.27  
 
Together, these are the only two historical overviews of white farmers in Southern Rhodesia 
from 1890 to 1980. These two did not explore the interaction of farmers and miners which is 
only mentioned in passing. However, as will be demonstrated by this thesis, miner-farmer 
interactions provide a useful lens to examine the country’s political developments. Until 1945, 
agriculture and mining were the country’s major economic activates and therefore the colonial 
state kept its eyes fixed on the two sectors. A political analysis of one sector during this period 
                                                            
24 R. Hodder-Williams, White farmers in Rhodesia, 1890 to 1965: A history of the Marndellas district, (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1983). 
25 J. A. McKenzie, ‘Commercial farmers in the governmental system of colonial Zimbabwe, 1963 -1980’, PhD 
Thesis, University of Zimbabwe, 1989. 
26 McKenzie, ’Commercial farmers’, 50. 
27 McKenzie, ‘Commercial farmers,’ 102. 
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is automatically deficient of more details related to the missing sector. This thesis will thus 
make up for such deficiencies through an analysis of state-miner-farmer relations. 
 
A. Selby’s28 (2006) study is on commercial farmers and the state in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. 
He offered “an analysis of how they interacted with the state and an assessment of how they 
competed for access to and control of land and other resources.”29 He provided a useful 
disaggregation of the settler farmers which contradicts earlier assertions by Leys and 
illuminates the heterogeneity of the settler farming community.30 Selby’s study is rich in 
primary source material since he was allowed unlimited access to Commercial Farmers Union 
Archives (CFU). R. Pilossof’s31 (2012) ground-breaking study on personal experiences of 
white farmers in Zimbabwe challenged the three earlier studies and provides a new analytical 
framework. Pilossof criticised Hodder-Williams’ study as a “micro-narrative masquerading as 
a national study.”32 Hodder-Williams failed to live up to the promise that he made in the title 
of his monograph. Although commending the richness of Selby’s study, Pilossof, however, 
argued that “Unfortunately his analysis and use of that material is not as rigorous as his source 
extraction.”33 Consequently, Pilossof offered a new analysis to the subject which captured 
farmers’ voices through different forms of their life-writings.  
 
Both Pilossof and Selby have called for a more nuanced understanding of the white commercial 
farming sector.34 As Pilossof noted: “it must be acknowledged that a singular and cohesive 
white rural identity (or voice) does not exist.”35 Selby has argued that the:  
white farmers, as a community, as an interest group, and as an economic sector, were 
always divided by their backgrounds, their geographical regions, their land uses and 
crop types. They were also divided by evolving planes of difference, such as affluence, 
political ideologies and farm structures.36  
 
So any formulaic one-dimensional representation cannot accurately reflect these diverse and 
changing communities. The groups elude neat and homogenous identities, as this thesis 
                                                            
28 A. Selby, ‘Commercial farmers and the state: internal group politics and land reform in Zimbabwe’, PhD Thesis, 
University of Oxford, 2006, 7. 
29 Selby, ‘Commercial farmers and the state’, 7. 
30 Selby, ‘Commercial farmers and the state.’ 
31 R. Pilossof, The unbearable whiteness of being: Farmers voices from Zimbabwe, (Cape Town: University of 
Cape Town Press, 2012). See also R. Pilossof, ‘The unbearable whiteness of being: White farming voices in 
Zimbabwe and their narration of the recent past, c.1970-2004’, PhD Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2010. 
32 Pilossof, The unbearable whiteness of being, 13. 
33 Pilossof, The unbearable whiteness of being, 12. 
34 Pilossof, ‘The unbearable whiteness of being’; Selby, ‘Commercial Farmers and the State’, 10. 
35 Pilossof, The unbearable whiteness of being, 20. 
36 Selby, ‘Commercial farmers and the state’, 7. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 11 
 
demonstrates for an earlier period than those focused on by Pilossof and Selby. Tacit 
assumptions of the existence of homogenous groups function to make falsely concrete the 
nebulous and imaginary constructs of “the colonizer” and “the colonized” – turning them into 
the colonizer’s fantasy. This fantasy offers a synchronic and simplistic taxonomic structure 
with monolithic classifications, which impede more complex understandings of power (and the 
lack of it). As A. Stoler and F. Cooper asserted, to counter this tendency, historians of the 
colonial (and, indeed, post-colonial) period should investigate the internal complexity of both 
“sides” of such encounters.37 
 
Environmental historians have also made a contribution to the historiography of intra-settler 
relations in Southern Rhodesia. Studies by M. Musemwa38 (2009) and V. Kwashirai’39 (2006)  
on farmer-miner conflicts in Southern Rhodesia are the only studies to date that are directly 
focused on the subject. These two studies focus on the wastefulness of farmers and miners of 
forest resources, mainly trees to obtain fuel and mining timber and how this eventually 
triggered the development of environmentalism during the colonial period.40 Musemwa and 
Kwashirai have made significant strides in breaking new analytical ground. They succeed in 
deviating from what all along appeared to be the norm in the presentation of intra-settler 
history. Kwashirai focuses on the Mazoe District and illustrates how ignorance and 
carelessness in the use of natural resources by settlers engaged in mining and agriculture 
resulted in environmental degradation and posed a threat to any attempts at conservation by the 
state.41 Kwashirai’s study, while offering a new perspective, is limited in geographical and 
temporal scope since it looks at Mazoe and ends in 1930. 
 
Musemwa’s paper illustrates how settler farmers and miners clashed over land, timber and 
water rights in the Gold belt area from 1908 to 1939. His key argument was that farmers’ 
discontent over the activities of miners was not in any way guided by a desire to minimise 
environmental degradation, but rather, it was guided by the need to wrest control of the means 
of production from the miners.42 Apart from referring to miner-farmer conferences convened 
                                                            
37 A. S. and F. Cooper, ‘Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda’).  
38 M. Musemwa, ‘Contestation over resources: The farmer-miner dispute in colonial Zimbabwe, 1903 to 1930’, 
Environment and History, 15, 1 (2009), 79-107. 
39 V. C. Kwashirai, ‘Dilemmas in conservationism in colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1930’, Conservation and Society, 
4, 4 (2006), 541-561. 
40 Musemwa, ‘Contestation over resources’; Kwashirai, ‘Dilemmas in conservationism.’ 
41 Kwashirai, ‘Dilemmas in conservation’. 
42 Musemwa, ‘Contestation over resources.’ 
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to discuss the dispute in 1925, 1926, 1933 and 1935 Musemwa does not show the shifting 
attitude among government officials who were proposing the amendment or repeal of the Gold 
Belt Title (GBT) after 1923. This was within the new political context of Responsible 
Government which is explored in Chapter Four. The conflict emanated not only from inherent 
intra-racial struggles between farmers and miners, but from the way the colonial administration 
sought to structure the colonial economy. Although useful in highlighting miner-farmer 
interaction in Southern Rhodesia, these two studies have not exhausted the seam of research 
since their chief focus was to link the miner-farmer tussle to the rise of environmentalism in 
the 1940s. This study provides a much broader discussion of state-farmer-miner relationship 
and how it impacted, not only on conservation issues, but also on the country’s political 
economy. Musemwa and Kwashirai’s coverage and assessment of farmer-miner disputes is 
therefore limited by the parameters within which they set to make the analysis 
(environmentalism). 
 
An earlier study by G. Arrighi (1966), influenced by Marxist ideology, discussed the different 
economic classes in Southern Rhodesia, thus emphasising on the plurality of the settler society 
in the country.43 He identified five different classes which included the white rural bourgeoisie 
(made up of small to medium mine owners and farmers), for him these constituted the 
foundation of the capitalist system. Other classes were international capital (mainly dominated 
by the BSAC), white wage workers, traders and the Africans.44 He thus discussed the 
development of the country’s political economy as guided by the different class struggles of 
the settler community. His Marxist oriented approach however concealed the inherent 
differences within particular classes. He lumped together miners and famers  and thus failed to 
capture the differences between the two groups (which this thesis explores). His study also 
failed to capture the ethnic and cultural differences amongst settler farmers. The country’s 
demography (white) constituted of settlers from various European countries, with the farming 
sector being made up of mainly British and Afrikaner settlers who were divided by ethnic and 
cultural differences.45 Arguing in sync with Arrighi was P. Mosley (1983) on the settler 
                                                            
43 G. Arrighi, ‘The political economy of Rhodesia’, New Left Review, 39 (1966), 36-65. 
44 Arrighi, ‘The political economy’, 36. 
45 See K. Larsen, “‘You Rhodesians are more British than the British’: The development of a white national 
identity and immigration policies and restrictions in Southern Rhodesia’, PhD Thesis, University of Western 
Australia, 2013; A. S. Mlambo, White immigration into Rhodesia: From occupation to federation, (Harare: 
University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2002); A. S. Mlambo, Building a white man’s country: Aspects of white 
immigration into Rhodesia up to World War II’, Zambezia, 15, 2 (1998), 123-146; R. Bickers (ed), Settlers and 
expatriates, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); R. Hodder-Williams, ‘Afrikaners in Rhodesia: A partial 
portrait’, African Social Research, 18 (1974), 611-644; J. Bonello, ‘The development of settler identity in 
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economies of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia.46 Although challenging Arrighi’s argument on 
the existence of divisions between international capital and local capital, he also identified fault 
lines between economic sectors in the two countries.47 Although his arguments were similar to 
what was earlier presented by Murray on the progressive role of the state in the economy, 
Mosley argued that this role of the settler state was significantly diminished after World War 
II (WWII). This thesis challenges this argument by Mosley and argues that the state’s role in 
the country’s economy (particularly relating to farmers and miners) was neither fixed nor did 
it diminish after WWII, it simply transformed to suit prevailing conditions at a given time. 
Chapter Five will elaborate on this aspect on how the state’s position had changed, first as a 
result of the adoption of a formal conservation policy and also because of structural changes in 
the country’s economy caused by the war. 
 
The thesis also engages with a huge body of literature on the country’s history which chronicled 
the country’s mining and agricultural history differently. This literature however makes 
tangential reference to miner-farmer relations. This thesis therefore makes a significant 
addition by providing a broader analysis of the interaction of the state, farmers and miners. 
Early historiography on Southern Rhodesia, written by what might be crudely termed “colonial 
apologists” before 1960 was heavily influenced by a Eurocentric notion with a whiggish, 
triumphalist view on agriculture, mining and political development. This colonial 
historiography criticised African economic and political systems for lack of sophistication and 
credited settlers for being progressive and scientifically-minded. Settlers were hailed for being 
brave frontier types who opened up Africa to civilisation. The best known representative of 
this Eurocentric strand of liberal historiography was L. H. Gann.48 His earlier accounts of 
Rhodesia’s history attempted to defend and justify European actions of setting up European 
rule in Africa for the benefit of both, European settlers and Africans. Gann’s 1963 defence of 
the 1930 Land Apportionment Act is a salient example of supposed settler generosity. He 
                                                            
Southern Rhodesia 1890-1914’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 43, 2 (2010), 341-361; 
B. S. Schutz, ‘European population patterns, cultural persistence and population change in Rhodesia’, Canadian 
Journal of African Studies, 7, 1 (1973), 3-25; G. Hendrich, ‘A history of Afrikaners in Rhodesia 1890-1980’, PhD 
Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2010. 
46 P. Mosley The settler economies: Studies in the economic history of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900 to 
1963, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
47 Mosley, Settler economies, 6. 
48 L. H. Gann, A history of Southern Rhodesia: Early days to 1935, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965). SeeI. 
Phimister, ‘Economic and social historiography since 1970’, African Affairs, 28, 311 (1979). 
, 266. Also see L. H. Gann and M. Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia: the Man and his Country, (London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1964).   
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described the Act as “an essay in trusteeship”: arguing that it was mainly intended to protect 
African land rights against unfair competition posed by settlers who could buy more land.49  In 
addition to this, memoirs and literary accounts were produced by former colonial officials who 
praised the European economic and political system, supported by agriculture and mining, as 
a testimony of ingenuity of politicians like Charles Coghlan and Godfrey Huggins.50 This 
literature made passing reference to miner-farmer relations, the subject is only discussed in 
reference to the pioneers who first went to Southern Rhodesia as being brave and adventurers 
who managed to make the country habitable. 
 
Ian Phimister described the year 1970 as an historiographical watershed.51 In that year G. 
Arrighi published his Marxist analysis of the proletarianization of the African peasantry in 
Southern Rhodesia.52 This article tremendously influenced the writing of the country’s history 
as will be demonstrated in this section. His study was premised on how the capitalist system 
restricted peasant production and ultimately refuted the notion that capitalism had an ultimately 
beneficial influence.53 Arrighi’s argument was primarily a challenge to the assumptions made 
by liberal scholarship as espoused by W. Barber (1961).54 Barber drew from A. Lewis’ model 
of development theory whereby labour was transferred from a low productivity sector to a high 
productivity economy.55 This analytical framework was also adopted by Mosley in his study 
on the settler colonies of Southern Rhodesia and Kenya.56 These liberal arguments were 
attacked by Arrighi who argued that Barber and Lewis conceived “of the underdevelopment of 
the African peoples as an original state which the development of a capitalist sector gradually 
eliminates.”57 Arrighi argued that the state resorted to the use of coercion in securing African 
labour mainly because market forces were not producing the desired effect.  
                                                            
49 L. H. Gann, ‘The Land Apportionment Act in Southern Rhodesia: An Essay in trusteeship, National Archives 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland’, Occasional paper, (Government Printer, 1963), 71-91   
50 E. Tawse Jollie, The real Rhodesia, (Bulawayo: Books of Rhodesia, 1971); E. Tawse Jollie, ‘Southern Rhodesia: 
A white man’s country in the tropics’, Geographical Review, 17, 1 (1927), 89-106; H. M. Hole, Old Rhodesian 
Days, (London: Macmillan, 1928); J. P. R. Wallis, One man’s hand: The story of Sir Charles Coglan, (Bulawayo: 
Books of Rhodesia, 1972). Tawse Jollie was a prominent politician during the early years of colonial rule: she 
was the first female member of Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, and a leading figure in the campaign 
for Self-Rule.   
51 I. Phimister, ‘Economic and social historiography since 1970’. 
52 G. Arrighi, ‘Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianization of the African peasantry 
in Rhodesia’, Journal of Development Studies, 6, 3 (1970), 197-234. 
53 Arrighi, ‘Labour supplies’, 201. 
54 W. Barber, The economy of British Central Africa (London: Athlone Press 1961). 
55 See W. A. Lewis, Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour (Manchester: Manchester School, 
1954).   
56 Mosley, The settler economies. 
57 Arrighi, ‘Labour supplies’, 199. 
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Arrighi’s seminal paper laid the foundation for more scholarly work on Southern Rhodesia’s 
political economy from the mid-1970s. He provided an analytical framework that gave birth to 
the discourse on political economy as studies by D. Clarke, I. Phimister and C. Van Onselen 
produced works on African labour, peasant production and underdevelopment, and mine 
worker consciousness which offered significant revisions to the liberal school of thought. 
Phimister’s (1988) study also presented a formidable challenge to colonialist historiography.58 
He disaggregated the capitalist state into two different entities and gave agency to the 
dominated classes and groups.59 He therefore produced a detailed study of the state, capital, 
labour and the peasantry inspired by class struggle analysis. C. Van Onselen’s (1976) Chibaro 
is another comprehensive piece of work on Rhodesia’s mining history. 60 The study which ends 
in 1933 provides a firm basis for any study on the mining history of the country. It makes useful 
contributions on the development of early worker consciousness and situates the country’s 
labour dynamics in the context of the sub-region. This historiographical school analysed inter-
racial relations in Southern Rhodesia’s history using a class based analysis. They therefore 
make passing reference to intra-settler struggles, especially farmer-miner relations, which are 
the subject matter for this thesis. Although raising important issues on the country’s 
development, they neglected an equally crucial aspect which significantly shaped colonial 
societies. As observed by F. Cooper “African history, particularly in Anglophone scholarship, 
took shape by differentiating itself from colonial history.”61 Writing about intra-settler conflicts 
in colonial Africa was considered tantamount to writing colonial history62 and to “reaffirm the 
old canard that real history meant the history of white people in Africa.”63 This thesis therefore 
sought to elaborate on how the interaction of farmers and miners shaped settler society in 
Southern Rhodesia. 
 
A counter-narrative to the earlier historiographical school was also provided by R. Palmer, 
whose 1977 monograph offered a revisionist interpretation and became a major source of 
reference for scholars writing on land and agriculture in Rhodesia.64 He provided a revised 
account of factors that ultimately led to the development of a successful white agricultural 
                                                            
58 I. R. Phimister, Economic and social history of Zimbabwe, 1890 to 1948: Capital accumulation and class 
struggle, (London: Longman, 1988) 
59 Phimister, Economic and social history of Zimbabwe. 
60 Van Onselen, Chibaro. 
61 Cooper, Colonialism in question, 43. 
62 A. Mseba, “Law, expertise and settler conflicts over land in colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1923’, Environment and 
Planning A, 48, 4, (2015), 665-680. 
63 Cooper, Colonialism in question, 34. 
64 R. Palmer, Land and racial domination in Rhodesia, (London: Heinemann, 1977). 
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sector. For Palmer, the apparently triumphal rise of European agriculture was mainly a result 
of discrimination and appropriation. Writing on South Africa, C. Bundy (1979) explored how 
the peasantry in South Africa responded to the new market conditions availed by capitalist 
developments and how this rise was curtailed by the development of a systematic and deliberate 
agricultural policy which promoted the growth of settler agriculture.65 Palmer’s argument 
emphasised the significance of the Land Apportionment Act (1930) in ensuring the promotion 
of white settler needs at the expense of Africans, to whom the piece of legislation was a major 
disability inhibiting any form of agricultural progress. This offered a direct challenge to earlier 
assertions by Gann that Europeans and Africans alike had benefited from the colonial land 
tenure policy. Many other scholars subsequently echoed similar sentiments to Palmer and 
provided an alternative explanation to what had been presented by colonial apologists. For 
example, V. E. M. Machingaidze’s (1980) study deals with the role of the state in the 
development of white capitalist agriculture.66 M. Rukuni67 also chronicled the development of 
settler capitalist agriculture. The two elaborated on how the colonial state ensured the 
promotion of white agriculture and the suppression of African production along with the 
Palmer model. Machingaidze’s study discussed how white farmers benefited from state 
support, use of ultra-cheap African labour and how they managed to extract surplus from the 
African producers through primitive accumulation.  
 
Most historical works on mining deal with the subject of mining separately and argue that, 
together with agriculture, mining formed the basis of the colonial economy. Phimister has 
written extensively on mining, his (1975) PhD thesis on the history of mining in Rhodesia was 
indeed ground breaking.68 Although it ends in 1953, the thesis remains a major point of 
reference for anyone undertaking any study of Zimbabwe’s economic history. The thesis looks 
at mining as it formed the basis for the colonisation of the Zimbabwean plateau and how the 
industry impacted on the political development of the country.69 This thesis augments and 
                                                            
65 See C. Bundy, The rise and fall of the South African peasantry, (California: University of California Press, 
1979). Also see S. Trapido, ‘South Africa in a contemporary study of industrialisation’, Journal of Development 
Studies, 7, 3 (1971), 309-320. 
66 V. E. M. Machingaidze, ‘The development of settler capitalist agriculture with particular reference to the role 
of the state, 1908 to 1939’, PhD Thesis, university of London 1980. Also see F. Keyter, ‘Maize Control Act in 
Southern Rhodesia 1931 to 1940: African contribution to white survival’, Rhodesia History, 8 (1977), 1-30; H. 
V. Moyana, The Political economy of land in Zimbabwe, (London, Mambo Press, 1984). 
67 M. Rukuni, ‘The evolution of agricultural policy: 1890 to 1990’, in M. Rukuni, P. Tawonezvi, C. K. Eicher, M. 
Munyuku-Hungwe and P. Matondi (eds), Zimbabwe’s agricultural revolution revisited, (Harare, University of 
Zimbabwe Publications, 2006). 
68 I. R. Phimister, ‘History of mining in Southern Rhodesia to 1953’, PhD Thesis, University of Rhodesia, 1975. 
69 Phimister, ‘History of mining in Southern Rhodesia to 1953’. 
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extends Phimister’s explanation of the decline of gold production in 1945, when agriculture 
produced more revenue than gold mining. It argues that this was a direct result of fiscal policies, 
on large gold mining companies, adopted by the settler government in its attempts to cushion 
settler farmers from the impact of the Great Depression in the 1930s Apart from the thesis 
Phimister has a collection of articles that deal with mining in Rhodesia. For example, he 
covered the mining history of Rhodesia in the early years of colonial occupation, when hopes 
were still high that the second Rand lay in Mashonaland.70 The paper provides a useful link 
between Rhodes’ Rhodesian and South African mining interests. More importantly, it shows 
how prospects of mining in Rhodesia rode on the back of South Africa’s mining success story. 
During the early colonial period farmer-miner contestations took centre stage, being fuelled by 
the company’s need to promote mining interests while neglecting farmer interests. This study 
will therefore illuminate how the Company administration presided over a disillusioned settler 
population. As discussed in Chapter Three, the country’s settlers made repeated requests for 
administrative authority 
 
The early years were characterised by more speculation than actual mining with the company 
officials managing to sustain high share values on the London stock market through 
exaggerated advertisements of the colony to London investors. Phimister discussed this illusory 
phase and how it came crushing down after the Jameson Raid and the Shona-Ndebele 
uprisings.71 He highlights the reconstruction era of Southern Rhodesia’s gold mining industry. 
He notes the various adjustments that were made by the Company administration as it sought 
to rejuvenate the mining industry and bring it to profitability, these included among others, the 
replacement of the fifty percent share clause by a thirty percent vendor scrip, the 
encouragement of small workers who were allowed to operate even without registering 
companies.72 Phimister also writes on mining labour issues and how they impacted on the 
political and economic affairs of the nation. His article on the Wankie Colliery discusses the 
various mine labour dynamics characteristic of Rhodesia’s mining economy. He starts by 
discussing how mining capital sought to make maximum use of cheap African labour, this was 
mainly because of the strict adherence to the capitalist concept of cost minimisation and profit 
                                                            
70 I. R. Phimister, ‘Rhodes, Rhodesia and the Rand,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 1, 1 (1974), 74-90. 
71 I. R. Phimister, ‘The reconstruction of the Southern Rhodesian mining industry, 1903-10’, The Economic 
History Review, 29, 3 (1976), 465-481. 
72 Phimister, ‘The reconstruction of the Southern Rhodesian mining industry, 1903-10.’ 
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maximisation.73 It was however,  not easy to get the adequate number of labourers to work in 
the mines chiefly because more Africans were now going to the more remunerative 
Mashonaland farms, hence they resorted to recruiting migrants and Wankie mainly preferred 
those from Zambia.74 These labour shortages coincided with a rise in the coal demand and a 
further deterioration of working conditions. Mine employees worked in unhealthy conditions 
with no protective clothing. Phimister proceeds to discuss labour dynamics for white workers 
and how they managed to carve a niche for themselves during the wartime labour shortages.75 
White workers at Wankie won concessions for themselves which included pay rises and a cut 
on working hours, it was also during this time that active trade unionism developed amongst 
white workers and it marked the genesis of strikes and labour activism. This thesis will deal 
with farmer-miner contestations over African labour in Chapter Six. The chapter does not make 
use of a class based analysis, but rather, it will examine the struggles amongst settlers over the 
distribution direction and supply of African labour. 
 
This thesis also engages with historical literature on conservation. The farmer-miner 
controversy was sparked by the Gold Belt restrictions on timber usage by farmers whose 
properties were located in mining areas. The two groups (farmers and miners) required timber 
for use as fuel either to run the mining mills or for curing tobacco. The adoption of a formal 
conservation policy in 1941 provided the context within which the settler government 
attempted to regulate timber cutting for mining purposes. This new system implanted by the 
enactment of the Forest Act in 1949 ultimately resulted in reduced tension between farmers 
and miners. Surprisingly, this subject has received limited scholarly attention. Musemwa’s 
(2015) study is the only one to date which is linked to the subject.76 It explores the development 
of environmentalism and then discusses how the Forest Act affected miners’ access to timber. 
It does not however deal with how the new system impacted on the miner-farmer relations. 
Chapter Five of this study considers the changing role of the state as it sought to arbitrate the 
farmer-miner differences. It therefore goes beyond Musemwa’s study by adopting a broader 
framework (not limited to conservation) but one which takes on board economic developments 
at that time, for instance the structural change in the country’s economy that was instanced by 
                                                            
73 I. R Phimister, ‘Coal, crisis and class struggle: Wankie Colliery’, 1918-1922,’ Journal of African History, 33 
(1992),65-86. 
74 Phimister, ‘Coal, crisis and class struggle’, 67. 
75 Phimister, ‘Coal, crisis and class struggle’, 69. 
76 M. Musemwa, ‘Sic utere tuo ut akienam non laedas: From wanton destruction of timber forests to 
environmentalism: The rise of colonial environmental and sustainability practices in colonial Zimbabwe, 1938-
1961’, Environment and History, 22, 4 (2016), 521-559. 
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WWII. Other scholars who write on the Forest Act demonstrate how it impacted on Africans 
who lived on areas that were designated as forest reserves.77 
 
There are a number of scholars who write on conservation issues on the sub-region and 
specifically Zimbabwe during the colonial period and beyond. This body of literature discusses 
conservation as it affected natural resources exploitation either by the white settlers or Africans. 
Interventions by the colonial state in the agricultural practice of both Africans and white settlers 
have sparked debate amongst scholars as they grappled to come up with a valid explanation 
behind the state’s intervention. W. Beinart discusses agricultural development schemes that 
were rolled out by the state in African areas during the colonial period. For him, the colonial 
officials were mainly concerned with soil conservation more than anything else.78 His major 
argument is that these development schemes were first intended to solve difficulties facing 
settler agriculture. He notes:  
One explanation that could be offered for the extension of conservationist concern to 
peasant farming is that colonial and especially settler states intervened in African 
agriculture in order to secure the basis for agrarian production. The response to stock 
disease provides an analogy. Scab in African owned sheep could threaten white famers’ 
flocks….79 
 
This argument was, however, challenged by Phimister who argued that the roots of 
conservation were shallower than what Beinart implied, for Phimister the major driving force 
was the settler goal to manipulate and exploit the Africans.80 This historiographical debate has 
influenced the writing of the country’s conservation history with many scholars supporting 
Phimister’s argument.81 Writing on Svosve communal lands and using spatial and temporal 
scales, J. A. Elliot presents a study on erosion and conservation highlighting the state’s moves 
                                                            
77 See S. Maravanyika, ‘Local responses to colonial evictions, conservation and commodity policies among 
Shangwe communities in Gokwe, Northwestern Zimbabwe 1963 to 1980’, African Nebula, 5 (2012), 1-20; E. 
Mapedza, ‘Forest policy in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe: Continuity and change’, Journal of Historical 
Geography, 33 (2007), 833-851. 
78 W. Beinart, ‘Soil erosion, conservationism and ideas about development: A Southern African exploration, 1900-
1960,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 11, 1 (1984), 54. 
79 W. Beinart, ‘Soil erosion, conservationism,’ 64. Also see J. McGregor, ‘Conservation, control and ecological 
change: The politics and ecology of colonial conservation in Shurugwi, Zimbabwe’, Environment and History, 1, 
3 (1995), 257-279; E. Kramer, ‘A clash of economies: Early centralisation efforts in colonial Zimbabwe, 1929-
1935’, Zambezia, 15, 1 (1998), 83-98; Mwatwara, ‘A history of state veterinary services.’; S. Maravanyika, ‘Soil 
conservation and the white agrarian environment in colonial Zimbabwe, c. 1908-1980,’ PhD Thesis, University 
of Pretoria, 2013. 
80 I. R. Phimister, ‘Discourse and the discipline context: Conservationism and ideas about development in 
Southern Rhodesia 1930-1950,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 12, 2 (1986), 263-275. 
81 See J. McGregor, ‘Conservation, control and ecological change: The politics and ecology of colonial 
conservation in Shurugwi, Zimbabwe,’ Environment and History, 1, 3 (1995), 257-279; S. Maravanyika 
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to improve agricultural production through development schemes, J. McGregor also writes on 
conservation and how the state attempted to improve agriculture. Sheuses the case study of 
Shurugwi.82 Such works provide an important context for this study, especially in the era of 
formal conservation (after the passage of the 1941 Natural Resources Act). They provide a 
window through which the policy of native development can be discussed since Africans were 
also important stakeholders. 
 
This study also draws concepts from comparative international studies that look at mining and 
agricultural activities as well as natural resources exploitation. Most of the existing scholarly 
works focus broadly on how imperialism resulted in the abuse of natural resources in settler 
societies. The settlers are depicted as pure capitalists who did not care about conservation but 
only utilised the resources for profit. This was mainly true for countries that were colonised by 
Chartered Companies. These wanted to maximise their profit levels and did not try to control 
reckless use of natural resources, in fact they encouraged the practices. T. Griffiths and L. 
Robin83 and Beinart and L. Hughes’s84 studies are very important in this regard, they look at 
the environmental history of the British Empire. By referring to different case studies they use 
a diverse approach which makes reference to more case studies. The problem of deforestation 
was also rampant elsewhere and drew the energies of various governments as they attempted 
to curtail it. R. Grove85, W. Williams86, W. Dean87, K. Brown88 and W. Beinart and P. Coates89 
all write on the ever-growing settler demands for wood to be used for mining purposes and the 
clearing of forests to create land for agriculture. K. Morse’s study on gold mining in the United 
States of America (USA) is also important since it acts as a useful example where mining 
activities had a negative impact on the environment, drawing the ire of farmers in the process.90 
                                                            
82 McGregor, ‘Conservation, control and ecological change.’ 
83 T. Griffiths and L. Robin (eds.), Ecology and empire: Environmental history of settler societies, (Edinburgh, 
Keele University Press, 2011). 
84 W. Beinart and L. Hughes, Environment and empire, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010).  
85 R. H. Grove, Green imperialism: Colonial expansion, tropical island edens and the origins of 
environmentalism, 1600-1860, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
86 W. Williams, ‘Ecology, imperialism and deforestation’, T. Griffiths and L. Robin (eds), Ecology and empire: 
Environmental history of settler societies, (Edinburgh, Keele University Press, 2011). 
87 W. Dean, ‘Forest conservation in South Eastern Brazil, 1900-1955’, Environmental Review, 1 (1985), 54-69, 
notes that, ‘the forest was attractive to European settlers because of the extreme though temporary richness of the 
litter and humus that remained when it was cleared.’ 
88 K. Brown, ‘Trees forests and communities: Some historiographical approaches to environmental history in 
Africa’, Area, 35, 4 (2003). She writes on the rising demand of wood for Kimberly mines. 
89 W. Beinart and P. Coates, Environment and history: The taming of nature in the USA and South Africa, (Oxon, 
Routlege, 1995). 
90 K. Morse, ‘The nature of gold: An environmental history of the Klondike gold rush,’ Environmental History, 
9, 2 (2004). 
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C. Montrie91 also highlights how various states in the USA passed laws that were intended to 
discourage surface coal mining since it had serious consequences for the land. There are other 
scholars who examine how resource conflicts in Africa affect politics and economics on the 
continent. B. Derman and A. Hellum discuss such conflicts arguing that the role of land and 
water in securing African livelihoods is unlikely to diminish.92 This study will make use of this 
kind of literature for comparative purposes and establish whether the Rhodesian settler 
government attempted to draw lessons from international trends as it sought to deal with 
farmer-miner conflicts in the country. 
 
Research questions and analytical framework 
The thesis sought to answer the following key questions: What was the attitude and policy of 
the state towards the farmer-miner relations throughout the period under study? What was the 
attitude of the state regarding the GBT? Were there any shifts by the state regarding farmer-
miner conflict? If there were, what influenced these shifts? This study is mainly concerned 
about the role of the state in the regulation of miner-farmer relations through the enactment of 
various pieces of legislation. It is therefore not confined to a single overarching theoretical 
orientation. It draws upon S. S. Eriksen’s ideas on state formation in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. 
Eriksen notes that “…state formation can be assessed empirically by analysing first the extent 
to which the state has been able to establish domestic sovereignty and second; whether it has 
the administrative capacity to enforce its rule.”93 The state must establish and sustain its 
position as the highest authority within its territorial boundaries with a capacity to make 
binding decisions for the entire society. As will be demonstrated in the thesis, the government 
in Sothern Rhodesia achieved this status after Responsible Government was granted in 1923. 
After this date, the settler government enjoyed enhanced autonomy since the Imperial 
government had significantly loosened its grip on the colony’s affairs. Eriksen posits that the 
state should possess administrative capacity, mainly economic resources to ensure effective 
implementation of its policies.94 As shall be delineated in the thesis (Chapter Three and Four), 
                                                            
91 C. Montrie, ‘Expedient environmentalism: Opposition to coal surface mining in Appalachia and the United 
mine workers of America, 1945-1975,’ Environmental History, 5, 1 (2000). 
92 B. Derman and A. Hellum, ‘Land, identity and violence in Zimbabwe,’ Conflicts over land and water in Africa, 
(East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 2007). 
93 S. S. Eriksen, ‘State formation and the politics of regime survival: Zimbabwe in theoretical persperctive’, 
Journal of Historical Sociology, 23, 2 (2010), 318. 
94 Eriksen, ‘State formation and the politics of regime survival’, 317. Scholars such as C. Tilly. ‘War making and 
state making as organised crime’ in P. Evans et al (eds), Bringing the state back in, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985) and M. Mann, The sources of social power: Volume II: The rise of classes and nation 
states, 1760 to 1940, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) discuss the rise of nation states in Europe. 
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the colonial state (starting with the Company administration and then the post-1923 settler 
government) continuously adjusted its revenue generation strategies as it aspired to create a 
stronger state (This has been discussed in depth by Mick Moore).95 For instance the tax 
imposed on gold miners (Gold Premium Tax) during the Great Depression period which was 
intended to sustain the colonial economy when the agricultural sector was under siege.  
 
The thesis also draws from Bruce Berman’s study of the colonial state in Kenya. Berman 
explored the nature of the colonial state in Kenya and challenged earlier Marxist and 
development theorists for their “limited consideration of the structural forms of the colonial 
state itself.”96 Rather, these groups of scholars treated “the political apparatus of colonialism 
as an externally determined instrument ensuring the conditions for the accumulation of surplus 
and its transfer to the metropole.”97 Central to the analysis of the state in this thesis is Berman’s 
depiction of the colonial state in Kenya as a ‘neutral and disinterested arbiter’ in its engagement 
with the varied settler interest groups in that country. He notes that “The frequent ensuing 
clashes between capital and the state authorities often quite unwittingly sustain the apparent 
autonomy and disinterested neutrality of the state.”98As delineated in Chapter Five, from 1941, 
the settler state in Southern Rhodesia played the role of arbiter regarding the use of land and 
timber resources by settler farmers and miners. This was instanced by the inauguration of a 
formal conservation policy which was intended to curb the excesses of capital and minimise 
environmental degradation. The new policy framework made the state to act as an adjudicator 
between settler farmers and miners. By 1961 it succeeded in developing a compromise 
amendment to the Mines and Minerals Act which significantly reduced farmer-miner conflicts. 
 
The analysis of the state and its interaction with settler farmers and miners also conforms to 
Max Weber’s model which is premised on the concept of ‘imperative co-ordination’, which he 
                                                            
They outline the relationship of state formation, warfare and the need to improve tax collection to finance the 
wars. All this relates to the geopolitical and and fiscal theories of state formation. Although the same cannot be 
said for Southern Rhodesia, the threat posed by indigenous Africans (because of their numerical superiority over 
settlers) provided an impetus for the creation of a strong and centralised state with a capacity to deal with any kind 
of threat. 
95 M. Moore, ‘Taxation and the political agenda, North and South’, Forum for Development Studies, 31, 1 (2004), 
pp 7-32. Also see D. A. Brautigam et al (eds), Taxation and state building in developing countries: Capacity and 
consent, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); M. Moore, ‘How does taxation affect the quality of 
government?’. Institute of the Development Studies Paper 280, University of Sussex, 2007. 
96 B. Berman, Control and crisis in colonial Kenya: The dialectic of domination, (London: James Currey, 1990), 
1. 
97 B. Berman, Control and crisis in colonial Kenya, 2. 
98 B. Berman, Control and crisis in colonial Kenya, 29. 
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defines as ‘the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) from a given 
source will be obeyed by a given group of persons.’99 This is what can be referred to as 
domination or authority, whereby the subjects will be obliged to respect the laws and 
proclamations made by the authority. This scenario is characteristic of most institutions such 
as churches, business establishments, clinics, schools and the nation state. For the nation state, 
Weber identifies and distinguishes three types of legitimate authority. He made his 
classification basing on the source of authority for each of the three. For him, authority can 
thus be based on rational, traditional and charismatic grounds.100 Weber’s theory also identifies 
various power and social relations and argues that “in everyday routine life, these relationships, 
like others, are governed by custom and in addition, material calculation of advantage.”101 
These relations are between those in authority and the subjects and their nature is not constant 
depending on the state of affairs prevailing at a given time. 
 
This study draws inspiration from, but is not limited to Weber’s tripartite classification of 
authority which explains the basis of legitimacy for a nation state. In this thesis the colonial 
state shall represent the legal authority (modern state) since it administered the colony deriving 
its authority from the Royal Charter and later on using a government drawn from elected 
members of the Legislative Council.102 The interaction of the state, settler farmers and miners 
in Rhodesia was characterised by many dynamics which included amongst others loyalty, 
discontent, and impunity. The state, firstly the Company administration and then the settler 
government had to deal with these two groups’ concerns and thus made efforts to ameliorate 
miner-farmer relations as it continuously sought a lasting solution to the problem for the good 
of the country’s economy. More importantly, the study agrees with Weber’s view that tensions 
will emerge as the subordinate groups seek to have certain components of the laws governing 
the state redressed. This Weberian understanding of the state exhibits striking similarities with 
Eriksen’s conception which states that the state is characterised by political struggles “about 
such matters as which policies that the state should pursue and which decisions it should 
                                                            
99 M. Weber, The theory of social and economic organisation, (London:William Hodge and Company, 1947). 
Weber distinguishes three ideal types of legitimate political leadership, i.e charismatic authority, traditional 
authority and legal authority. 
100 Weber, The theory of social and economic organisation 
101 Weber, The theory of social and economic organisation, 297. 
102 Murray, The governmental System of Southern Rhodesia. The sources consulted include published books, 
journal articles, theses and dissertations, conference papers 
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impose.”103 This thesis will explore the various state-miner-farmer relations, highlighting 
various points of conflict over different policies amongst the three.  
 
Methodology 
This thesis utilises primary sources mainly archival material and secondary literature. 
However, primary sources accessed at the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ) form the 
bedrock of the study. Due to the limited literature that deals with miner-farmer relations in 
Southern Rhodesia, the study made use of scholarly work that deals with intra-racial/intra-
settler relations. As demonstrated in the literature review most of these studies which deal with 
state-farmer relations are limited in scope since they only link the subject to environmentalism. 
The thesis was based on the use of documentary evidence, mainly archival documents. All 
primary sources related to settler mining and agriculture in Rhodesia used in the thesis were 
obtained from the NAZ. The study also made use of statistics to clarify some aspects of the 
survey. The material accessed at NAZ included institutional records from the various 
representative organisations for miners and farmers and these include the Rhodesia Chamber 
of Mines, Chamber of mines (Salisbury chapter), the Rhodesian Tributors and Small Workers’ 
Association and the Rhodesia Farmers Union. However, most of the documents for the 
Chamber of Mines are housed at the organisation’s library which is not open to the public.The 
same applied to the CFU, which keeps all documents for the Rhodesia National Farmers Union 
(RNFU). Access to their documents was prevented because of the dispute with the government 
that was sparked by the land reform programme. 
 
Documents that were accessed at the NAZ also include correspondence between relevant 
government departments (the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Mines). These 
provided useful information relating to views of government officials on various concerns 
raised by both farmers and miners on such matters as the GBTs. This also revealed government 
plans and attitudes over the farmer-miner controversy. Correspondence between the Ministries 
of Agriculture and Mining and farmers was useful in highlighting the grievances raised by 
farmers. These usually constituted requests for the repeal of the GBT and complaints over the 
adjudication process of disputes between farmers and miners. Replies to such correspondence 
by the respective Ministries significantly revealed the government’s position and willingness 
to have the problems solved. Some letters also originated from individual farmers. 
                                                            
103 Eriksen, ‘State formation and the politics of regime survival’, 317. 
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Correspondence by the Chamber of Mines to the Mines Ministry usually included complaints 
raised by miners against fellow miners over clashes on mining claims. Correspondence to 
Native Commissioners, Mining Commissioners and the Natural Resources Board (NRB) was 
also useful in shedding light on the subject. Evidence gathered for various Commissions of 
Inquiry as well as actual reports, helped in bringing out the voices of the actual farmers and 
miners on issues under investigation. The thesis also made use of minutes of meetings for the 
Mining Timber Permit Board (MTPB), NRB, RAU, Chamber of Mines, the BSAC and many 
other meetings between miner and farmer representatives. Annual reports of the Commissioner 
of Taxes, Department of Mines, Geological Survey Department and the MTPB provided very 
useful data for the thesis. 
 
The thesis used Legislative Council debates and law statute reports that provided the official 
government position. A closer analysis of the Legislative Council debates enabled me to 
scrutinise the diverging views of the members of the Council on proposed policies. This was 
very crucial in the pre-1923 period when the Legislative Council was the only platform, closer 
to administration, that settler representatives had access to, on which to challenge government 
policies. Legislative Council debates proved to be a useful source especially for Chapter Three 
which scrutinises the debates so as to get the sentiments of settler representatives on their 
position in the Council. The thesis used magazines such as The Countryside, The Rhodesian 
Farmer and the Smallworker. These magazines provided useful reports relating to agriculture 
and mining issues.  Newspapers, mainly The Herald and The Bulawayo Chronicle were also 
consulted and they provided a useful source of information which helped in gauging public 
opinion at different times. 
 
Oral interviews were conducted but it was quite difficult to get informants. This was because 
of the political situation in the country, therefore many people involved in mining thought I 
was a government agent and were not willing to give interviews. I am however grateful to Mr 
Mugumbate, Deputy Director of the Geological Survey Department for the few minutes that 
he allowed me to ask a few questions on the country’s mining industry. Eddie Cross, Member 
of Parliament for Bulwayo North Constituency, was very helpful. He linked me to the few 
informants that I managed to interview. 
 
Structure and layout 
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This thesis is chronologically arranged and makes use of major benchmarks in Southern 
Rhodesia’s history. This particular chapter has introduced the study and gave the scope as well 
as analytical framework for the study. It has also reviewed related literature and identified gaps 
that warrant further research. Chapter Two focuses on the interaction of farmers and miners 
during the period of Company administration. The chapter lays the foundation by providing a 
background for the development of the colonial economy based on mining and then agriculture. 
It deals with the land titles granted to farmers that had major hindrances to the development of 
agriculture since they had blocked farmers from making use of timber resources. Agriculture 
was initially not allowed on the country’s Gold Belt, which coincidentally had rich agricultural 
land. This became a major grievance and farmers contested it with no success. The chapter 
traces the farmer-miner conflict, triggered by the GBT which was the Company’s way of 
safeguarding its economic interests. 
 
Chapter Three discusses the politics of administration, representation and taxation during the 
period of Company administration. It therefore provides a reconsideration of the debate for 
either joining the Union of South Africa or Responsible Government. The chapter offers a fresh 
analysis to the dispute between the state and the two major interest groups in the country during 
that particular time (farmers and miners). It highlights the significance of taxation issues in the 
country’s political agenda, challenging literature which argue that, unlike in the South, taxation 
issues are more prominent in the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries. Through a rigorous use of Legislative Council debates, the chapter argues 
that farmers, and other settlers in Southern Rhodesia were actually not happy with the 
representation that was granted by the Company administration in 1898. Representation in the 
Council even at a time when the elected members had a majority did not work to their 
advantage since the administrator had the power to veto any proposals that were not in the best 
interest of the Company, in its administrative as well as its commercial capacity. Since farmers 
and the remainder of settlers not inclined to Company administration were paying tax, they 
wanted actual administrative power not mere representation. 
 
While Chapter Three highlights how the Company administration protected the mining sector 
more than any other group in the country, by 1923 agriculture had developed tremendously and 
farmers had grown into a formidable political force. Chapter Four thus examines how the 
emerging state (Responsible Government) grappled with issues of taxation, mining law and 
farmers’ interests. It argues that the policies adopted by the settler government almost brought 
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the mining sector to its knees especially through the levying of a Gold Premium Tax. The 
chapter considers government policies towards farmers and miners. It explores how such 
policies, adopted by the state contributed to a significant decline in gold mining by 1945. In 
that year, the agriculture sector, for the first time in the country’s history, generated more 
revenue than the mining sector.  
 
Chapter Five covers the era of formal conservation, 1939 to 1961. It details how the adoption 
of a formal conservation policy, ushered in through the 1941 Natural Resources Act, was used 
by the state to try and bring harmony between famers and miners. It demonstrates the ever-
shifting role of the state, which by this time, posed as an arbiter between settler farmers and 
miners. The chapter discusses the formation of various state agents such as the NRB, Mineral 
Resources Committee, MTPB and the Intensive Conservation Area Committees (ICACs). It 
delineates the crucial role played by these state agents in trying to curb land and environmental 
degradation and in the process ameliorate farmer-miner disputes.  Chapter Six discusses the 
miner-farmer tussle for labour up to 1953. After the creation of a federation of the two 
Rhodesias and Nyasaland labour ceased to be a problem in the country. Influx control 
mechanisms were actually employed in an attempt to limit more labourers coming into the 
country. 
 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis, summarises and ties together the key arguments. It makes 
recommendations for future study on state-farmer-miner interaction during the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) period and delineates the role of farmers and miners in 
sanctions busting. This will also allow for the coverage of the liberation war period. This will 
produce knowledge on how farmers and miners related during this period as well as illuminate 
on the areas that were cordoned off by liberation war fighters. The chapter points out that the 
problems confronting the current government regarding mining companies, artisanal miners 
and farmers have a long history which dates back to the early colonial period. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
Farmer-miner contestations and the British South Africa 
Company, 1895 to 1923. 
 
 
Cecil John Rhodes’ ambition to control what was to become the eponymous Southern Rhodesia 
in 1890 was premised on the discovery of gold reefs comparable to the Rand. His British South 
Africa Company (BSAC), having obtained a mandate to administer the territory through the 
Royal Charter, established an administrative system that oversaw the economic and political 
order of the new state for the next three decades. Rhodes’ goal was to establish an economy 
anchored by mining enterprise. As a business, the BSAC was supposed to produce profits so 
that it could pay dividends to its shareholders. It made strenuous efforts to bolster mining 
development through pro-mining legislation. Although a formal agricultural policy was 
adopted in 1908, mining remained the “favoured child.”104 Despite the failure of a Second Rand 
to materialise as anticipated, the base laid for the prosperity of mining remained unshaken, 
even after the formal adoption of agriculture as the second economic buttress in 1908. 
 
The development of Southern Rhodesia’s colonial economy has attracted scholarly attention 
over the years, with historians focusing chiefly on the development and growth of the country’s 
mining and agriculture.105 This literature chronicles the economic history of Southern 
Rhodesia, in most cases highlighting the repressive and exclusive colonial land and economic 
policies, which systematically promoted European economic advancement at the expense of 
indigenous Africans. This literature has therefore concentrated on inter-racial economic 
relations and in the process made passing reference to intra-racial contestations amongst 
European settlers themselves. Existing literature which covers intra-settler relations in 
Southern Rhodesia only deals with state-farmer relations.106 Yet differences also existed 
                                                            
104 L. H. Gann, A history of Southern Rhodesia: Early days to 1934, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965), 161. 
105 V. E. M. Machingaidze, “The development of settler capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesia with particular 
reference to the role of the state, 1908 to 1939’, PhD Thesis, University of London, 1980; G. Arrhigi. The political 
economy of Southern Rhodesia, 16 (The Hague: Mouton, 1967); R. Palmer, ‘The agricultural history of Rhodesia’, 
in R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds), The roots of rural poverty in Central and Southern Africa, (London: 
Heinemann, 1977); I. R. Phimister, An economic and social history of Zimbabwe, 1890 to 1940: Capital 
accumulation and class struggle, (London, Longman, 1988). 
106 See J. A. Mckenzie, ‘Commercial farmers in the governmental system of colonial Zimbabwe, 1863-1980’, 
PhD Thesis, University of Zimbabwe, 1989, R. Pilossof, The unbearable whiteness of being: Farmers’ voices 
from Zimbabwe, (Cape Town: Cape Town university Press, 2012); A. Selby, Commercial farmers and the state: 
Interest group politics and the land reform in Zimbabwe’, PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 2006. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 29 
 
amongst various settler groups such as farmers, miners and the state as shall be demonstrated 
by this chapter. M. E. Lee’s (1974) study covered intra-group conflicts amongst the various 
settler factions in Southern Rhodesia during Company rule.107 She, however, made only brief 
reference to the miner-farmer dynamics as one of the unfolding struggles amongst the many 
interest groups during that time. This chapter will instead concentrate more tightly on how 
ever-shifting state policy influenced (and was influenced by) the changing contours of miner-
farmer relations. It will concentrate on the controversies surrounding the Gold Belt reservations 
and how their construction by the state further affected the interaction of farmers and miners. 
M. Musemwa108 (2009), V. C. Kwashirai109 (2006) and a recent study by A. Mseba110 (2015) 
discussed miner-farmer disputes but focused more on the development of environmentalism 
during the colonial period. This chapter argues that the dispute was not because of the inherent 
greed of the farmers or miners as Musemwa posits.111 Rather, this chapter argues, the conflict 
between the two groups actually emanated from the way the Company administration sought 
to structure the colonial economy. 
 
This chapter discusses the interaction of the state, farmers and miners during the period of 
Company administration. The Company administration was the source from which all 
commands (laws) originated. Such commands, as argued by M. Weber in his model of 
“imperative co-ordination,”112 were influenced by “material calculation of advantage”113 by the 
state. The Company administration enacted different laws to which social and economic groups 
reacted differently. Some obeyed the commands while others (actively or passively) challenged 
laws which threatened the success of their economic activities. The chapter provides a brief 
historical background to the development of a colonial economy based on mining, which saw 
agriculture (at least initially) as a mere appendage. The chapter traces the genesis of Gold Belt 
reservations on agricultural land granted. Gold Belt reservations later mutated into the Gold 
Belt Titles (GBT) granted to farmers who acquired land situated on mineral formation from 
                                                            
107 M. E. Lee, ‘Politics and pressure groups in Southern Rhodesia, 1898 to 1923’, PhD Thesis, University of 
London, 1974. 
108 M. Musemwa, ‘Contestation over resources: The farmer-miner dispute in colonial Zimbabwe, 1903-1939’, 
Environment and History, 15 (2009), 78-107. 
109 V. C. Kwashirai, ‘Dilemmas in conservation in colonial Zimbabwe. 1890-1939’, Conservation and Society, 4, 
4 (2006), 541-561. 
110 A. Mseba, ‘Law, expertise and settler conflicts over land in early colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1923’, Environment 
and Planning A, 48, 4 (2015), 665-680. 
111 Musemwa, ‘Contestation over resources’, 81. 
112 M. Weber, The theory of social and economic organisation, (London: William Hodge and Company, 1947), 
297. 
113 Weber, The theory of social and economic organisation, 297. 
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1909. This chapter highlights the conflicts brought about by this land holding title on some of 
the finest agricultural land in the country. The Company administration promoted development 
of the mining industry at the expense of farming. This is exhibited by its insistence on the GBT 
even after the inauguration of a formal White Agricultural Policy (WAP). The chapter 
demonstrates the state’s position by using the attitudes of different state and Company officials 
on the controversies surrounding the Gold Belt reservations during the time of Company 
administration. 
 
Early Years: Foundation of the Colonial Economy 
When the Pioneer Column crossed the Limpopo into Southern Rhodesia in 1890 in the wake 
of the gold rush on the Witwatersrand, they anticipated finding a “Second Rand”. They hoped 
to establish an economy based on mining. Indeed, the passing of the Mashonaland Mining 
Regulation number 1 (1890), which embodied the American apex principle114, and the 
subsequent opening of two large mines, the Cotopaxi and the Dickens, in Fort Victoria District 
in 1893115, marked the genesis of large scale mining. In addition, numerous mining claims were 
parcelled out by the BSAC administration. It also encouraged floatation116 of mining 
companies, as it aspired to maximise profits since it held a 50 percent share in all mining 
ventures. Mining therefore, became the initial cornerstone on which the colonial economy was 
built. Its successful execution became the primary goal of the newly minted Southern 
Rhodesian State – an ambition also shared by some settlers. 
 
In line with its vision of a mining-led economy, the Company administration was at pains to 
create an enabling atmosphere for the successful operation of the mining sector. This was 
facilitated by the crafting, and passage of appropriate legislation such as the Mines and 
Minerals Ordinance of 1895 which granted miners water, timber and grazing rights. This piece 
of legislation provided that a licenced prospector had the right to peg claims on land owned by 
others and that on the land so pegged he could freely graze twenty draught animals, take 
indigenous wood for domestic purposes on payment of compensation, take water for free when 
this was required for domestic purposes and erect temporary buildings within the limits of the 
                                                            
114 The apex principle, or extra lateral right allowed the claim owner to follow the gold reef in all its ‘dips, spurs 
and variations’, outside the limits of the claim. Transvaal mining regulations allowed only that gold within the 
claim boundaries to be worked.’ I. R. Phimister, ‘Rhodes, Rhodesia and the Rand’, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 1, 1 (1974), 74–90. 
115 C. Van Onselen, Chibaro: African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia, (London, Pluto Press, 1976), 14. 
116 The process of offering a company’s shares for sale on the stock market for the first time. 
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pegged area.117 There was a shift, as this chapter will demonstrate, in settler goals, as these 
exclusive rights were detested and then contested by settler farmers. 
 
Company directors and officials made efforts to sustain the hopes of a Second Rand north of 
the Limpopo. As a result, they gave lip service to the country’s mineral potential, while eagerly 
awaiting for the discovery of rich deposits. Leander Starr Jameson, BSAC Administrator in the 
colony for example telegraphed London in 1893 stating that: “Everywhere new finds are 
occurring daily. Crushings everywhere successful. Wonderful development in every district. 
Reefs certainly improve as depth increases.” 118 This and many other ebullient declarations 
produced the intended consequences for they were followed by a rise of share prices on the 
London market. However, the averred boom was ephemeral, the Rhodesia Herald reported in 
1898 that: “By 1898 shares such as those of the Rhodesian Exploration and Development 
Company which at the height of the 1895 boom were selling at £18 could be bought at £4 and 
those of the British South Africa Company had dropped from £8 17d 6d to £2 25s 0d.”119 The 
realisation that the territory was not to become an extension of the Johannesburg gold rush 
came with J. H. Hammond’s report in November 1894, which revealed that there were  no vast 
gold deposits in the country.120 This revelation did not end the speculative tendencies which 
had characterised the nascent mining industry. Significantly, though, it precipitated a slight 
shift in the state’s economic policy from mining to agriculture in 1897. This was born out of 
the Company’s realisation that it could still derive profits from utilising the land it had intended 
for mining for agro-based activities.  
 
The Company remained adamant about its prospects for mining development in the country. 
They simply began considering agriculture as an economic activity of note, intended to 
supplement mining. Optimism did not drop with the fall of share prices on the London market, 
the Company kept its hopes alive. In 1901 the Company President, the Duke of Abercon 
assured shareholders that: 
Since the close of 1895, in spite of rinderpest, rebellion and war, we have been able to 
show astonishing progress. Our population and our revenues are increasing, we have 
more than one million sterling in hand; the success of our gold mining industry is 
                                                            
117 D. J. Murray, The governmental systems in Southern Rhodesia, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1970), 120. 
118 Van Onselen, Chibaro, 14. 
119 Rhodesia Herald, 30 March 1898. 
120 I. Phimister, ‘Rhodes, Rhodesia and the Rand’; J. H. Hammond was a Mining Engineer for the Consolidated 
Gold Field who was asked by Rhodes to come and inspect Southern Rhodesia’s mineral potential in 1894. 
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assured, we have the best coal fields in Africa, we have extensive and efficient railways 
and we can confidently say that our prospects have never been so hopeful.121 
 
This was intended to appease shareholders who were yet to receive dividends since the 
Company commenced operations. All the Company could offer were promises because gold 
reefs in Southern Rhodesia were not comparable to the Rand. The Company therefore, decided 
to make their investment in the country worthwhile by mining a different seam: through the 
successful settlement of mainly British immigrants who were expected to take up farming and 
work on the land.122 
 
As noted, there had been very little white commercial agricultural activity in the early colonial 
days. Gann noted “Mining began as the Chartered Company’s favoured child – farming was 
its neglected Cinderella.”123 It was the indigenous African producers who made available food 
requirements for the mining men in the absence of a meaningful white agricultural sector.124 
Most settlers who had received land grants sold that land to big companies and sought to make 
a quick fortune in prospecting and gold mining. Even some who had come intending to farm 
in the new colony also sought the elusive fortune from gold mining. According to P. F. Hone: 
The perennial hunger for gold, about which fabulous reports were constantly being 
spread throughout the country drew many of the would be farmers away from their 
original intentions, in order to seek a more speedy fortune in the most hazardous of all 
ventures, that the world offers.125 
 
For the few who opted to venture into agriculture it was usually at a subsistence level. Some, 
especially those who settled in remote areas, kept their cattle, goats, pigs and poultry and 
produced maize by adopting African methods. While many of those who settled on land closer 
to towns “preferred to make a scanty living by cutting down timber and selling the logs as 
firewood, by using their oxen and wagons for transport riding or kaffir trading while others 
eked out a livelihood by market gardening.”126 White commercial agriculture thus had a slow 
start.  
 
                                                            
121 British South Africa Company, Report of the 7th General Meeting. 
122 For more on immigration into Southern Rhodesia see A. S. Mlambo, White immigration into Rhodesia, From 
occupation to federation, (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publication, 2002). 
123 L. H. Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia, (London, Chatter and Windus), 1976), 161. 
124 See I. R. Phimister, ‘Peasant production and underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia’, African Affairs, 73, 
291 (1974), 217-228. 
125 P. F. Hone, Southern Rhodesia, (London: George Bell and Sons, 1909), 93. 
126 Gann, History of Southern Rhodesia, 162. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 33 
 
Land was considered as an asset and was being held chiefly for speculative purposes by the 
large land companies. These land consortiums had received generous land grants from the 
Company in the hope that they would use their vast capital resources to develop the country.  
One example of such land barons was John Willoughby, who apart from buying “a large 
number of land rights from gold-obsessed pioneers”, was also “granted some 600 000 acres in 
Mashonaland by Jameson on the understanding that he spend £50 000 on developing the land.” 
He finally accumulated 1. 3 million acres for his own company Willoughby’s Consolidated.127 
Consequently, many other speculative land companies were floated and Palmer notes that by 
1896 the total registered capital of such companies was about £20 million.128 By 1899, of the 
15. 3 million acres of land alienated to Europeans, about 9. 3 million acres belonged to the land 
companies.129 No agricultural activity actually took place on these vast tracts of land, which 
constituted the country’s best agricultural land. Moreover, as shall be demonstrated in the 
chapter, individual land applicants were denied land grants in such areas and this factor 
contributed immensely to the predominance of mining interests. 
 
In an attempt to foster the development of agriculture in the country, the Company 
administration opened a Department of Agriculture in 1897. It was merely a subdivision of the 
Surveyor General’s office. Some of the department’s main functions as mentioned by the 
Company report included the maintenance of mining timber through the “demarcation of 
timber reserves, the conservation of woods and forests and the formation of nursery farms and 
experimental plantations.”130 It was also at this time that formal appeals for the development 
of a robust agricultural sector that could complement the mining industry were being made. 
The Mines Department, Bulawayo District declared that: 
The district is a good agricultural and pastoral one, but little advantage has been taken 
of this fact by the farmers and landowners as they have absolutely done little or nothing 
in the shape of cultivation. The land should be cultivated to assist the mines in providing 
produce on a cheap scale. It is to be regretted that large tracts of country have been 
given to people who practically close them up and allow valuable land to lie fallow 
which should otherwise be of the utmost assistance to the miner.131 
 
                                                            
127R. Palmer, Land and racial domination in Rhodesia, (London: Heinemann, 1977, 36. 
128 Palmer, Land and racial domination, 36. 
129 Palmer, Land and racial domination, 36. 
130 Report of the British South Africa Company, 1896-97. 
131 NAZ T/2/29/7/1 Annual report for the Mines Department, Bulawayo district for the year ending, 30 September 
1897. 
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Such pronouncements stemmed from a desire to see the coexistence of settler farmers and 
miners in a way that replicated the gold and maize alliance forged in South Africa around the 
same period. The first farm in the Lomagundi district can be cited as an example of this 
intention. It was developed on the Ayshire Mine so as to grow maize needed for the food 
requirements of the mine’s African labourers.132 A combination of bovine diseases, 
introduction of the railway and the South African War connived in necessitating the 
development of white settler agriculture. The railway line succeeded in opening up new 
markets for farm produce and replaced ox transport which had been rendered useless by the 
cattle diseases. The war helped in eliminating competition from South Africa and ensured 
lower prices for local produce. 
 
As this chapter seeks to show, the gradual promotion of agricultural activities (and the ensuing 
land grants) meant an encroachment of agriculture into both already pegged mining claims and 
potential mining zones. This perceived encroachment, as this chapter will show, sowed the 
seed for contestation between the miners and the farmers. This was exacerbated by the 
relaxation, in 1903, of the mining regulations which allowed small independent miners to dig 
without forming companies. The result of this policy was to scatter small miners across the 
country and they were to come into conflict with emerging farmers over natural resources 
utilisation and rights of entry into the new farmlands. Meanwhile, Africans were also victim to 
the colonial land policies. Africans were being relocated to the newly created reserves in 
marginal areas with poor soils and low rainfall.133  
 
Land Allocation in the Mining Zones and the Genesis of Gold Belt Reservations 
The manner in which the Company administration dealt with applications for land grants in the 
first decade of occupation mimics in microcosm the Company’s attitude towards agricultural 
development and the country’s economy at large. Mining was favoured and it became one of 
the Company’s policies to scrutinise all areas before allocation of land for agriculture was 
effected. It was only the administrator who had the prerogative of approving land grants, 
especially on land suspected of bearing gold deposits. Land applications were therefore dealt 
with in a manner that ensured that the Company retained much control over the farms 
                                                            
132 Rubert, A most promising weed: A history of tobacco farming and labour in colonial Zimbabwe, 1890 to 1925, 
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133 See R. Palmer, Land and racial domination; E. Punt, ‘The Development of African Agriculture in Southern 
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concerned, in case minerals were discovered upon it. For example, when a settler, J. Squair, 
applied for a farm in an area about 15 miles from Salisbury in August 1892, Jameson, 
responded: “With reference to your letter August 22nd last it is evident that the land you have 
occupied is situated upon the Gold Belt. Under these circumstances the company is not 
prepared to issue the ordinary title to the land.” This kind of response from Jameson can be 
taken to be representative of the Company’s general policy on land allocations as it was to be 
invoked in many other instances as shall be highlighted. Squair was allowed to occupy the land 
on interim basis until: 
…such time as the land is proved to contain gold in payable quantities or no: in the 
former case you shall vacate the land without any compensation and peg out elsewhere 
– should the company consider your retirement necessary; in the latter case the district 
shall be considered as off the Gold Belt and will be surveyed in the ordinary case, title 
issued and fees charged.134 
 
Mining interests were given priority and agriculture was treated as the second option. Squair 
intended to carry out farming on the said land, but his prospects could be trashed once the area 
was discovered to bear gold. Land that was deemed unfit for gold production was then allocated 
to settlers intending to embark on full time farming.  
 
Initial applications for land in that same area, the Enterprise Gold Belt, by Thurgood, Fiancome 
and Krants had been turned down.135 The major reason for this denial to grant land on known 
gold bearing areas was because of a disinclination by the state to settle farmers on the Gold 
Belt. This was made clear by the Surveyor General’s statement in 1898 to Frames and 
Grimmer, he even made reference to Squair’s case, he stated that:   
There is much development work proceeding on the Enterprise Gold Belt. I cannot now 
change the views taken in ’92. Indeed the serious question lately arised re-outspanning 
the neighbourhood rather strengthens me in the opinion that no ground except gold 
claims should be alienated. [sic] 136 
 
This was an accurate reflection of Company’s policy on land grants in the years immediately 
after occupation. The Company’s intention to promote mining at the expense of agricultural 
development can be discerned from the Mashonaland Mining Regulations (1890), which 
provided that: 
Every holder of a prospecting licence shall have the right of grazing six horses or mules 
or sixteen oxen and of taking wood and water for his domestic use free of charge on 
                                                            
134 NAZ S2136/2862/A Letter from L.S. Jameson of the BSAC to J. Squair, March 18 1893. 
135 NAZ S2136/2862/A Letter to from the A/Surveyor General to Frames and Grimmer, 31 November 1898. 
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unalloted lands, and on allotted lands on payment to the occupier of the land where such 
license is exercised of one shilling per diem.137 
 
This was also emphasised in the subsequent mining law, promulgated in 1895. Very few 
farmers had managed to acquire land situated on or close to mining formations and working on 
the land full time. Most of the land grants to people or companies other than mining concerns 
in the gold bearing areas, had been made to the big land owning companies as indicated in the 
previous section. There were very few exceptions where farmers were allocated land in these 
areas. For example, in 1896 Messrs Edmonds and Christian were granted farm Meadows, 
measuring 3000 morgen, on the Empress Gold Belt.138 This land grant was made on condition 
that if the ground was to be expropriated for mining purposes, the two could not claim any 
compensation. This land grant had established a precedent which pushed other land seekers to 
claim land which was next to Meadows. During one of his surveying errands in the 
Chishawasha area, the Acting Surveyor General met Farranti (a land seeker) in an area opposite 
the Enterprise Gold Mining Company. Farrant had built a hut close to the river and he claimed 
to be occupying the area on Squair’s behalf.139 The Surveyor General at once warned Farrant 
to vacate the area and to inform his principal that: 
permission would not be given to locate a farm in either the Umtinge or Amafen Valleys 
since the available water would all be used for mill racas, the banks of the rivers for 
battery sites, the ground in the immediate vicinity would in the near future be traversed 
by tramway lines and would always be necessary for depasturing stock belonging to 
the mining companies or miners.140 
 
The Company administration was bent on enforcing the universally known prohibition against 
selection of land on gold bearing land and kept refusing to grant land requests for such areas. 
However, pressure was mounting from the settlers who wanted land on the Gold Belt for 
farming purposes. 
 
The main motive behind the land policy pursued by the Company administration was the 
maintenance of rights extended to miners through the mining laws enacted during a time when 
it was believed that mining revenue would finance economic development in the colony. 
Consideration was not given to farming interests. The overall result of this scenario was that 
                                                            
137 NAZ EC4/1/3 Mashonaland Mining Regulations No. 1 of 1890. 
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whenever senior company and administrative officials learnt of any development related to 
land allocation on the Gold Belt, their defence for mining rights was immediate and 
unequivocal. When in 1896 the Surveyor General was informed about intentions to survey and 
peg agricultural land on the Penhalonga-Umtali Gold Belt he argued:  
To prevent legal complications between future miners, existing claimholders, as the 
principal and the farmer as the secondary party concerned, the authorised surveyor 
employed will have to be careful to steer clear of dumping ground, mining timber, 
miners’ water rights furrows and racas, also of ground required for compounds 
buildings and battery sites.141 
 
Such considerations, as cited above by the Surveyor General, usually delayed the processing 
of applications made for land in the areas concerned. The response to W. F. King’s application 
for a plot of land in the Imbeza Valley, Umtali was dispatched after three months from the date 
of application.142 In this particular case the delay was caused by research conducted by the 
Mines Department on the matter regarding water requirements of the Lisboa Gold Mining 
Syndicate situated in the same area.143 Permission to grant King the land requested was only 
issued after the Mines Department had declared that Lisboa was no longer viable. All these 
were attempts to foster adherence to the Company’s vision of a mining led economy and curb 
any interruptions by agriculture. Such delays, coupled with the country’s mining laws, 
frustrated the genuine farmers who wanted to settle in the country and work on the land. 
 
The Company’s attitude and policy towards land grants had the potential to drive away 
potential settlers. A classic case occurred in 1903 when two pioneers, Wayne and Schukala, 
applied for a farm in the Belingwe District. Their attorneys notified the Civil Commissioner 
for Bulawayo that the two did not intend to settle on farms situated on mineral formation, they 
wrote: “They have instructed us to state that the farms in question are so thickly interspersed 
with claim pegs – apparently pegged off the gold belt – that they have no desire to disturb the 
fortunate claim owners by commencing farming operations at or near their properties.”144 The 
two former prospectors wanted to engage in farming since their former trade was no longer 
profitable; their initial application for land had been turned down because the land concerned 
lay on the Gold Belt. Government officials kept on delaying the land grant prompting the 
attorneys of the two applicants to write to the Civil Commissioner again, this time stating that: 
                                                            
141 NAZ L2/2/80/1 Surveyor General, 22 December 1987. 
142 NAZ L2/2/80/4 W. F. King to Secretary for Lands Department, 2 September 1902. 
143 NAZ L2/2/80/4 Secretary for the Lands Department to W. F. King, 10 December 1902. 
144 NAZ S2136/2862/A Letter from Russell and Hendrie to the Civil Commissioner Bulawayo, 11 February 1903.  
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We would point out that both our clients are ‘pioneer men’ who have constantly resided 
in the country since the occupation and if the government now refuse to entertain their 
application for even a small portion of unalienated land which they are prepared to pay 
for, no other course is left open to them but to leave the territory. Prospecting their 
former occupation is no longer encouraged or transport riding allowed and farming 
which they were anxious to make a success of appears to be denied to them.145 
 
After issuing this threat, Wayne and Schukala were finally allocated the land. The Company 
administration did not want to lose settlers who intended to take up farming, but at the same 
time, it did strive to promote uninterrupted growth of the mining industry. Granting land on the 
Gold Belt seemed to be a negation of the latter, which was, as noted, solved by introduction of 
Gold Belt reservations. 
 
As indicated earlier, the Company administration allocated land suspected of bearing gold 
deposits to the big land consortiums, a favour which was not extended to the individual farmers 
(land applicants). In instances where there was actual mining taking place on the land 
concerned, such applications were not granted. For example, Raleigh Grey’s company, the 
United Rhodesia Goldfields Limited, had earlier on been granted land on the Gold Belt, but 
kept applying for more land grants. Grey’s further land requests were denied in 1898 but he 
kept pleading with the administration to grant him the requested land. He opined: 
You have informed me that the grant cannot be made on account of the gold properties 
which lie within it. I beg to submit that the fact of these gold properties does not affect 
this land in any greater degree than former grants which have been made to my 
company on the gold belt. I have no wish to interfere in any way with the gold properties 
which exist on the land, and I should desire for the grant to be made under the same 
conditions as those which were formerly made to my company.146 
 
Although Grey promised not to interfere with water flowing through the farm which was used 
for mining purposes, that particular piece of land in the Mazoe area could not be granted. The 
whole area was littered with gold claims, some of which were actually being worked on. 
Responding to the point why he had been granted land in the first instance, Secretary to the 
Administrator informed him:  
that when it was agreed to give permission to the United Rhodesia Co. to peg on gold 
belt, it was distinctly understood, that it would not apply to any part that was being, or 
likely at the time, to be worked, in fact it was to apply to gold belts, which is not likely 
to contain payable ground.147 
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The above statement by the Secretary sheds more light on prior land grants to land companies 
in the country. The areas concerned were only expected to contain gold deposits. Refusal by 
the administration to parcel out land in areas with known gold deposits to the land companies 
(who were favoured by the administration) is a significant pointer on the Company’s desire to 
ensure uninterrupted mining development in the country.  
 
Most of the country’s minerals were found in a geological environment known as the 
“greenstone belt” found mostly in the central part of the country.148 This mineral bearing belt 
also contained the country’s best agricultural lands and settlers who wanted to pursue farming 
applied for land grants in these areas. As has been highlighted, the Company administration 
was reluctant to allocate land for agricultural purposes in such areas. However, towards the 
turn of the century when reality had dawned on most settlers that the country did not have as 
much gold deposits, some wanted to try their luck on agriculture. The settler population had 
grown to 12 596 in 1904.149 Applications for land grants on the Gold Belt kept coming and 
this, together with the failure to find gold, precipitated a policy shift by the Company 
administration. As indicated, the government began promoting land settlement for agricultural 
purposes so as to make its investment worthwhile. This could not be achieved if good 
agricultural land was lying idle. Grey became the first beneficiary of this shift in policy by the 
Company administration. The Director for Lands and Settlement requested the Surveyor 
General to inform Grey that “the government propose to attach conditions to the grant of further 
land on the Gold Belt and that pending formal publication of which, they do not propose to 
register further grants on such gold belts.”150 This proposal marked the conception of Gold Belt 
reservations that were later inserted on permits of occupation for land granted on the Gold Belt, 
which later developed into the GBT in 1909. 
 
In line with the policy shift delineated above, E. W. S. Montagu, Commissioner of Mines, 
wrote to the Secretary for Lands approving the extension of Grey’s farm to include a portion 
of wooded hills on the Gold Belt. He noted that:  
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The provision should be made in the lease granting claimholders the right to cut wood 
for mining operations free of charge as if the land was still government land and that 
the government should be held harmless for any claims for compensation for any loses 
sustained by the United Rhodesia Goldfields through mining operations.151 
 
This was the first permit of occupation to be issued containing such a Gold Belt clause reserving 
timber against cutting or removal for sale by the lessee. Although the clause allowed farmers 
access to land on the Gold Belt, it signified the beginning of contestations over the use of timber 
and water, grazing rights as well as rights of access to land between farmers and miners. C. A. 
Jennings, Director of Lands in 1928 noted that this reservation should not only be seen as being 
in favour of mining, but also as a precaution against depreciation of the assets of the land during 
the lease period.152 This claim by Jennings should be subjected to scrutiny. As highlighted by 
Musemwa, both farmers and miners were equally guilty of excessive wood cutting.153 If the 
Company administration was really concerned about conservation, it should have implemented 
measures which prevented excessive wood cutting by both farmers and miners. It was more 
concerned by maximising profits as far as possible for the mining capital, and one way of doing 
this was to provide the sector with unlimited and uninterrupted wood supplies (miners used 
wood mainly for fuel as shall be shown in succeeding sections). The most efficient way of 
doing this was to curtail competition for wood by the fledging farming sector. This was a 
deviation from the initial policy whereby miners were supposed to pay for wood cut on private 
land. The clause was made part of the permit of occupation from 1904 onwards.  Miners’ access 
to free water was also maintained in the new Gold Belt reservations.  
 
From 1905 the Company administration was granting land to farmers on the Gold Belt and the 
Gold Belt reservations were attached to the permit of occupation. This opened up the Gold Belt 
area to farmers and a number of applications for land in the area were processed and approved 
by the Lands Department. Meanwhile, there was an increase in the number of farms from 300-
400 in 1903 to 900 in 1904.154 R. Reimer applied for land and was granted a farm under the 
Gold Belt permit of occupation on 14 November 1905.155 As clarified by Inskipp who became 
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a member of the Legislative Council for Mazoe, under the Gold Belt permit of occupation, 
claimholders had the right to wood free of charge and trading stores could only be erected on 
the farm with government’s special permission.156 A similar explanation was given to Henry 
Middleton, Engineer for the Bernhein (Mazoe) Gold Mines, by the Secretary for Mines when 
he had asked the following question “For instance when Smith of South Mazoe has completed 
payment for his farm and gets his deeds, he expects to be able to be charging the mining 
companies a royalty for any wood cut on his land. Shall we be compelled to pay such a 
royalty?”157 This seemed logical under normal circumstances. Farmers were supposed to derive 
profits from their investment after all. Yet the Company administration decided otherwise. This 
new piece of legislation and other laws enacted during the era of Company administration were 
approved by an executive which consisted of the most able and senior Company officials.158 It 
therefore, reflected the Company’s bias towards mining interests. Although farmers were also 
represented in the Legislative Council, their voices were usually suppressed as evidenced by 
their failure to push successfully for an amendment of the mining law. 
 
From 1903 onwards, measures were taken to rejuvenate the mining industry and return it to 
profitability after the 1903 collapse of the London market for Rhodesian mining shares.159 It 
was around the same time that small independent miners were allowed to operate without 
floatation because many of them struggled to get companies registered before operations 
commenced. This move coincided with the opening up of the Gold Belt area to farmers and the 
subsequent issuance of the Gold Belt permits of occupation. The independent miners were 
undercapitalised and wanted to make maximum use of the free wood so as to minimise 
production costs to the barest minimum. Therefore, they presented the most vociferous 
challenge each time farmers complained about depletion of wood and water resources on their 
farms. The Chamber of Mines, a representative of big mining capital added a voice to the 
challenge on what they considered to be their rights. The organisation was formed in 1895 as 
two separate chambers for Matebeleland and Mashonaland had merged to form a single 
representative body in 1904.160 The formation of a chamber of Mines was first put forward by 
the Chamber of Commerce (which had been formed in 1894). This was in respect of a new 
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mines legislation which was put on the table and a provisional committee was formed in 
Bulawayo in June 1895. A second body, the Salisbury Chamber of Mines was formed at the 
end of June 1895 mainly because mining concerns in Mashonaland feared that they might be 
misrepresented by the Bulawayo chapter.161 The Chamber of Mines did not stand for interests 
of small miners. They were represented by the Smallworkers and Tributors Associations 
formed after this group of miners were legalised, the first one was formed in 1907 in Gwelo 
and was followed by others in mining centres like Gatooma, Hartley and Penhalonga.162 The 
farmers’ representative body, the Rhodesia Agricultural Union (RAU) championed the 
farmers’ concerns and challenged the Company’s discriminatory policies. RAU was formed by 
a union of nine different farmers’ associations from different districts in 1904 who merged at 
the invitation of the Mashonaland Farmers Union to form a united representative body. The 
three Matebeleland unions did not join for fear of domination by the Mashonaland union. This 
showed the differences between settler farmers emanating from differences in agricultural 
activities. By 1911 the number of affiliate associations had risen to 29 up from 9 who had 
registered when it was formed in 1904. By this time, agriculture had registered significant 
growth, B. S. Schutz notes that between 1904-1911 agricultural growth had more than doubled 
“involving 879 males in the earlier year and 2067 in the latter one.” In addition to this, the 
agricultural proportion of the total population increased at a faster rate than any other 
occupational class amongst whites.163 The big land companies were represented by the 
Landowners and Farmers Association. This organisation, besides its name, did not represent 
the interests of small farmers. 
 
Land Grants Under the Gold Belt Title 
The first formal (GBT) was issued in 1909. This was despite the fact that Company Directors 
had visited the country in 1907 and recommended the development of white agriculture so as 
to realise the country’s full productive capacity. In their report, the Directors stated that the 
Company intended “to stimulate in every possible way the opening up and steady development 
of the mineral and agricultural resources of the country.”164 In 1908 the Company 
administration adopted the WAP165, intended to stimulate the development and further growth 
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of settler agriculture in the colony. The growth of agriculture was promoted based on a variety 
of imported maize seed, tobacco, wheat, sorghum and groundnuts.166 Changes adopted 
included the reconstitution of the Department of Agriculture under the directorship of Dr Eric 
Nobbs in 1908 and the establishment of two research stations in 1909,167 among many other 
innovations. The success of the new agricultural policy lay behind its ability to lure into the 
country many immigrants, who could then settle on large farms in the high potential areas and 
work on the land. It is paradoxical that the Company administration introduced the GBT on 
land situated in the country’s Gold Gelt, yet it anticipated an inflow of new immigrants to foster 
the growth of settler capitalist agriculture. The land title for areas containing the country’s 
prime land (the Gold Belt area) had a number of disabilities with regards to land, timber, water 
and grazing rights. This course of events reflected the attitude of the Company administration 
towards agriculture and the general direction to where it intended to steer the country’s 
economy. Mining retained its favoured position and agriculture still played second fiddle. This 
was despite the growth levels registered by agriculture during these early years. 
 
On the eve of the enactment of an amendment to the Mines and Mineral Ordinance in 1908, a 
number of applications for farm land were made in the Hartley District by Messrs Campion 
Bros., A. G. Land, G. C. Woodforde, C. Watkins and C. E. Charter. The Mining 
Commissioner’s report regarding these applications stated that “As far as I am aware there are 
at present no working claims situated on the ground applied for.”168 This report triggered a 
conversation with the Secretary for Mines who kept enquiring if there were any claims being 
worked on the land applied for and surrounding areas. This was in spite of the first 
pronouncement made by the Mining Commissioner. Upon such further probing, the Mining 
Commissioner revealed that he anticipated pegging of claims on land applied for very soon. 
This prompted the Secretary for Mines to affirm that “I view this activity in farming in Hartley 
District with considerable suspicion as mining is so active there and I recommend the holding 
over of applications there until we know how legislation is going to turn.” 169 This 
recommendation had the effect of locking up agricultural land that had been applied for and 
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was lying idle in the district. The insistence by the Mines Secretary on the issue can be used to 
depict the Company administration’s stance on agriculture. Instead of promoting settlement of 
new farmers by granting their land requests, they were being turned down. In this particular 
case, it was happening in the very year that the WAP had been launched (1908). 
 
This action by the Mines Secretary was criticised by C. D. Wise, the Director for Land 
Settlement. He represented the few civil servants who dared to go against Company policy. 
Wise’s main argument was based on the fact that the Mining Commissioner for Hartley had 
earlier on stated that there were no claims on the land applied for. In his view, the move to hold 
up land was not healthy for the development of a robust agricultural sector. He argued that 
“Further am I to understand that you recommend that the whole of the land in Hartley District 
should be locked up pending legislation? Having in view the number of settlers coming up that 
would be a serious step to take.”170 Agricultural development had been adopted in an attempt 
to bolster settlement, yet the Company administration retained and further entrenched policies 
that discouraged new settlers from taking up land. 
 
Miner-farmer differences had become more acute mainly because of the operations of the Gold 
Belt Title. There was a growing desire by the farmers to enjoy full liberty in the use of timber 
resources on the farms. On the other hand, miners were not willing to give in. The Visiting 
Company Directors in 1907 hoped to put an end to the tension between the two sectors. 
Jameson and Birchenough, two of the Visiting BSAC Directors had hopes of seeing the 
introduction of a uniform title to land ownership. The two believed that granting a universal 
title would facilitate settlement. In 1910, Jameson was still determined to address farmers’ 
concerns regarding the GBT. He therefore, asked a farmer to compile measures that could be 
taken to improve the title, without affecting miners in any way.171 Jameson wanted to hear 
farmers’ sentiments and determine the need for a universal land title in the country. A 
memorandum containing farmers’ views on how best to improve the mining law was drafted 
and it included the following points: There was a growing need amongst farmers for miners 
working on farming land to pay rent direct to farmers, not to the government. By so doing the 
government would stop encouraging miners to peg more claims on farm land. All farmers were 
supposed to receive half claim licences as was happening under the Victoria Agreement. The 
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memorandum also had a proposition that farmers be granted permission to take proceeds from 
timber sales and to use water from streams on pegged ground. Prospecting and timber cutting 
was to be prohibited within fenced paddocks and within half mile of the homestead without the 
owner’s consent.172 Such demands did not cause any changes but they did indicate to the 
Directors how much the farming community detested the GBT. The Company administration 
did not, however, use the farmers’ grievances in moulding new mining laws.  
 
Land grants on the Gold Belt were therefore, from 1909 onwards, based on the GBT. For 
example, an application by J. R. Chiseolm for a farm in Victoria was granted on Gold Belt 
terms. When granting the land request, the Acting Mining Commissioner stated that “Provided 
wood and water are reserved for the mining industry in this region, I see no objection to the 
alienation of the land.”173 Company officials were always hoping that one day major gold 
deposits might be struck, Mining Commissioners’ reports on land allocations that were made 
in Gold Belt areas reveal that the hope for a second Rand never went away.  Referring to the 
application for farm Redmond in the Victoria district, the Mining Commissioner for the district 
reported that “It is common knowledge that this district has only been very superficially 
prospected and new discoveries may be made any day.”174 Basing on reports received from 
prospectors that some areas in Ndanga district, which had been earmarked for ranching, had a 
distinct possibility of discovery and exploitation of minerals in the future, the Mining 
Commissioner maintained that “Cannot some expert opinion be engaged before the whole area 
is given over to ranching without reservation as regards wood and water.”175 Such sentiments 
point to the ambitions of administrative authorities to push for thorough prospecting in the hope 
of striking rich mineral deposits. They were only prepared to promote agricultural development 
in an area only after its mineral potential was thoroughly examined. 
 
Company policy on settlement 
The Company administration embarked, as has been noted, on a drive to lure new immigrants 
who could start up farming in the country. A number of initiatives were put in place to ensure 
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the success of this project including the inauguration of a number of settlement schemes.176 
However, the Company administration aspired to build a British dominated settler community 
as depicted by the exclusionist settlement schemes that were intended to lure the ‘desired’ 
(British) settlers, and discriminated against Afrikaner settlers coming from South Africa as will 
be delineated in this section. In 1905, the administrator reported to the Legislative Council that: 
The company is desirous of assisting as far as may be expedient, the settlement of 
suitable immigrants upon its unalienated lands, and with that view is preparing a scheme 
under which considerable funds will be provided for the purpose. The main objects will 
be to obtain settlers of the agricultural class with sufficient capital to ensure the 
beneficial occupation of the land, and to assist them by some preparation of their 
holdings prior to arrival, and by skilled advice while they are gaining experience on the 
conditions under which farming is carried on in the country.177 
 
The urgent need for more settlers was also noted by Godfrey Munay, the Government 
Agriculturist and Botanist, and he proposed a rather different approach. He advocated for the 
settlement of smallholder farmers rather than the established trend in the country of parcelling 
out huge tracts of land to large farmers. He noted thus:  
Unfortunately, the best land in the country has been allotted in large farms but the time 
is ripe for a change. A place must be found for the small holder who if he is prosperous 
is the real wealth and backbone of the country. The large farmer thinks in pounds and 
neglects shillings – the small holder looks to the shillings for his livelihood.178 
 
The smallholder farmer was likely to make a home out of his farm. The Company 
administration, however, acted otherwise. It pursued actions and policies that were not in any 
way attractive to the potential settlers. Some scholars on the country’s agrarian history like 
Rukuni179 mention the state’s desire to settle farmers on the most fertile soils but they neglect 
the fact that some of the finest agricultural land in Rhodesia (referred to by Rukuni as the high 
potential areas) lay in the vicinity of Salisbury, Mazoe, Hartley and Umtali. Such areas 
coincidentally constituted most of the country’s Gold Belt in Mashonaland. This land was 
therefore either closed to settlement or being issued under the unattractive Gold Belt permits 
of occupation, as has been demonstrated. 
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The Company administration welcomed and helped settle immigrants who possessed what it 
considered to be the requisite capital. It was, at the same time, unhesitant to turn down 
applications for assistance by settlers who were facing difficulties in establishing themselves 
as vibrant commercial farmers, even if they had already taken up land. Considering the 
minimum capital requirement of £700, it appears as if they looked more at the money when 
selecting settlers. Wise noted in a special report that: “I can only repeat that a great deal will 
depend on the selection of men, and only those who have had experience in farming should at 
all events at present be accepted as settlers. Taking men without experience is a risk for the 
company and a risk for would be settlers.”180 From this report it appears as if farming 
experience counted more than anything else. But when it came to the real issue, men who had 
the requisite farming experience and had actually taken up farms were denied any kind of 
assistance and instead had their land taken away. A classic example was the case of F. E. 
Sedman who held a farm and had spent his savings on clearing the land for cultivation and 
labour costs. His application for state assistance was turned down by Wise. Sedman enquired:  
If the Charter Company want men to settle and cultivate and civilise this country, why 
not give the men that have been in the country a number of years and who are 
acclimatised and who understand the nature of the climate and its population of 
different natives a chance and who would be only too glad to settle and make a home 
for their friends and relations, with a little assistance at first, to be paid back by 
instalments?181 
 
Sedman had been in the country and possessed the requisite experience, yet his application for 
assistance was turned down. Sedman’s case took a dramatic and unfortunate turn when he 
wrote to the press discouraging potential immigrants from taking up land in Southern Rhodesia. 
Writing to the editor of the Overseas Daily Mail he said that, if published, his story:  
would probably help some of the unfortunate men already in South Africa and open the 
eyes of other intending immigrants from home and who have a little or no capital what 
they have to expect if such capital is lost through no fault of their own, but through the 
disadvantages of this country as regards farming etc. including no rains, fever, ticks and 
all pests.182 
 
He had actually issued a warning to potential immigrants that Southern Rhodesia was not the 
best destination to invest their £700. Instead, he offered the following alternative: 
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A man in England with £700 capital would be better off to stay there and buy 3 acres 
instead of coming to a new country (namely Southern Rhodesia) and to speculate it in 
farming, or try to, against all the disadvantages of South Africa, unless they want to 
work for all their lives to benefit the company and future generations.183 
 
This negative publicity was not good in any way for a country that was on a recruitment drive 
for new settlers. This almost coincided with R. Cross’s vicious attack on the BSAC’s policy of 
occupation titles that had major disabilities for farmers holding land on the Gold Belt. His 
article titled, Straight talk from a leading expert published in the Queenstown Daily Press was 
also published in the Bulawayo Chronicle. Cross, a farmer from Queenstown in the Cape 
Colony, advised the BSAC administration as follows: 
I am not in a way interested in Rhodesia or likely to be, but if the Chartered Company 
does not take steps to give more favourable and secure titles to the land, which will 
induce people to take up the vast stretches of unoccupied land, Rhodesia will remain a 
wilderness. To make a country you must have population, and the soil worked, and this 
too before gold mining.184 
 
Such publications had a negative impact on the country’s settlement policy. They had the 
potential of dissuading people from settling.185 Such negative publicity was not good for a 
country attempting to invite more settlers to come and commence farming. Especially 
considering that Southern Rhodesia had to attract settlers who also had the option to emigrate 
to more developed countries like Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand The 
country’s GBT was the worst enemy for it had the potential to scare away potential settlers. It 
was however, serving the miners’ interests by providing free access to timber, water and 
pasture land. In this regard, the Company’s primary economic concern, mining, was well 
catered for. 
 
Apart from the capital requirements and agricultural experience expected from settlers 
emigrating to Southern Rhodesia, the settler administration aspired to build a settler society 
dominated by British settlers throughout the period under study. It was this ethnic bias which 
contributed significantly in shaping the country’s demographic structure. It was during the first 
thirty years of colonial rule that Southern Rhodesia’s settler society was moulded. The settlers 
constituted of Europeans of different nationalities, the dominant being the British settlers 
followed by Afrikaner settlers.  The settler community was transformed from being “a 
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temporary miners frontier to a family oriented farming and trading society.”186 Although the 
composition of Southern Rhodesia’s settler community kept shifting and shuffling, it generally 
kept the form established during the time of Company administration until about 1965.187 There 
was a desire amongst the early settlers to create a country which “mirrored the image of Britain 
in terms of its demographic composition and economic health.”188 It was this desire which led 
to the development of a settler identity which promoted the superiority of British settlers (over 
indigenous Africans and non-British settlers). The majority of the settlers were British-born or 
British South African so they promoted their home country’s brand of civilisation.189  The 
ultimate result of this “racial chauvinism” was a general dislike of non-British settlers, 
especially Afrikaners who were perceived as a major threat to the creation of a “white man’s 
country.” This drive to recruit good quality settlers from Britain failed to yield the intended 
consequences. It blocked would-be settlers who could have made Southern Rhodesia their 
home and it ultimately obstructed the desire to build a white men’s country.190 
 
Afrikaners entered Southern Rhodesia at various junctures of the country’s history. They were 
part of a predominantly British Pioneer Column which crossed the Limpopo into Rhodesia in 
1890. Thereafter, G. Hendrich notes that some more Afrikaners went to Southern Rhodesia in 
search of improved living conditions and job opportunities.191 This was mainly through treks, 
the most famous of which was the Moodie Trek of 1892. Most of the Afrikaners settled in the 
Enkeldoorn and Melsetter areas. Although their numbers were inferior when compared to the 
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British settlers, Afrikaner settlers became a crucial component of the white community in the 
country. They were predominantly a rural population and Rhodes “encouraged them to 
immigrate to Southern Rhodesia particularly to develop the agricultural industry.”192 
Immigration flows (and the county’s immigration policies) for both British and Afrikaner 
settlers kept changing and dictated Southern Rhodesia’s demographic complexion. Schutz 
notes that “in 1911 the total population of Southern Rhodesia was published as 701 077 of 
whom 21 606 were Europeans. The European population represented 3. 06 percent of the 
population or a ratio of 33 Africans to one European.”193 The majority of the European 
population were South African born whites consisting of a smaller number of adherence of the 
Dutch Reformed Church (Afrikaners) when compared to Anglicans (English speaking). The 
table below gives the various religious categories that immigrants belonged to. 
 
Table 1: Showing religion by percentage194 
Year % Anglican % Dutch 
Reform 
% Presbyterian % Methodist 
1904 41, 53 15, 35 10, 91 5, 33 
1911 44, 67 13, 79 11, 15 6, 89 
  
The period between 1911 and 1921 was marked by a change in the country’s demographic 
make-up characterised by a rise in the proportion of Afrikaner immigrants. Schutz notes that 
“The absolute number of Dutch Reform members increased from 3256 – 13. 8 percent of the 
European population in 1911 to 6537 – 19. 4 percent of the population in 1921.”195 These 
figures continued to change over time but English speaking settlers maintained their numerical 
and political superiority as shall be demonstrated in succeeding chapters. 
 
Immigration and emigration continued and there were always shifts in the country’s settler 
population as shown in the graph below. 
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Graph 1: White population by country of birth, 1901-1056 (%)196 
 
 
The settler population did not reach the anticipated levels because of the high turnover. R. 
Roberts made the following comment regarding this scenario: 
The most striking and persistent feature of “settlement” in Southern Rhodesia is that, 
for every hundred migrants arriving, between sixty and eighty were always 
leaving…..As a “settlement”, white Rhodesia has been a sort of select suburban-cum-
gentlemen-farming frontier outpost of Britain and English speaking South Africa, to 
which many “settlers” always intended to return.197 
 
 
As a result of this population structure, the settler population was not homogeneous. The same 
applied to the settler farming sector. As already noted, the majority of Afrikaner immigrants 
went into farming. These Afrikaner farmers in due time played a significant role in the 
country’s overall agricultural industry.198 Very few trekked towards Salisbury and most of them 
settled in the Rusape, Odzi, Marandellas tobacco districts, Bikita, Buhera, Charter, Gutu and 
in the uplands of the Eastern districts. They thus came into contact with mostly British South 
African farmers who had flocked into Southern Rhodesia.  Relations between British and 
Afrikaner settlers were amicable at first but started deteriorating after the 1896 Jameson Raid 
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and the South African war (1899-1902). Hendrich argues that the Afrikaner minority was in a 
“relatively friendly coexistence with the dominant English-speaking population of a British 
colony, although unsympathetic political attitudes… and fear of Afrikaner nationalism often 
hampered relations.”199 For him, Afrikaners were not politically assimilated into the 
mainstream white population until 1965, instead they clung to a more separatist identity. The 
British on the other hand feared numerical domination by the Afrikaners hence the ploy to 
block their entry into the country in favour of British immigrants. Authorities in Rhodesia also 
viewed the Afrikaner culture as inferior to that of the British.200 These differences thus 
characterised relations amongst the settler farmers. The settler farming community was more 
heterogeneous, fissured by these ethnic divisions. 
 
Contestations over wood and water 
The relaxation of the mining law in 1903, which allowed farmers to occupy land in the Gold 
Belt area, coincided with a move by the Company administration which enabled small 
independent miners to operate without floatation. Such actions by the administration set the 
farmers and the miners on collision course. Miners required wood for use as fuel in their mining 
operations. In the main mining districts, there was wood cutting on both settler and African 
land and J. McGregor argues that it was worse on the latter.201 Free wood for fuel and mining 
timber was crucial for mining operations and miners defended their right to timber on the Gold 
Belt. For the small miners “unfettered access to water, wood and grazing could make the 
difference between profit and loss.”202 The same applied to the farmers, access to timber was 
crucial as is noted by McGregor that “sale of timber had always been easy money and an 
important side-line on the farm and indeed, in bad years it could make all the difference 
between profit and loss.”203 Neither of the two sides was willing to lose access to wood and 
this resulted in a prolonged legal struggle over wood rights. Farmers challenged the 
administration’s policy which favoured miners as provided by the Gold Belt reservation clause 
in the land titles. Such favouritism can also be discerned from a reply that the Administrator 
received from the London office after he informed the Company board about the numerous 
challenges levelled against Gold Belt reservations by farmers. Part of the reply read: 
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“Supposing agriculture was seriously impeded, we should all be delighted for it would 
necessarily mean a very large and flourishing mining industry.”204 Such statements revealed 
the company’s intransigent stance regarding the country’s economic development. 
 
The move therefore intensified the tussle over water and timber. Water was a pre-requisite for 
most, if not all agricultural ventures. Miners on the other hand required water for their mining 
mills. In 1903, Colonel Heyman, a member of the Legislative Council for the Midland District, 
moved to include this clause in the mining legislation: “Provided that should the claimholder 
or claimholders desire to expropriate all or any of the water on private land they may do so on 
payment of compensation, the amount whereof to be fixed by arbitration in default of 
agreement.”205 If this was ratified, farming men argued, it would guarantee an uninterrupted 
water supply to the mines and they would not close down. Heyman’s argument hinged on the 
fact that “The agricultural industry depended upon the mining industry for its successful 
development and if the mining industry had an obstacle put in the way of successful mining it 
must materially affect the prospects of the agricultural industry.”206 Colonel Napier, member 
of the Legislative Council for the Western District, moved to support the motion, he said 
“farmers looked upon the water as an asset of the farm and this was the point they had fought 
upon since 1895.”207 He thus supported the move to make miners pay for the water they used 
in their operations. In this way, the miner would not be blocked from using water to the 
detriment of the industry. Napier proceeded to argue that “it was better for the mines to pay a 
large amount for water than to be deprived of it altogether.”208 Farmers from Matebeleland, a 
water scarce region, were the ones spearheading this campaign to have miners pay for the water 
that they used. 
 
The restrictions on water usage by farmers were viewed as a major obstacle with the potential 
to push potential settlers away. The question to be answered was whether Southern Rhodesia 
was going to be populated by mining men or farmers. If these restrictions were maintained, 
then the door was being shut for men who would be willing to take up land and commence 
farming, this was highly likely if the Company administration continued to issue the Gold Belt 
permit of occupation. F. Myburgh echoed similar sentiments in 1907:  
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If they wanted to encourage bona fide farmers to settle in this country, not men of the 
Salvation Army type, but men who were prepared to come into the country with a 
certain amount of capital to settle down, not necessarily for the actual money that they 
could make out of a farm, but to make their home in the country. If they wanted to 
encourage such men and they were the men they required – those men would have no 
encouragement if they felt the title to the farm which they might purchase was so 
insecure.209 
 
The Mines and Minerals Act Number 10 of 1904 deprived the farmer of his water. Myburgh 
added that expropriation of the farmer’s water was tantamount to expropriation of his farm.210 
Besides the use of water, there was also the problem of the inter-mingling of stock belonging 
to the miner with that of the farmer. Napier highlighted a scenario whereby more than eight 
prospectors could come onto a farm, each with his own cattle. It was highly likely that the stock 
might have picked some disease along the way, and this will be passed on to the farmer’s cattle. 
This was in view of the quarantine regulations instituted to contain the spread of bovine 
diseases that had decimated the country’s herd in the past few years.211 This general fear was 
shared by farmers who were in the process of rebuilding their herds. 
 
The Administrator supported mining interests. This was a major challenge confronting farmers, 
dealing with an administrative system that supported one sector at the detriment of another. He 
argued that he did not even see the insecurity in the tenure system that was being referred to 
by farming men in the House. The basis of his argument was the fact that “the history of the 
colonies which were developing more as the result of mining than agriculture was that the 
mines should take precedence.”212 Milton went on to compare Rhodesia’s mining law to the 
situation prevailing in the Transvaal where a farmer should be prepared to leave once a mineral 
was discovered on his land. Montagu, the Secretary for Mines had earlier on written to the 
Lands Department arguing against the payment of water used by miners. His point was that “if 
the proposed new legislation takes place were by a farmer has to be compensated by a miner 
for water the latter desired to use we may anticipate a good many applications for farms on 
gold belts with the hope that the acquisition of which will lead to compensation.”213 
 
                                                            
209 Myburgh quoted in the legislative Council Debates, 14 may 1907. 
210 Myburgh quoted in the legislative Council Debates, 14 may 1907. 
211 See W. Mwatwara, ‘A history of state veterinary services and African livestock regimes in colonial Zimbabwe, 
c. 1896-1980’, PhD Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2014. 
212 Milton quoted in the Legislative Council Debates, 14 May 1907. 
213 Letter from Montagu (secretary for mines) to Secretary Department of lands 27 July 1903. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 55 
 
Opposition to water and timber restrictions by the farming community was on the rise and 
miners remained defensive. At the 1906 RAU Congress farmers registered their discontent 
towards the state’s attitude of always standing in the miners’ corner. Trollip, a farmer, drew 
the attention of the congress to the sort of standing order in the country that whenever there 
was an objection raised by a farmer as against the mining community, a law was passed to 
compel the farmer to part with what he was unwilling to part with.214 The Company 
administration always came to the miners’ aid. This was despite the fact that a number of 
schemes had been put in place to promote the growth of settler agricultural in the country. 
These did not however, disadvantage miners in any way.  
 
It seemed the state wanted to maintain the dominance of the mining industry at all cost. In 
1908, the Chamber of Mines passed a crucial resolution stipulating that “in the opinion of this 
chamber all titles to land situated in Mashonaland gold belts must contain full reservation of 
wood, water and grazing for the free use of the mining industry.”215 This resolution was issued 
when the passing of an amendment of the mining law was drawing closer. It clearly defined 
the mood prevailing amongst the miners. They were not willing to give in on the farmers’ 
demands. A farmers and miners conference was held in March 1908 to try and reconcile the 
differences of the two groups in line of the proposals made by the Visiting Directors. However, 
the Mining Act Amendment Number 15 of 1908 did not do much to alter the status quo. The 
pro-miners’ legislation was further entrenched and farmers lost out on their demands. The only 
change introduced by the legislation pertained to access to timber by farmers. It provided for 
the reservation by the Mining Commissioner of wood not exceeding fifty percent for use by 
the farmer.216 The clause only worked when the farmer concerned had genuine need for the 
wood, in which case he was supposed to make an application to the Commissioner of Mines 
for that wood to be reserved against cutting by miners. This was not the end: the struggle 
persisted with each group trying to win concessions that would improve the conditions for its 
members. 
 
It should be noted that applications for the reservation of timber (in line with the latest 
amendment of the mining law) were made by farmers and Mining Commissioners, in certain 
instances supported such applications. For instance, the Mining Commissioner for Bulawayo 
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recommended wood reservation for Edmonstone of Gwanda. Edmonstone had written to the 
Mining Commissioner, who in turn forwarded the application to the Secretary for Mines 
saying:  
I enclose copy of a letter from Edmonstone of Gwanda complaining that his farm Mjeni 
is being cleared of timber for mining purposes thereby depreciating its value. I beg to 
recommend that some reservation be made as in the case of Mr Fynn.217  
 
This case also presented a somehow unique scenario whereby the Mining Commissioner, being 
a true advocate of Company interests, supported a farmer. He argued for the protection of 
farmers’ land against uncontrolled wood cutting and proposed that if possible, a charge should 
be levied for wood removed by mining companies. He wrote to the Secretary for Mines arguing 
that:  
Is it now time the BSAC should impose their charge for cutting timber on their land. If 
they did so a reasonable refund could be made to the farmer in a case like this after he 
has obtained his title. I have been often on the point of writing on this subject as I am 
of opinion the charge would be a fair and reasonable one.218 
 
Here the Mining Commissioner was challenging the principle behind the Gold Belt 
reservations providing miners with free wood. He noted the unfairness characterising the title 
and the need by the administration to drop it for a fairer title. Some more applications for 
reservation of wood were made by farmers in line with the amended legislation. There were 
some farmers who appeared to have taken the reservation clause as an excuse to gain access to 
wood. For instance, Stanley Pyne of Everton Farm in Rusape, he wanted some wood on his 
farm to be reserved from cutting. In presenting Pyne’s case to the Secretary for Mines, the 
Mining Commissioner for Umtali District stated that “He wishes the 500 acres on Everton 
reserved, his reasons being that he requires this reservation for shelter purposes and wind 
breaks and domestic use. He stated that there is no cutting in the immediate vicinity but fears 
that there may be.”219 His farm had not even been subjected to cutting, yet he was already 
applying for reservation. 
  
Small miners, however, still wanted unfettered access to wood and they interpreted the 1908 
Amendment to mean that farms were being given out on the Gold Belt with full right to wood. 
This was raised by Forbes in the House in 1910 on behalf of the Smallworkers Associations, 
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protesting on the alleged action of the BSAC in granting timber rights to farmers on farms 
within the Gold Belt.220 This was in reaction to the several reservation orders that had been 
granted since the new amendment was ratified. They saw these reservations as a challenge to 
their established right over all wood on Gold Belt farms. The Secretary for Mines assured 
Forbes that all the reservations made had been carefully adhered to, with regard especially to 
working mines and where claims were pegged.221 Some farmers too had misinterpreted the new 
amendment and thought that it granted them a new title which gave them exclusive rights over 
all timber. They therefore thought that they were now empowered to charge mine owners for 
wood cut on their farms. A farmer, G. A. Peacocks wrote to P. J. Jensen of Arcturus Mine that:  
Having been informed by Mr Atherstone of Lands Department, that since the grant of 
new title issued to me some two months ago, I have the right to charge for all wood cut 
on my farm such being the case, I shall expect payment for any or all wood cut in 
future.222 
 
Mr Jensen was perturbed and he immediately sought clarification from the Mining 
Commissioner. One of his major worries was that:  
As I hold a permit to cut timber and wood for the Fiona Mine free of charge on Peacocks 
farm, will the government meet any charge there may now exist? The amount of capital 
invested in Fiona on the supposition of free wood and water will otherwise be 
considerably lowered in value, and may even prevent it ever being worked as a 
producing mine.223 
 
The Mining Commissioner, however, allayed his fears by assuring him that there was only a 
single form of GBT issued by the BSAC. Such instances reveal the significance of free wood 
for both famers and miners. 
 
Reservation of wood against cutting by miners on occupied Gold Belt farms was reaffirmed by 
the Mines and Minerals Ordinance Amendment Number 26 of 1914. Farmers were deeply 
dissatisfied and militated for absolute authority over all wood on their farms. This was reflected 
by a resolution that was made by the RAU at their annual congress in 1915 that: 
this Congress is of the opinion that after a farm on the Gold Belt has once had its wood 
cut off by the mines for fuel etc, it should thereafter become exempt for further 
servitudes in that respect, and that the owner of such farm should thereafter be given 
his timber rights over the farm.224 
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The state could not be moved on this point because it wanted the guarantee of miners’ timber 
access to be retained in the country’s mining law. Rather, the Secretary for Mines referred RAU 
to a clause in the 1914 amendment which provided for a simple court of arbitration “to consider 
and settle questions which may arise between a landowner and a prospector, as to whether or 
not ground is open to prevent the entire cutting of wood on an occupied farm.”225 This clause 
did not bring any desired change for the farmers. They were still supposed to make applications 
for reservations to the Secretary for Mines. 
 
The outbreak of World War I in 1914 stimulated the demand for base minerals, especially 
chrome, required for making munitions. This boosted chrome production in Southern Rhodesia 
as producers sought to meet the international demand for the mineral. The mining process for 
chrome ore was different from the manner gold was mined. The extraction of chrome ore on 
the surface was done by means of trenches and shallow excavations, damaging land and 
destroying trees in the process. What made chrome mining more destructive was the nature and 
size of the claims pegged when compared to gold mining. The Secretary for Mines explained 
the differences between base minerals and gold locations in a letter to the Administrator in 
1916:  
At present a base mineral location is 30 claims equivalent to 60 acres, but this size was 
arranged many years ago as the mining industry contended that to place base mineral 
locations on the same basis as gold locations, viz 10 claims of 20 acres, would restrict 
the industry as base minerals occurred in different nature of deposit to gold and were 
not so valuable.226 
 
Farmers quarrelled with the miners on two different fronts. First, the long established battle 
against the Gold Belt restrictions on their land titles, then the destruction caused by base 
minerals mining. In 1923 the Secretary for the RAU wrote a letter to the Secretary for Mines 
urging “the government to amend the mining laws affecting base metals, to prevent the 
destruction of trees and herbage on the large tracts of land without compensation to the 
landowner.227 Nothing was done in this regard because the state was generating a lot of revenue 
from base minerals mining at the time.  
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Farmers did not give up the fight. They continued to pressure the administration to effect 
meaningful changes on the country’s mining laws. This was reflected through the various 
resolutions made by different farmers’ associations calling for the repeal of the GBT. The RAU 
Congress of 1921 noted that this form of title had outlived its usefulness. The following 
resolution by the Hartley Farmers Association was also part of the Congress’ agenda: 
That the administration be asked to introduce legislation altering all present and future titles so 
that in every case the holder of such titles shall be permitted to sell the timber on his land for 
his own benefit for industrial and other purposes on receiving the permission of the Director of 
Land Settlement and the Mining Commissioner of his district, with the right of appeal to the 
Administrator if such permission should be unreasonably withheld.228The Congress resorted to 
making resolutions calling upon the administration to curb the destruction of trees, for the 
miners to provide compensation to landowners and the need for the payment of mining grazing 
fees. Responding to these resolutions, the Secretary for Mines was candid in stating the state’s 
position; he said “I have the honour to inform you that after consideration of resolutions number 
1 and 2 the government are not prepared to introduce legislation to amend the mining law on 
the lines indicated.”229 The Administrator added weight to this statement by saying that it made 
no use to forward the resolutions for discussion by the Chamber of Mines and the Smallworkers 
Associations. He showed his support for the miners by unequivocally stating that “They would 
naturally object to any alteration of the law in the sense proposed, and in view of the 
dependence of the whole country on the mining industry, I find all the objections would have 
to be upheld.”230 The administration considered mining as the country’s chief economic 
activity. Around this same time (1920), Henry Joseph Filmer, who later became Manager for 
the Pangani Asbestos Mine, entered the country from South Africa. The story of his train 
journey provides a crucial pointer to the significance accorded to the mining industry. Upon 
discovering that he did not have a passport or any other document, the Plumtree Border officials 
denied him entry into the country. At that point, Davies, a Bush Tick Mine Engineer he was 
travelling with remarked: “What, a man coming to open up our asbestos industry, you are going 
to stop him coming into the country?”231 Upon further inquiry on the kind of job that he was 
intending to undertake, he was allowed into the country. Although settler agriculture had by 
this time been developed into a viable enterprise, farmers’ concerns continued to be neglected. 
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The government could not be seen to be capitulating to farmers’ demands at that particular time 
when the two sides were involved in a political debate on whether Southern Rhodesia was to 
be granted Responsible Government or to be joined to the Union of South Africa as shall be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Miners’ roads on Gold Belt farms 
Farmers and miners clashes on the Gold Belt were either centred on the resources highlighted 
above, or were concerned about miners’ right of access on the farms. There were 
misunderstandings over roads or lines of rail made usually by miners across farming land. 
Miners needed to transport wood cut from the farms to their mining locations. Also, some 
mines were located far away from main railway lines and so they needed to construct smaller 
lines of rail connecting their mines to the main railway line for easier transportation of minerals 
and machinery. Problems started when such smaller lines were also supposed to pass through 
farming land, thus presenting a major cause for conflict with the farmers whose land was 
involved. Conflicts of this nature were common and they were presided over by Mining 
Commissioners of the various districts. Mining men argued that farmers presented major 
obstacles in their operations by blocking the only available roads, passing through their farms, 
for use by miners. Mennie, a wood contractor cutting wood at Brooksville Farm, complained 
to the Mining Commissioner for Umtali that the farmer refused him permission to continue 
using the only available road across the farm as the agreement between the two had been 
terminated.232 Informing the Secretary for Mines on the dispute the Mining Commissioner 
added that “The contractor now claims a right of way by this road as, owing to hills etc, there 
is no other available route. I now propose visiting the ground again to settle the dispute if 
possible without recourse to law.”233 He later wrote to the farm owner informing him that:  
If this is the case I must inform you that, under your farm title, all timber on your land 
is available for bona fide mining purposes free of charge, also that access to such timber 
must not be interfered with – in other words the right to any timber on your farm or in 
its vicinity carries the right of way thereto, provided, of course that you are not 
prejudiced thereby.234 
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The ruling was made in favour of the miner and his contractor. Although the Registrar of 
Claims later said that a wood contractor did not have any rights whatsoever, as a wood 
contractor, he only derived rights from being an agent of a mine. The ruling made by the Mining 
Commissioner was made to stand.  
 
Another case reported at the RAU Congress in 1915 had clearly laid bare the bias of Mining 
Commissioners in the settlement of cases of this nature. A mining company intending to ferry 
its minerals to the main railway line had commenced surveying of the line and started actual 
work on it without consulting owners of the land over which the line was passing through. One 
of the farmers objected to the line going over his farm, resulting in the matter being taken to 
the Mining Commissioner for Gwelo. Without hearing evidence from either of the two sides, 
he decided that the mining company had the right to take its line over the land without paying 
farthing compensation.235 The line passed within a few yards to an orchard and was very close 
to the farmer’s house. The farmer concerned was not happy with the manner the case was 
adjudicated.  
 
It was further revealed that the same mining company had reneged on its initial promise of 
giving the owner of the farm first call to supply vegetables to the mine and a monetary payment 
of £300. The mining company had made this promise to the farmer as compensation for 
allowing the railway line to pass through his farm. This might have been a deliberate move by 
the company knowing well that the Mining Commissioner was going to settle the dispute in its 
favour. Trollip contended that such cases were unjust and further argued that “when a mining 
company got any advantage from a farmer, it should be prepared to pay for it.”236 Farmers were 
not happy with the manner in which the Mining Commissioners had handled the cases and the 
RAU Congress made the following resolution at their 1915 congress: 
That this Congress is of the opinion that applications by mining companies and mine 
owners for permission to lay and work light railways over private lands and similar 
applications affecting the owners of land, should be referred for decision to arbitration 
in terms of the Lands and Arbitration Clauses Act, 1882 as provided for under section 
5 of the Mining Law Amending Ordinance, No. 26 of 1914, instead of being decided 
as at present provided for under section 171 of the Mines and Minerals Ordinance 
1903.237 
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Their major argument was that if the matter had been dealt with by arbitration, not the Mining 
Commissioners, a decision could have been made that the mining companies should pay 
compensation for the land that they used. Allen stood to argue that the matter involved a vital 
principle and could affect any farmer whose land was in the vicinity of a mining area.238 
According to Allen “It was not a matter of penalising the mining company but it was a question 
of an ordinary payment for value received.”239 Farmers were no longer comfortable having 
Mining Commissioners adjudicating in any other disputes that involved farmers and miners. 
Mining Commissioners were biased towards miners hence the need for neutral arbitration by 
the farmers. 
 
Conflicts of this nature were not limited to farmers and miners only. Miners also quarrelled 
amongst themselves, not only for gold claims, but also on issues related to roads. A miner could 
block a fellow miner’s intention to construct a road passing through the former’s claims. An 
example of a conflict of this nature was reported to the Mining Commissioner for Umtali by 
the Manager of the Bartissol Gold Mining Company Limited. He claimed that Little (a claim 
holder) had stopped his men from making a small deviation from the main road, the latter had 
been made impassable by the heavy rains.240 The road was mainly used to transport timber 
from Tshituku forest. The slight deviation was supposed to pass through Little’s claims but he 
had objected to the move and stopped men sent by Bartissol Mine from working.241 Such 
disputes between farmers and miners as well as between miners themselves were very common 
in the country’s main mining areas. Mining Commissioners and in some instances Civil 
Commissioners presided over the disputes with the sole aim of harmonising the parties 
concerned. Farmers continued challenging the use of Mining Commissioners in the settlement 
of farmer-miner disputes. The government did not change the system since it ensured that 
miners’ interests were protected against the farmers. 
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Conclusion 
The chapter has highlighted the evolution of Gold Belt reservations on land granted to farmers 
in gold bearing areas.  The system entrenched the administration’s favouritism of mining 
interests as the country’s major economic activity. The chapter argued that conflicts between 
farmers and miners were not a result of any attempts to foster environmentalism nor were they 
driven by farmers’ and miners’ desire to control the means of production as previously 
presented by existing literature on miner-farmer relations. Rather, the conflicts were a direct 
result of how the Company administration intended to structure the colonial economy from the 
onset. The ever-shifting policies of the administration, as represented by legislation and 
pronouncements by the administrative officials such as Mining Commissioners, the 
Administrator and Company Directors, were the major sources from which conflicts emanated 
as has been demonstrated in the chapter. As shall be demonstrated in succeeding chapters, the 
nature of the state policy and its intentions on the country’s economy continued to dictate the 
nature of farmer-miner relations. Its role as arbiter kept changing over time and this 
significantly influenced how the state interacted with the different interests. By highlighting 
the manner in which the BSAC planned to structure the colonial economy, the chapter has 
revealed the ensuing relationship between farmers and miners in the country. It has also dealt 
with the various controversies surrounding this land holding title (GBT) in relation to the 
overall Company’s land settlement policy. The chapter has shown that, although the Company 
adopted a formal settler agricultural policy from 1908 onwards, it never lost interest in mining. 
Settler agriculture certainly received concessions which were not availed to the indigenous 
African agricultural sector, but mining remained the favoured child. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
‘He who pays the piper has the right to call the tune?’ 
Administration, representation and taxation in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1898 to 1923. 
 
 
Upon being granted a Royal Charter by the British government, the British South Africa 
Company (BSAC) hastily embarked upon effective occupation of the territory north of the 
Limpopo River and commenced prospecting for gold. Cecil John Rhodes set up a government 
led by the Company to administer both Mashonaland and Matebeleland as well as to facilitate 
the building of railways and telegraphs, develop commerce and to explore the country’s 
mineral resources as stipulated in his application for the Charter.242 This Company 
administration presided over Southern Rhodesia’s affairs until the Charter was terminated in 
1923. It grappled with numerous setbacks in its attempts to develop a colonial economy, 
initially based on mining as discussed in the previous chapter. This was notwithstanding the 
criticism and challenges from the growing, but disillusioned settler population which was 
already calling for the dismantling of Company rule soon after 1900.  
 
A body of scholarly work exists on how Southern Rhodesia attained Responsible Government 
in 1923. Literature on the subject has covered aspects on the voting pattern in the 1922 
referendum and South Africa’s interest in incorporating Southern Rhodesia into the Union.243 
Other historians have chronicled this phase of the country’s history by focusing on the political 
careers of prominent figures in the fight for Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia.244 
Three historians in the last generation have explored on intra-racial relations by focusing on 
white farmers and the state in Southern Rhodesia.245 This literature provides the current basis 
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African Studies, 23, 2 (1997), 259-281; J. P. R. Wallis, One man’s hand: The story of Sir Charles Coghlan and 
the liberation of Southern Rhodesia, (London: Longman, 1950). 
245 J. A. McKenzie, ‘Commercial farmers in the governmental of colonial Zimbabwe, 1963-1980’, PhD Thesis 
University of Zimbabwe, 1989; A. Selby, ‘Commercial farmers and the state: Interest group politics and land 
reform in Zimbabwe’, PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 2006; R. Pilossof, The unbearable whiteness of being: 
Farmers’ voices from Zimbabwe, (Cape Town: Cape Town University Press, 2012). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 65 
 
for understanding issues on land, agriculture and the state in Southern Rhodesia. This chapter 
contributes to this existing historiography by tracing settler discontent with the BSAC 
administration in Southern Rhodesia during the period of Company administration. It argues 
that, apart from clamouring for changes in the administrative system as presented by M. E. 
Lee,246 there was an ever-growing desire by the elected members of the Legislative Council to 
have administrative power ceded to representatives of the tax paying settlers by the BSAC. 
Settlers had been granted representation in the Council in 1898 and by 1913 they had majority 
representation.247 This was, however, not complemented by administrative power and therefore 
failed to placate the settlers. They contributed to the country’s revenue and there were 
indications that the Company administration would bequeath to the succeeding settler 
government (after expiry of the Charter) a debt of past expenditure. Elected members thus 
continuously demanded an influential administrative role as shall be demonstrated by this 
chapter.  
 
The chapter joins a historical conversation on law and the state in colonial Africa. Existing 
literature has confined law in colonial Africa to be a platform of engagement between 
Europeans and Africans.248 This thesis adds an equally important dimension by focusing on the 
role of law in shaping the contours of contestation between key settler interest groups in 
Southern Rhodesia. C. Palley’s249 (1966) publication on Southern Rhodesia’s constitutional 
history presented a detailed discussion on the evolution of the country’s constitution. However, 
Palley’s emphasis was on Britain’s role in Southern Rhodesian constitutional development as 
well as a discussion of various government institutions in the second part of the book.250 This 
chapter concentrates on the significance of the Legislative Council in challenging the BSAC’s 
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continued hold over power. Through exploring debates in the Legislative Council on the 
significance of tax payment in relation to lobbying for settler rule, the chapter challenges M. 
Moore’s argument on the prominence of taxation issues on the public political agenda in 
southern countries. Moore argues that taxation issues have been far less prominent on the 
political agendas in the south than within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries.251 Moore’s template is not applicable to Southern Rhodesia’s 
case where debates about taxation, representation and administration formed the basis of 
agitation against Company administration and ultimately contributed to the attainment of 
Responsible Government in 1923. 
 
Scholars who have written on the subject have argued that settlers were always appealing for 
increased representation in line with the growing settler population.252 Although almost an 
historiographical truism, this chapter makes extensive use of Legislative Council debates to 
reveal that settler representatives themselves aspired for real political power to be granted to 
the country’s settlers rather than merely paper representation. Besides the various pressure 
groups which constituted the core of Lee’s study, the Legislative Council was the single most 
important constitutional platform available for the settlers to challenge Company rule. The 
chapter begins by analysing the nexus of representation, administration and taxation 
highlighting the need for more administrative power by the settler representatives. It briefly 
outlines attempts by the country’s settlers and their representatives in the Legislative Council 
to terminate chartered rule. The chapter proceeds to give an example of how the Company 
administration manipulated the flaws in the legislative system to dodge resolution of important 
matters such as its claim to be the legal owner of the country’s land resource. The Company 
promoted mining interests at the expense of farming and commercial interests. This rift was 
manifested when settler representatives demanded the amendment of the country’s mining laws 
with very limited success, as Chapter Two explained. The chapter then considers the politics 
in the period from the end of the First World War to 1923. It highlights how the settler 
representatives attempted to extricate the country from the hands of Company rule by making 
repeated calls to the Imperial government to transfer power from the BSAC to the tax paying 
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settlers. The chapter therefore uses the divisions in the Legislative Council as a lens to examine 
the intra-settler struggles in the settler community. These also mirrored on the existing state-
farmer-miner differences that characterised interaction of the triad in the period of Company 
administration and after. 
 
Representation and taxation: Elected members in a BSAC dominated legislative council 
After conquering King Lobengula and his Ndebele State in 1893, the BSAC was granted 
permission by the imperial government to administer the territory.253 Consequently, an Order 
in Council was issued in 1894 and it provided for the appointment of an administrator to govern 
the country with the aid of a Council made up of Company appointees.254 With this 
arrangement, the Administrator and his Council were placed under the supervision of the 
London Board, which had the final say on all vital matters concerning government of the 
territory. Appointed members of the Council represented and served Company interests and 
this left no one to represent the varied interests of the emerging farming and commercial 
interests. Lee discussed the emergence and development of various pressure groups that aspired 
to fight for settler interests since there was no settler political representation in the Council.255 
Settler discontent on the absence of elected members scored early success when the Company 
granted sectional representation through an 1898 Order in Council.256 Settler representation 
initially set at four members, was finally brought to par with that of Company representatives 
in 1903 after the Settler Representative Association had made a direct appeal to Rhodes against 
settler under-representation in the Legislative Council.257 This equality was only on paper 
because in reality elected members could not outvote the nominated representatives on crucial 
policy issues. Strict instructions were dispatched to the Company from the colonial office 
stating that “For as long as the Company bore the expense of governing the country, there must 
be no chance of the official members being outvoted by the elected members.”258 Whenever a 
stalemate was reached on discussions in the Council, the Administrator used his casting vote 
to ensure victory for Company interests (when the elected representatives had an equal number 
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of representatives with the appointed members), and he could veto any issue that contradicted 
the interests of the BSAC. 
 
The BSAC had a firm hold over the country’s affairs and controlled political as well as 
economic affairs. The following examples can be cited to show the level of control that the 
Company had on the country’s affairs. Sir E. L. Guest, a lawyer who held various senior 
ministerial positions in the government including Minister for Air during the Second World 
War, highlighted the extent of the Company’s control by noting that it “dictated what you were 
to have for breakfast.”259 Guest arrived in Southern Rhodesia from Kimberly where he had also 
experienced a company (De Beers), dominating the whole system. Upon arrival in Southern 
Rhodesia, he realised that there existed a similar scenario with the BSAC having absolute 
control of the country’s affairs. This dominance resulted from a combination of factors. One 
of the major sources of the Company’s dominance was a reliance of the bulk of the country’s 
population for employment opportunities on the BSAC or associate companies such as 
Willoughby’s Consolidated and the Gold Fields (which also supported the BSAC’s agenda).260 
Patrick Fletcher (Agriculture Minister in the 1940s) highlighted an example of a case where 
the BSAC manipulated the railway company for its own advantage. He noted that a train 
transporting voters (for the 1914 election) to Bulawayo suddenly developed a ‘hot box’ and 
stopped outside Bulawayo. One of the voters travelling on that train was an ex-engine driver 
so he went to check with the driver, he realised there was no ‘hot box’ after all on the engine.261 
This was a strategy to delay voters so that they could arrive in Bulawayo after polls had closed. 
This was just one example of how the Company utilised the position of authority to its favour. 
 
The country was being run by a commercial company which had a dual mandate, first as a 
business that was supposed to generate profits for its shareholders, and then as a government 
to preside over all administrative matters. It was not the Company’s desire to incur losses as a 
result of its administrative mandate in Southern Rhodesia and therefore all funds advanced to 
the administrative side were classified as a debt to be offset by future revenues. This scenario 
was challenged by Percy Ross Frames, elected representative for Mashonaland, who in 1902 
moved a motion that “The time has arrived when the British South Africa Company should 
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contribute a definite sum to the revenue of this territory, in proportion to the property and 
interests which the said Company has in this country, for the good government thereof.”262 The 
Company was thus expected to make a contribution towards the country’s administration. 
Immigrants who had settled in the country and commenced various business and employment 
ventures were making a huge contribution towards the country’s revenue, assisting the 
Company in the process. Indigenous Africans were subjected to coercive taxation 
“characterised by arbitrary assessment, coercive collection and the absence of any 
representation for taxpayers in policy decisions.”263They contributed a significant portion 
towards the same. For example, out of a total revenue of £435 000 collected in 1903/04, 
Africans had contributed £130 000 through taxes.264 In spite of such contributions, Africans 
were at the receiving end of the administration’s repressive and oppressive laws and remained 
at the periphery of the administrative system.  
 
During these early days of colonial rule, the country’s expenditure surpassed accumulated 
revenue and thus left a huge deficit. Frames noted that “the revenue from 1897 to March 1902 
had been roughly £77 000 and the expenditure £1 695 000 leaving a deficit of £1 618 000 
which had been advanced but not contributed by the Chartered Company as a commercial 
concern.”265 The settler population which constituted mostly, as stated by the Administrator, 
of wage earners made a contribution to this collected revenue.266 These settlers, who were still 
recovering from the economic depression of the recent past years, could not be expected to 
cover the deficit through further taxation. The Company was therefore expected to make a 
definite contribution towards the country’s revenue and ameliorate this problem. The 
administration, however, rejected this proposal, arguing that such a move could only be 
considered when the country’s revenue and expenditure had balanced. 
 
The country’s economy was still at an embryonic stage and therefore the income of most 
settlers was still constrained. Yet the settlers still managed to contribute towards the country’s 
revenue. This was raised by Herbert Longden, member of the House for the Midlands district 
during one of his lengthy presentations in the Legislative Council in 1907 on the disadvantages 
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of Company administration and the limitations that it imposed on the country’s nascent 
economy and its settler population. He opined:  
Was it not extraordinary that in a country like this, with its small population, with its 
small resources as yet almost wholly undeveloped that the people were nevertheless 
able to provide the revenue, which was now exceeding over half a million necessary 
for the purpose of carrying on the government and although able to do all that they had 
no voice whatever in the administration and only a semblance of representation in the 
administration.267 
 
Settler agitation had succeeded in the granting of representation in the Legislative Council, a 
move which gave them an opportunity to express their views and criticise the manner in which 
the Company was running the country. Although settlers were accorded a platform to register 
their discontent, such criticism of the administration by elected members in the Council 
counted for nothing because it could simply be outvoted by the nominated members using the 
Administrator’s casting vote as well as his veto power.  
 
The country’s white population, which numbered 12 596 in 1904,268 was therefore left with no 
voice in the actual administration of the country. The seven elected members were mere 
figureheads in the Council because their presence did not make a difference. The other seven 
members, nominated by the Company, usually acted in unison since they were subjected to a 
whipping system which made it mandatory for them to pursue and sustain specific arguments 
suggested by the Administrator. In most cases this was done to protect the commercial interests 
of the Company – with no regard to the proper administration of the country for the benefit of 
the general populace. The scenario was made worse, as Longden noted, because opinions of 
the elected members “were free, and because they were free, they were sometimes divided” 
while arguments of the appointed members were “consistently and obediently unanimous and 
they recorded their votes with the reliability and the sureness of a mechanical automaton.”269 
The BSAC administrative system thus dictated its own terms and its success was guaranteed 
by the country’s legislative system that was tilted in its favour. It thus became imperative (in 
settler eyes) to dismantle this form of government and replace it with a more representative 
government which placed real administrative authority in the hands of the settler population as 
shall be discussed in succeeding sections. 
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It became increasingly difficult for the elected members of the Legislative Council (as well as 
the electorate) to trust the Company administration. The London Board supervised the 
administrative system and made sure that its desires were fulfilled. Gordon Forbes, who was 
an elected member of the Legislative Council for the Western District, argued that the 
Company’s administrative structure was:  
Controlled by a Board whose business it was to look after the commercial side of the 
Chartered Company. They must endeavour to make a success of the business; therefore, 
when the interests of this country clashed in any shape or form with the interests of the 
company they could expect nothing else but that the interests of this country should go 
to the wall.270 
 
Under such circumstances, settler interests were sacrificed for policies that promoted and 
provided a safeguard for the Company’s commercial interests. This argument can be used to 
justify the continuation of the Gold Belt Title (GBT) despite continued calls for its repeal by 
farming interests, both inside and outside the Legislative Council from 1905. Administrators 
feared that its repeal would negatively affect the country’s mining industry by scaring away 
international mining capital which might have entertained hopes of investing in the country’s 
mining sector, as Chapter Two noted. Thus elected members and the various sections of society 
that they represented wanted to get rid of the Company administration. They hoped to replace 
it by whatever form of government which was directly responsible to the people. Responsible 
Government featured prominently in many Legislative Council debates as the most preferred 
form of administration, by the elected members to take over from Company rule. 
 
As noted, elected members could freely put forth their views even if they contradicted motions 
raised by fellow elected members. Differences certainly existed between the various groups of 
settler interests represented in the Legislative Council. Raleigh Grey, an elected member of the 
Council for the Northern District was a classic example of an elected member who decided on 
some occasions to support the Company nominees in the Legislative Council. His company, 
Rhodesia Lands Limited, owned vast tracts of land as well as successful mining ventures such 
as the Jumbo Mine. He could therefore not be classified as an ordinary farmer representative, 
since his personal circumstances differed from average settler farmers whose interests were 
being suppressed by the Company’s actions. Rather, he could have easily qualified as a 
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nominated member because of his land and mining interests. Grey’s sentiments in the House 
were pro-big business, he argued against the idea of Responsible Government on the basis that 
no one in Southern Rhodesia was ready to take up a full time government post. His main 
concern was how those elected “were going to carry on as businessmen if they were called 
upon to take over the government and all sit in their offices on purely government business 
from one end of the year to the other?”271 Contrary to what had been said by his fellow elected 
colleagues, he argued that the representation system in use was satisfactory and that the only 
improvement needed was an addition of a few more elected members in line with growth of 
the settler population. This revealed the heterogeneity of the elected members: they did not 
share homogenous concerns, an attribute synonymous with the settlers themselves who had 
different interests shaped by various factors. 
 
Attempts to terminate Company rule 
Despite the insignificance of settler representation in the Legislative Council, it provided a 
forum to call for the termination of Company rule and its substitution with a new form of 
government. Debates on the termination of Company rule became a centre of discussion in the 
Legislative Council. Failure of calls for abrogation of the Charter demonstrated the strong grip 
of the Company on the country’s administration and the futility of the representation granted 
to the country’s settlers. A number of factors had resulted in the development of an anti-
Company government sentiment in the country during that time. G. Goldie, a financial 
representative of the BSAC Board, sent a memorandum to the Legislative Council in which he 
stated that his investigations (on the Company’s instigation) had revealed that Southern 
Rhodesia’s expenditure was in excess of £7. 5 million, he further noted that this was a debt to 
the BSAC for which the settlers were liable.272 He therefore proposed that the settlers be 
granted administrative power on condition that their new government was immediately saddled 
with this debt. This sparked indignation with the cross section of the country’s settler society.273 
The ultimate result was a conference of representatives of the country’s people convened in 
Salisbury in July 1904. The Salisbury conference was marked by heated arguments and the 
Company administrators dismissed it as a sham – mainly because of the resolutions adopted 
by the delegates. One of the main resolutions was “That it is desirable that the administrative 
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rights of the Chartered Company should cease as soon as they can be relieved of the 
responsibility for any deficiency between revenue and expenditure.”274 Delegates from the 
extreme side of the conference selected a delegation that went to England to present settler 
grievances to the London Board. These were drawn from all sectors experiencing the heavy 
handedness of Company administration. They also tabled a request for scrapping of the 30 
percent share clause on mining, reduction of railway tariffs especially for farm produce, an 
absolute majority of the elected members in the Legislative Council as well as repudiation of 
all past budget deficits once settler majority was in control. 
 
In 1907, Longden raised a motion in the Council that “in the interest of the country the British 
South Africa Company ought to be relieved of its administrative responsibilities in Southern 
Rhodesia and the administration entrusted to a government adequately representative of the 
people.”275 Apart from the resolution adopted at the 1904 conference which revealed the 
settlers’ desire to relieve the Company of its administrative duties, no attempt had been made 
to push for a change of government through a constitutional channel in the Legislative Council. 
This can be attributed to a realisation by the elected members of the futility of trying to call for 
something which the nominated members, with the backing of the London Board, would 
vehemently oppose and ultimately destroy using their majority in the House. Presenting his 
motion, Longden said that continued silence by elected representatives of the people on the 
issue was bound to be misinterpreted by the Chartered Company as a reflection of people’s 
contentment with the status quo.276 This argument does not downplay the significance of 
protests to Company administration outside the Legislative Council such as that exhibited at 
the 1904 Salisbury conference. It, however, illuminates the significance of the Legislative 
Council in the country’s government system. It reveals the unwillingness of elected members 
to continue under the dominance of Company authority. 
 
Longden made attempts to demonstrate that the view on the change of government was shared 
by many other settlers who had registered their discontent on various forums. He made 
reference to the 1904 Salisbury conference as an example of such platforms were dislike of 
continued Company administration had been voiced. He also referred to the High 
Commissioner’s visit to Southern Rhodesia in October 1906. In every town visited by the High 
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Commissioner he was met by various deputations from the people and public bodies whose 
grievances converged on the fact that “the country could make no true progress as long as the 
Chartered Company had the control over their affairs.”277 Company administration was 
accused of breeding national uncertainty. This was not good for Southern Rhodesia’s economic 
well-being. The GBT, which was given to farmers who purchased land in areas with high 
mineral potential, for instance, dissuaded potential immigrants from considering taking up land 
and commencing agricultural production. These complications could only be resolved by 
relieving the BSAC of its administrative duties. This view had been discussed in the Council 
during debates on the GBT discussed in Chapter Two. 
 
The Company’s claim to land ownership 
The previous chapter highlighted the significance attached to land by the administration. It 
therefore maintained its hold and control over the country’s land resources to further its 
commercial interests. The Company’s claim to land ownership and failure by the country’s 
legislature to resolve the dispute is a good example of how the BSAC took advantage of its 
superior position in the Legislative Council to sustain the claim until its final resolution in 
1918. Control over land allowed the BSAC to promote its commercial interests anchored on 
uninterrupted exploration and exploitation of gold deposits as well as unhindered land sales. 
This claim to land ownership was, as emphasised by the Treasurer in 1906, based on the 
conquest of the Ndebele after the 1893 war of disposition.278 Thus, the Company controlled all 
the land in its commercial as well as administrative capacity, a scenario which sparked conflicts 
with settlers.279 The country’s settlers detested this Company attitude of promoting its 
commercial interests while neglecting the country’s development. 
 
The Company was not willing to relinquish its control over land and it advanced different 
explanations to justify its claim to land ownership. When it was contesting the 1918 Privy 
Council verdict, which granted land ownership to the Imperial government, the BSAC stated 
that when it had inquired from the colonial office in 1898 asking to have all administrative 
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expenditure not met by revenue to be charged against the country and to constitute a public 
debt. The reply from the colonial office on the 18th of July 1898 stated that the Secretary of 
State:  
Must decline to pledge His Majesty’s government in advance to acknowledging 
anything in the nature of a public debt, or of a charge on the administration as 
distinguished from the company itself, which has been placed in possession of all the 
assets of the country.280 
 
The key phrase in this letter was ‘all assets’, which was interpreted by the Company to be 
referring to all the country’s assets chief amongst which was the land and minerals. The 
argument here was that the Company was made, by the Imperial government, to believe that it 
owned land in the country. Land was even used as a guarantee when the BSAC raised capital 
on the London market. It raised £4 292 937 between 1896 and 1906.281 All this while, the 
BSAC noted: 
the company naturally placed before its shareholders what had been officially stated by 
the crown with regard to “all the assets of the country,” including the land, the 
company’s possession of which constituted an essential part of the security which was 
being offered to the public in return for its money, and laid great stress upon that 
possession.282 
 
The struggle as to ascertain the rightful land owner between the Company and the country’s 
settlers raged on until it was halted by a 1918 Privy Council ruling as shall be illustrated in 
succeeding sections. The struggle in turn ignited new conflicts over land tenure legislation and 
the control of funds derived from land. The Company appropriated such moneys derived from 
land sales and quit rent to its commercial enterprise a move which infuriated settlers who 
preferred to have such funds expended solely for administrative purposes. 
 
It was on the basis of this control over land and the desire to ensure prosperity of the mining 
venture that the Company initially did not issue land for farming purposes on the Gold Belt. A 
shift in this policy saw the crafting of Gold Belt reservations for farmers who purchased land 
in areas deemed to contain the country’s richest gold deposits. This land title became a major 
cause for concern and sparked the miner-farmer controversy as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Apart from the land title issued for land in the mining areas, the administration had 
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parcelled out vast tracts of land to the big land companies who held on to the land for 
speculative purposes (as demonstrated in Chapter Two). Selby observed that “Speculative land 
purchases by the British South Africa Company and other land consortiums such as 
Willoughby’s Consolidated preceded most settler farming and dominated land control in terms 
of quality and quantity.”283 This land lay idle and could not be accessed by incoming settlers 
who wanted to start farming and make productive use of the land. Jameson, who had presided 
over the extensive land handouts, acknowledged that, by pursuing this course of action, the 
Company had erred. He made this confession in 1907 when he visited the country as part of 
the delegation of Company Directors:  
As regards these concessions – the Company have to a certain extent locked up the 
country, and I must confess that in those early days I was principally responsible for a 
great many of them. Grants were then given to companies on condition that they 
introduced so much money in the country to keep it going. That time has passed and I 
do not think there will be any complaint of any future grants. I may tell you that the 
Chartered Company are more sick of them than anybody else.284  
 
It also resulted in settler discontent over the manner in which the land revenue was being 
appropriated especially after 1907 when land transactions were transferred to the Company’s 
commercial side.285 The ultimate result was a growing desire by the settler population to gain 
control of the country’s Legislative Council so that they could challenge the Company 
dominance and influence change on such crucial matters as the ownership of land. The 
Legislative Council (in which settlers had been granted representation in 1898) became a major 
platform to register settler discontent and demand for more power for the settlers so that they 
could challenge the Company’s monopoly. Longden raised an objection to the country’s 
constitution which enabled the BSAC, through the administration to “promote its commercial 
interests in the country to the detriment of the rights of people.”286 This included enormous 
land grants that were made to the large landowning companies who – in turn – held on to the 
land for speculative purposes, obstructing the development of farming ventures in the process. 
There was a growing need to curtail Company dominance in the Council and replace it with 
settler hegemony over administrative affairs.  
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Elected members in the Legislative Council challenged the Company’s claim to own the land 
on a number of occasions. The Company considered the land as one of its precious investments 
and any challenge to the claim was criticised vigorously. It should be emphasised that although 
the land ownership issue generated intense debate in the Council, the legislative body could 
not reach common ground as the Company always defended its position. It was during such 
crucial debates that deficiencies of the country’s legislative system were exposed. Elected 
members could challenge the Company nominees on the issue, make elaborate presentations 
supporting their views but at the end of it all the nominated members always emerged 
victorious. 
 
Longden challenged the Company’s claim to be the legitimate owner of all of the country’s 
land resources in 1905. Contrary to the Company’s rhetoric of basing their land title to the 
Royal Charter, he argued that “the Chartered Company was prepared to arrogate to itself 
powers which it did not lawfully possess.”287 The Company was on the defence and employed 
all sorts of arguments in trying to justify its title to land ownership. C. Tredgold, the Attorney 
General, challenged such arguments and even contended that it did not lie in the hands of the 
inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia to refute the Chartered Company’s title to land. He was 
supported by F. J. Newton, the Treasurer, who went as far as quoting a fellow Company man, 
the late former Attorney General Kotze, who had “pronounced a very decided opinion that by 
both the Charter and the legislation of the country, the land and mineral rights belonged to the 
company.”288 After a lengthy debate session, the Council failed to reach any agreement on this 
question of land ownership and a vote was called for, after which both sides were at par with 
six votes each. Under such circumstances H. W. Milton, the President, gave his vote against 
the motion arguing that the motion on land ownership was not within the province of the 
Council and the motion was thrown away.289 Although the BSAC granted equal representation 
to the elected members, that equality was not bearing anything positive. This is one of the many 
instances when the administrator used his casting vote in favour of the nominated members. 
Representation granted to the settlers therefore carried no weight as the will of the Chartered 
Company continued to prevail at the expense of the elected representatives. 
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Revenue and expenditure 
Another source of conflict between the Company administration and the elected members of 
the Legislative Council concerned the country’s revenue and expenditure. The dual nature of 
the BASC made it a difficult task to distinguish between the Company’s revenue and money 
which was supposed to be directed to treasury. When the BSAC Directors visited the country 
in 1907, settlers hoped that they would provide a lasting solution to this problem which had 
been exacerbated by the transfer of all land transactions to the Company’s commercial side. 
The visiting Directors however failed to provide useful remedies to this, and many other 
grievances presented before them by the country’s settlers. Rather they proposed minor reforms 
which were mere palliatives and they failed to tackle the major points of conflict between the 
Company and the settlers. It was strange, as argued by Longden that such a serious matter 
remained unresolved and remained a subject of debate in the Legislative Council soon after the 
Directors’ departure. Settler representatives questioned the manner in which the Company was 
allocating revenue to its administrative and commercial accounts. The source of the problem, 
as was noted by Gordon Forbes was “because a certain portion of the money was derived from 
assets which were distinctly the property of the Company. But the greater proportion of it the 
people claimed, belonged to the revenue of the country.”290 For example, before 1907 funds 
realised from the inspection of mining claims were credited to the country’s revenue account. 
This was changed after 1907 when the same money was treated as the Company’s private 
revenue. Such funds which, elected members argued were supposed to be used in financing the 
country’s development, were now being used for the Company’s benefit. On behalf of the 
elected members, Forbes therefore challenged the principle employed by the Company in 
diverting funds that were supposed to finance the country’s fledging industries (especially 
farming) for private company use.  
 
After 1907 the Company administration made changes to its budget system and allocated to 
the Company income that had all along been considered as administrative revenue. This 
development raised more questions, which required immediate answers from the 
administration. For instance, the following case can be cited for the 1906/07 financial year. In 
that particular year, the gross revenue of Southern Rhodesia amounted to £539 912 and the 
expenditure was £501 989, leaving a surplus of £37 923.291 Yet the Company claimed over 
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£70 000 for their commercial side and left the country with a deficit. Again in his budget 
statement presentation for the year 1908, the Treasurer noted that the country had shown a 
surplus of £10 000 but at the same time highlighted that some of the money belonged to the 
Company in its private capacity.292 After the deductions were made, the country was again left 
with a deficit. Elected representatives argued that the Company administration was short-
changing the country and the majority of the settlers for its selfish commercial interests. Charles 
Patrick Coghlan, who had moved to Bulawayo in 1900 to practice law and became a vigorous 
campaigner for Responsible Government, was first elected to the Legislative Council in 1908 
representing the Western electoral district,293 challenged the actions of the BSAC of turning 
administrative revenue into commercial revenue and vice versa as they wished. He argued that 
“any tariff authorised in an ordinance was taxation unless there was something in the ordinance 
which stated it had to be specifically devoted to private purpose such as the 30 percent clause 
or royalty upon gold won.”294 This distinction was necessary as a move to stop the Company 
from deriving benefits through the country’s resources while at the same time retaining 
absolute administrative authority over the same settlers that it was ‘fleecing’. Criticism of the 
system was not only confined to the elected members of the Legislative Council. Even the 
Company’s Auditor-General opposed the new system and pointed out that “revenue collected 
under administrative ordinances ought to accrue to the administrative funds.”295  
 
Settlers and their representatives considered it correct for the Company to collect all the royalty 
on minerals. However, it was not entitled to appropriate other revenues that were again 
connected to mining. Such revenues as observed by Hone “were collected purely in the form 
of taxation and the licences and certificates were stamped with the government stamp to the 
value of the amount paid.”296 Hone further notes that the administrative stamp: 
Was an acknowledgement that the tax was for the purposes of administration, and was 
a statutory obligation imposed because the country had a certain expense in maintaining 
good government and in the protection of the claim holders, the cost of which was 
defrayed out of public revenue.297  
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After all this income related to mining had been appropriated to the commercial side of the 
Company, expenditure for the Mining Department was charged against the country. This 
practice was criticised by Coghlan. His argument hinged on the fact that people in the Mining 
Department acted more as “collectors for the British South Africa Company for the Company’s 
private purpose”298, – yet the country was charged for their upkeep. Representation in the 
Legislative Council enabled the elected members to challenge the Company’s administration 
of the country’s financial resources. They however could not force through amendments to the 
system since this was deemed an attack on the Company’s commercial interests and therefore 
was not tolerated. Representation alone without real administrative authority was not benefiting 
the settlers. This conflict over revenue conforms to M. Moore’s theoretical underpinnings on 
taxation. Moore’s core proposition is that political regimes are the outcome of conflict and 
tension between the elite who control the state and societal actors who desire to restrain this 
power and ultimately gain political power for themselves.299 Revenue is central in this tussle. 
The fight to control revenue between the BSAC and the settlers in Southern Rhodesia was a 
typical case which fits Moore’s scenario. The struggle continued throughout Company 
administration and was crucial in the achievement of Responsible Government. 
 
The arbitrary appropriation of revenue to the commercial side of the Company emanated from 
the porous boundary between the Company’s assets and revenue, and that which belonged to 
the country (and was therefore supposed to cater for administrative expenditure). Another 
elected member, Colonel Grey, proposed that the Company should revert to its old budget 
system which gave the Treasurer use of land revenue and inspection payments. He argued that 
“the people of this country had just as good a case in regard to those monies as the British 
South Africa Company.”300 Since the Company Directors had failed to solve this problem, 
elected members resolved to refer the matter to the High Commissioner as well as the Secretary 
of State for Colonies. The administrative officials were not prepared to give in on this settler 
request but at the same time, did not like the matter to be taken to the colonial office. Opposing 
this motion to refer the matter to the High Commissioner, the Treasurer said that it did not 
serve neither the BSAC nor the country’s settlers to have other South African colonies say 
“There are the public of Rhodesia at loggerheads with the British South Africa Company 
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again.”301 The following resolution was however adopted by the Legislative Council in line 
with Grey’s proposal: 
The Council therefore requests that its respectful request be conveyed to His Excellency 
the High Commissioner through the Honour the Administrator, that the matter in 
question be inquired into and be decided upon by His Majesty’s government without 
delay.302 
 
Settler representatives hoped that the British government would provide a solution to this 
problem which had been brought about by the Company’s desire to promote its commercial 
entity. The manner in which the BSAC handled the matter exhibited the power that the 
Company Directors had over the country’s affairs. It revealed that the centre of administrative 
power lay in London and that no matter what the elected members attempted to do, their 
representation did not count for much under the prevailing administrative system headed by 
the Company. The overall result exposed the Company’s insincerity in finding a lasting 
solution to the problem regarding the differences on the interpretation of commercial and 
administrative revenue. Commenting on the settlers’ vulnerability to the Company’s abuses, 
Coghlan declared: 
The people of this country were like men fighting with their hands tied behind their 
backs. Everything they did was open to the Directors of the British South Africa 
Company but the people knew nothing about the representations made by the Directors 
to the Secretary of State.303 
 
The BSAC had taken advantage of its position of authority to disadvantage the settlers in their 
plight to have the Company’s position on revenue and expenditure revised. The Secretary of 
the BSAC had presented the matter to the Under Secretary of State for Colonies differently 
from what had been discussed in the Legislative Council. Instead of asking for the intervention 
of the colonial office, he presented the Company’s angle of the dispute that “In the view of the 
Company, the issue cannot be advantageously discussed until a change was contemplated in 
the present system of administration.”304 The Secretary of State concurred with the Company’s 
view and again the settlers’ case was dealt a blow. By adopting this strategy, the BSAC 
managed to buy time and secure its hold on the country’s financial resources while settler 
agitation continued.  
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Political developments after 1910: Enhanced call for settler authority 
As provided by clause 33 of the Royal Charter granted to the BSAC in 1889 to administer 
Southern Rhodesia, the Company’s administrative mandate was due for review after the first 
25 years of chartered rule. The country’s settlers considered a number of alternative forms of 
government to succeed Company administration. The main options considered were full 
Responsible Government, Crown Colony government, entering the Union of South Africa and 
continuation of chartered rule. It had always been Rhodes’ dream for union with the Cape 
Colony and Natal as a counterpoise for Transvaal (only after Responsible Government).305 
Prospects for incorporation became even brighter when, in 1908, the South African colonies 
invited Southern Rhodesia to send delegates to a Convention organised to consider unification 
or federation.306 The invitation coincided with Coghlan’s election to the Legislative Council. 
Coghlan was determined to ensure the country’s inhabitants were represented at the 
Convention because he feared that the Company was going to consider its commercial interests 
only and thus ignore the country’s political future.307 
 
The Convention was held in October 1908 and Southern Rhodesia’s delegates were Coghlan 
for the elected members while Milton (the Administrator) and Mitchell represented the elected 
members. The three were only allowed to speak but could not vote. Being a British colony, 
Southern Rhodesia anticipated that Natal and the Cape colony would emerge dominant from 
this assembly. This scenario could have facilitated Southern Rhodesia’s immediate entry into 
the Union. However, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State gained a disproportionate 
advantage in the allocation of parliamentary seats.308 This victory of the Afrikaner republics 
convinced Coghlan that time was not yet ripe for Southern Rhodesia to join the Union.309 The 
Union of South Africa’s colonies (achieved in favour of the Afrikaner colonies) in 1910 
widened the rift between British and Afrikaner settlers in that country as well as in Southern 
Rhodesia. The Company wanted to get the best price for the colony and negotiations for a 
possible deal with the Union government were underway in 1910. However when “the Union 
ministers refused to accept a lock, stock and barrel round figure deal the directors of the 
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Company decided that the ‘grapes were sour’”310 and pulled out of the deal. The Company 
needed more time to negotiate a better deal with the Union government and this was only 
possible if it could secure extension of the Charter when the first 25 years elapsed in 1914. The 
Company, which had all along been making union negotiations made a sudden turn and created 
a “Union bogey”311 to ward off any form of support for Union while attracting support for a 
continuation of chartered rule after 1914. 
 
Meanwhile, preparations for the post-1914 era were under way. A political association initially 
known as the Rhodesian Political Association (later renamed the Rhodesian League) was 
formed in 1912. Its major objective was the achievement of representative and then 
Responsible Government.312 Although founded by non-farmers, the League soon became a 
farmer organisation and three executive members of the Rhodesia Agricultural Union (RAU) 
(Fletcher, Jobbling and Hull) were signatories to the organisation’s manifesto which was 
launched in November 1912.313 They proposed a representative government completely 
weaned from the control of the BSAC to take over the reins of power. As noted at one of the 
League’s meetings, such a government was to be one “under which the people would have the 
control of legislation, taxation and finance, the full power to manage their own affairs, while 
they would be free at any time to undertake the additional responsibility of executive 
administration”314 In making such proposals, the League had hopes of dismantling the 
Company’s hold over the country’s administrative authority. It represented those elements of 
settler society who, although paying tax, their opinion was not given full consideration in the 
crafting of the country’s laws and policies. The proposed form of government reflected a need 
by the country’s settlers of something more than mere representation in the Legislative Council 
but with no authority to effect amendments to the country’s laws using their majority 
representation in the Council. 
 
The League provided evidence showing that it was no longer necessary to continue with 
Company administration at a time when the country’s population was able to make a 
meaningful and sufficient contribution to the country’s revenue needs. Therefore, the League 
argued that it was “neither desirable nor fit that a large and powerful corporation owning 
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enormous interests in Rhodesia should retain any direct control over the finances or legislature 
of the country.”315 To buttress their argument on the the settlers’ ability to meet the country’s 
financial requirements, the League referred to the administrative surpluses made in the 
financial years 1911 to 1913 as proof. The following figures were cited:  
 
Table 2: Showing administrative surplus for the three years from 1909 to 1911316 
Year ended: Revenue surplus in £ 
1909 27 318.13.1 
1910 73 130.15.1 
1911 136 224.12.0 
Total: 236 674.0.2 
 
This revenue was derived from taxes levied on the country’s various economic ventures 
constituted mainly of farming and commercial enterprises.  Africans also made a contribution 
towards the country’s revenue through the various taxes such as the hut tax. It was very 
unfortunate that those who provided this surplus did not have any control over its use. This had 
sparked a debate (over the distinction between administrative and commercial revenue) which 
remained outstanding for the duration of the Company administration period. Besides increased 
representation in the Legislative Council, the League wanted more than that. Its ultimate goal 
was the granting of Responsible Government to Southern Rhodesia when the appropriate time 
had arrived. 
 
However, when it was almost time for the 1914 election, divisions emerged within the 
Rhodesia League over the form of government to be adopted when the Royal Charter expired 
in 1914. This split resulted in the formation of a Common Platform whose manifesto was 
signed by Fletcher, Jobbling, Moffat, Miekle, Wilson McChlery, Bertin and Leggate.317 This 
document became the rallying point for their election campaign and one of their major policy 
objectives was:  
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To make a definite and immediate move to obtain a form of Responsible Government 
suitable to Southern Rhodesia by urging the Imperial Government as an initial step to 
assume provisional control of the Executive, preliminary to arranging with the British 
South Africa Company the price to be paid for such public works and buildings as 
would be required and framing a constitution in conformity with the wishes of the 
people.318 
 
This was heavily criticised by Coghlan, Grey, Napier, Mitchel and Eyles who all supported the 
continuation of Company administration until such a time when the country was “ready” to be 
granted Responsible Government status.319 The pro-Charter members won representation in 
the Legislative Council, while those who supported the Common Platform Manifesto lost the 
1914 election.  
 
The election result reflected on the desire of the electorate for a continuation of Company 
administration. This was considered the most tactical move considering the prevailing 
circumstances. It was however considered a step towards self-government. In line with this 
development, on 14 May 1914 Coghlan moved that: 
This Council is of the opinion that under the existing conditions a continuation of the 
administration of the British South Africa Company is necessary in the interests of the 
territory and humbly prays to His Majesty that no change be made in the present form 
of administration.320 
 
It was also stipulated that this action should not in any way, affect the people’s right to self-
rule at the appropriate moment. This was a unanimous opinion by the elected members 
reflecting the position of the electorate. Consequent to this motion, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies issued an extension of the Charter. Part of the amended clause 33 made the 
following provision: 
…should the time appear to be ripe for such a step during the ten years which would 
elapse before, under the terms of the Charter, His Majesty’s right of review would again 
become exercisable and that, if during these ten years the inhabitants of Southern 
Rhodesia find that they were financially and in other respects strong enough to assume, 
with the concurrence with His Majesty’s government the burden of administration and 
should express through the Legislative Council their desire to assume that burden, they 
(the Directors) would be most willing that effect should be given to that desire.321 
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This revision of the Royal Charter was crucial because it granted the country’s settlers and their 
legislative representatives the power to push for the termination of Company rule at a time they 
deemed most appropriate. It also provided the elected members a chance to make effective use 
of their majority in the Legislative Council by invoking the Supplemental Charter (revised 
Clause 33 of the Royal Charter) and requesting the Imperial government to grant self-rule to 
Southern Rhodesia. The Supplemental Charter also made reference to the need for the 
country’s financial independence. This had been a thorny issue for some time and had been the 
centre of numerous debates in the council. The revised Charter provided for the elected 
members to prove, at the moment the request for Responsible Government would be made, that 
the country’s settlers had financial self-sufficiency, a point which has all along been ignored, 
as shall be highlighted in the next section. 
 
This was not the first time this demand for enhanced settler authority was made (by the 
Rhodesian League) in Southern Rhodesia. As demonstrated earlier in the chapter, similar calls 
had punctuated Legislative Council debates in the previous years with elected members 
challenging the Company’s dominance of the country’s administrative as well as financial 
affairs. Majority settler representation that had been proposed by the Company Directors when 
they visited Southern Rhodesia in 1907 did not bring any phenomenal changes to the manner 
in which the BSAC administered the country. The Directors had recommended a reduction of 
the number of nominated members from seven to five. The administration delayed the 
implementation of the Directors’ recommendation and this prompted Coghlan to resurrect the 
issue in the Council in 1910. He repeatedly condemned the Company’s failure to implement 
the promise made in 1907 and argued that “If the promise of the Company was not to be relied 
upon, the majority of elected members which existed today was no safeguard to the people.”322 
The elected members were supposed to represent and promote settler interests in the Council 
but the administrative system that was in place made this task a difficult one. Increased 
representation was granted, recommended by the Directors, was then ratified by a 1911 Order 
in Council which however intimated that the appointed members, though a minority “must 
maintain the position of the Company in fiscal matters as now secured by the existing rules and 
regulations of the Legislative Council.”323 This meant that it was only the Administrator who 
had the prerogative to introduce fiscal matters for debate and eventual amendment by the 
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Council. This arrangement guaranteed protection of the Company’s financial interests even 
after settler representative majority was further increased to 12 in 1914. Majority representation 
did not translate into enhanced authority because the appointed members of the Council 
maintained their powerful position even after the reduction in the number of their Legislative 
Council seats. Grey formed the Southern Rhodesia League to counter calls that were being 
made by the Rhodesia League against continued dominance of the BSAC in the country’s 
administration.   
 
Culmination of the land ownership dispute 
The 1914 war suspended the country’s active internal political life. No significant political 
move or announcement was made since the war broke out in 1914. The Company had secured 
an extension of the Charter and the 1914 farmer-miner conference had resulted in 
discontentment on both sides. The 1914 Mines and Minerals Act Amendment failed to end 
farmers’ disgruntlement over miners’ privileges. Meanwhile the Company’s Statement of 
Policy of 1913 had outlined a new land settlement scheme. This sparked outrage which resulted 
in the Mazoe and Midlands Farmers Associations repeatedly pushing the RAU to petition the 
administration to deal with the land ownership issue first. According to Lee, the farmers’ 
opinion was that “no satisfactory land settlement scheme would be undertaken without first 
solving the land ownership issue.”324 Protest against this proposed land settlement policy had 
contributed immensely in the resolution passed at a RAU meeting calling for a new form of 
government to replace the Company.325 The Company’s new scheme aimed at transferring land 
settlement from the commercial side of the Company and recommended control by a Board 
(controlled by the Company). If this scheme was approved, it could also have meant an 
acceptance of the Company’s claim to land ownership as was noted by the Colonial Secretary 
that: 
The contention of the Company in this regard has been disputed by elected members of 
the Legislative Council, and, as I understand, by a large number of settlers in the 
country. It has never been, nor is it now, accepted by His Majesty’s government.326 
 
In the wake of all the opposition and contestations surrounding the proposed scheme, the 
Secretary of State submitted the land dispute to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
1914 for determination. Farmers were bent on pushing the Company administration out of 
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power as testified by the events of 1917. The country’s settlers and farmers were elated after a 
ruling on the land issue was made by the Privy Council. It ruled that the land resources in the 
country were not owned by the Company as a private possession but belonged to the Crown.327 
The Privy Council made a further declaration that the Company could claim, after termination 
of the Charter, the accumulated administrative deficit. The next section will show the 
significance of this ruling by the Privy Council on the country’s political developments with 
particular reference to Company-settler contestations over the country’s revenue, 
administrative authority and representation in the Legislative Council. 
 
The road to self-rule 
In July 1917 the Responsible Government Association (RGA) was formed as a reaction, mainly 
by farmers, to continued Company administration. Farmers wanted Southern Rhodesia to be 
granted Responsible Government urgently and curb any attempts by the Company 
administration to join the Union of South Africa. The idea to form the organisation was mooted 
at a political meeting held soon after a RAU Congress held in Salisbury in July 1917.328 The 
association’s main objective was the attainment of Responsible Government in Southern 
Rhodesia at the earliest opportunity.329 Although it was initially mainly constituted by farmers, 
membership was open to anyone who shared the association’s objective as stated in the 
constitution. Most of the founding and prominent members were, or had been RAU’s executive 
members. They included Fletcher (one time president of the RAU and a Hartley farmer, 
Leggate who was the RAU president in 1919.330 One of the chief campaigners for the 
Responsible Government movement was Ethel Tawes Jollie, the widow of Archibald Ross 
Colquhoun who was Rhodes’s first Administrator for Mashonaland.331 She was a founder and 
influential member of the RGA. Jollie became a legislator and made significant strides in 
criticising Company rule and mobilising settlers to swell the ranks of the RGA. Coghlan joined 
the RGA in 1919 and was quickly elected President of the association. Coghlan fervently 
fought Company machinations for Union with South Africa. Newton, the former Treasurer also 
joined and became an influential member of the party.332 The RGA made a strong appeal to 
elements of Southern Rhodesia’s settler community for varied reasons. Farmers and small 
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miners feared losing their labour to the Union while junior civil servants viewed the Union 
policy of bilingualism as a threat to their prospects of promotion. Many in the commercial 
sector feared and did not like the Union’s tax policies which disadvantaged the provinces.333  
The cultural and language difference between Afrikaners and the English was also another 
reason why English speaking Rhodesians detested Union. It should be noted that not all 
Afrikaner settlers in Southern Rhodesia favoured union, some only sought better economic 
opportunities in Southern Rhodesia and distanced themselves from the campaigns for union 
with South Africa. A Rhodesian Afrikaner wrote to the Rhodesia Herald stating that: “We as 
Dutch settlers have come to Rhodesia for our own good….there is no need to stir up ill-feeling 
by saying that we are all in favour of union when we are not.”334 Such a sentiment reveals that 
divisions also existed amongst the Afrikaners. They also had different ideologies and visions 
for the country’s political future. 
 
In the same year that Coghlan was appointed President of the RGA, a significant political 
development occurred in South Africa which had direct implications on Southern Rhodesia’s 
politics. Jan Smuts succeeded Botha as Prime Minister. Smuts had a good relationship with 
British mining interests cultivated during his days as Defence Minister when he crushed 
European strikes on the Rand.335 Smuts’ rise to power therefore presented an opportunity for 
the BSAC Board to strike a better bargain with the new Union leader. As a result, prospects for 
Southern Rhodesia entering the Union were enlivened and a Rhodesia Unionist Association 
(RUA) was formed in 1919 to champion this cause and challenge the RGA which had made 
inroads in campaigning for Responsible Government. The RUA’s Chairman was Longden, 
who was a Bulawayo lawyer just like Coghlan.336 The RUA enjoyed support from the mining 
companies, senior civil servants and wealthy professional men. Mining companies for instance 
expected to benefit from South Africa’s more developed mining industry and reduced rail 
tariffs as noted by H. J. Filmer that “It seemed so absurd that we were paying the chartered 
company railage from Balla Balla to Mafikeng much higher than the total railage to Durban on 
the South African railways (Mafikeng to Durban).”337 The two parties, with clearly divergent 
ideologies contested in their quest to determine the form of government that was going to take 
over from the Company administration. 
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The 1918 Privy Council ruling on the land issue amplified RGA’s hopes of dislodging the 
BSAC from power and ultimate realisation of a long cherished settler goal of Responsible 
Government. As argued by B. Mtshali, after the 1918 ruling “the company lost the economic 
motivation to govern since this now entailed intense liability.”338 The RGA capitalised on this 
development and perfected and magnified their argument on the need to give administrative 
authority to the country’s settlers by granting Responsible Government. This was emphasised 
by a unanimous resolution carried by the party’s executive that: 
This meeting of the executive of the RGA reaffirms the principle that the immediate 
grant of Responsible Government for Southern Rhodesia, for which the country is in 
every respect fitted, is the form of administration best suited to the present requirements 
of the country and that no alternative should be permitted to prevent or delay the 
accomplishment of this object. That accordingly the executive urges the people of the 
country to unite in supporting the association in the next election in their demand for 
the immediate fulfilment of the promise of self-government given in the Supplemental 
Charter.339 
 
The period after the Privy Council ruling was followed by stagnation as the Company was no 
longer willing to expend more financial resources to keep the country running. R. Hodder-
Williams summed up the prevailing scenario by highlighting that:  
The British South Africa Company lost its enthusiasm for development work and the 
whole period between the end of the war and Responsible Government in 1923 is 
marked by local demands and complains being met with bland responses of regret. 
Mails were held up, schools were closed, road improvements were delayed, medical 
officers were not immediately replaced, in other words, caution prevailed.340 
 
This worked in favour of the Responsible Government movement. This situation assisted the 
recruitment drive of the RGA as the electorate lost faith in the Company administration and its 
calls for Union. 
 
This lack of enthusiasm did not extend to land transactions. It seems as if the Company wanted 
to benefit from land transactions while it still had political power. On 1 January 1919 the 
Company issued a new set of rules regulating land grants in the country.341 The RGA criticised 
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the Company’s handling of land transactions under the new regulations and made the following 
resolution at a meeting held in Gwelo: 
That this meeting of the executive of the Responsible Government Association calls 
upon the elected members to draw the attention of the High Commissioner to the fact 
that large blocks of land belonging to the Crown are being granted away since the 
judgement of the land case and at the same time settlers with limited but sufficient 
capital are being met with unsympathetic treatment and are consequently leaving the 
country.342 
 
The Director of Land Settlement denied such claims and even challenged the RGA to 
substantiate its claims with evidence. However, his response pointed to a shift from what used 
to be the norm prior to the land ruling. He stated that there were no major changes “with the 
exception that the financial requirements of the company have been, if anything, more 
stringently enforced as regards later grants of ranching land.”343 The timing of the policy 
changes raised questions and in a way substantiated claims that were made by the RGA. 
 
Towards the 1920 Legislative Assembly elections the call for Responsible Government kept 
growing louder. There was a growing desire for the Imperial government to facilitate the 
transfer of administrative power from the BSAC to the settler population. Gauging by the 
nature of debates in the Council over the past years, Coghlan concluded that change was both 
“desirable and inevitable.”344 The country’s settler population had grown (33 620 settlers in 
1921)345 and their contribution towards administrative revenue was paramount in aiding the 
country’s fiscal stability. He therefore argued that “where the people of a country were obliged 
to have the affairs of the country conducted at their own expense they might as well have the 
conduct of those affairs in their own hands, rather than in the hands of another body.”346 This 
had always been the desire of the elected members, but as highlighted in the previous sections, 
the Company administration had responded by granting majority representation in an attempt 
to pacify them. This did not kill the desire for self-rule amongst the settlers which kept 
strengthening especially after the RGA was created. The forthcoming Legislative Council 
election in 1920 was earmarked to be the litmus test in determining whether the electorate was 
ready for Responsible Government.  
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Elected members therefore invoked the Supplemental Charter arguing that, it alone had 
propositions for the most appropriate and suitable form of government to replace Company 
administration (Responsible Government). This revision to the original Royal Charter provided 
that a majority in the Legislative Council could successfully demand the formation of a 
Responsible Government. Heyman presented a petition drawn by settlers from the various 
constituencies represented in the Legislative Council calling for the beginning of negotiations 
for a Responsible Government in the country. It stated that: 
We the undersigned being residents in your constituency, wish to draw your attention 
to the fact that the British South Africa Company has already approached the Imperial 
government as to the settlement of its affairs, without any intimation of intentions of 
the people of this country, and that in other directions there are evidences that our future 
is under discussion. Under these circumstances we feel that instead of waiting for the 
election of a new Council and its first section, which probably cannot take place for a 
year, the people of Rhodesia ought to make some expression of their own views and 
expressions at once and through the effective channel open to them, the Legislative 
Council; and we therefore hope that you will do your best to secure in the present 
Legislative Council the passing of a resolution in favour of an immediate appeal to the 
Imperial government in terms of the Supplemental Charter.347 
 
This petition had been prepared by RGA members. In their opinion, it was a representation of 
the majority of the country’s settlers. Although the RGA enjoyed considerable support 
throughout the country, a true reflection of settler opinion on the preferred form of government 
could only be obtained through an election.  
 
In the Legislative Council election that was contested in 1920 the RGA won 12 out of the 13 
seats resoundingly. The only member of the opposition who won the 13th seat was R. A. 
Fletcher, he represented the opposition on the constitution delegation and was later on 
appointed Minister of Agriculture when H. U. Moffat became Premier.348 The association was 
now in a stead to request for Responsible Government. Accordingly, on 12 May 1920, Coghlan 
moved the following motion in the Council: 
This absolute majority of the whole number of members of the Legislative Council of 
Southern Rhodesia humbly prays the king’s most Excellent Majesty in Council to 
establish forthwith in Southern Rhodesia the form of Government known as 
Responsible Government which this territory urgently requires for the proper 
development of its resources and the freedom and prosperity of its people.349 
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He further stated that the country’s settlers had made contributions towards administrative 
revenue in the form of various taxes. This was clear testimony that they had the capacity to 
finance the administration of the country when the BSAC was no longer in the picture. In 
addition to this, Newton (the former Treasurer), stated that the country possessed ample 
resources (land and minerals) for the provision of additional revenue. This countered threats of 
possible bankruptcy (if a settler government replaced the Company) that were being touted by 
the RUA to promote its agenda for Southern Rhodesia’s incorporation to the Union of South 
Africa. It should be noted that by this time the country’s revenue collection capacity had been 
significantly enhanced by the opening of the Income Tax Department (ITD) in 1918. Created 
by the War Taxation and Excess profits Duty Ordinance No. 20 of 1918 to assist in financing 
the war effort, the ITD went on to mobilise more revenue for the country even after World War 
I as shall be demonstrated in the next chapter.350 
 
Arguments presented by settler representatives in the Council in Support for the grant of 
Responsible Government had a nationalistic appeal regarding the need for the people of 
Rhodesia to be in control of their affairs. The development of this nationalist feeling can be 
traced back to the early colonial period. In 1907 the Mashonaland Progressive Association 
declared that “We are Rhodesian and Rhodesia belongs to us and we have every intention of 
developing our country after our fashion and without interference of neighbours.”351 The RGA 
members in the Council demonstrated this kind of sentiment: first, by outright refusal to be 
joined to South Africa and second, by emphasising their ability to provide administrative 
revenue. Coghlan argued that “The people out of whose pockets roughly a million and a quarter 
were being raised in revenue today were not spending the money.”352 That money was being 
spent by the BSAC. The Responsible Government could simply substitute the Company and 
perform administrative duties using that same revenue made available by the country’s settlers. 
 
Alfred Milner, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, took time to endorse the request made 
by the Legislative Council to consider granting Responsible Government to Southern 
Rhodesia. This delay revealed his support for the country to be joined to the Union of South 
Africa. The elected members remained adamant and made reference to the 1920 election which 
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had reflected the overall position of the majority of the country’s settler population regarding 
their desired form of government. Consequently, the Imperial government appointed the 
Rhodesia Committee chaired by Earl Buxton on 7 March 1921. Its terms of reference included 
the determination of a practical procedure and timeframe for the granting of Responsible 
Government.353 The committee made a recommendation that a better expression of opinion 
would be obtained by a referendum not a general election. The committee also supported the 
argument that was made by elected members concerning the country’s financial fitness and its 
ability to meet administrative expenditure.354 Setting up of this committee was a positive 
development for the RGA and their representatives in the Council. Unlike other earlier 
consultative processes to determine solutions for the country’s troubles, the Buxton Committee 
reported in a very short space of time (one month). Campaigns by both the RUA and the RGA 
intensified, leading to the 1922 referendum. The RGA won with 8 774 votes cast in favour of 
Responsible Government while 5 989 voted for Union.355 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has considered the ever-growing settler desire to be weaned from the BSAC which 
administered the country from 1890 to 1923. Taking into account the significance accorded to 
increased settler representation in the country’s legislative council, the chapter has examined 
the nature and functioning of this legislative system. It argued that settler demands exceeded 
what existing literature on the subject has presented. The chapter engaged with the historical 
conservation on law and society in colonial Africa, and highlighted that law and state policies 
provided an arena of contestation not only between Europeans and Africans, but also amongst 
settlers themselves. A close examination of the Council’s debates on crucial political and 
economic matters such as land, taxation and administrative power, shows that the elected settler 
representatives actually wanted administrative authority to be transferred from the BSAC 
(which also had commercial interests) to the country’s settlers. As argued in the chapter, the 
main justification for their demand rested on the fact that the settler population was making an 
important contribution towards the country’s revenue through various taxes and therefore, had 
a right to make decisions on important administrative matters. This casts doubt on the 
applicability of Moore’s assertion that taxation issues do not feature prominently on the 
political agenda in southern countries like they do in the OECD countries.. Representation in 
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the Legislative Council had failed to bring about this position since the nominated members 
and the Directors of the BSAC made all decisions. The majority representation granted to 
settlers did not satiate their desires. As shown in the chapter, it only worked to the settler’s 
advantage when Coghlan used this majority to demand (successfully) for the consideration of 
Responsible government negotiations in 1920.  
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Chapter Four  
 
‘Killing the goose which lays the golden eggs?’: Responsible 
Government and miner-farmer relations in Rhodesia, 1923-1945. 
 
 
Southern Rhodesia’s mining law became a major subject of controversy the moment settler 
agriculture started gaining a foothold from 1897. This was after the realisation by the British 
South Africa Company (BSAC) Administration that the much vaunted second Rand did not lie 
in the country as discussed in Chapter Two. The BSAC therefore started promoting the 
development and growth of white settler agriculture. This policy shift sparked farmer-miner 
antagonism, which became more pronounced after 1903 when the Gold Belt area was opened 
by the Company administration for occupation by farmers. Restrictions on wood cutting and 
water usage were added to land holding titles issued to farmers who purchased land from 1904 
onwards. The Company administration had to keep under constant check the numerous and 
vociferous challenges levelled against it for this biased land title. The Gold Belt restrictions 
were viewed by settler farmers as a menace to the growth of the nascent white agricultural 
sector. As Chapter Two showed, the cessation of Company rule in 1923 did not bring closure 
to this farmer-miner tussle. But it did bring prospects of change for the farmers and anxiety for 
mining capital, which felt the new dispensation threatened their interests. 
 
This chapter focuses on miner-farmer relations in the post-1923 period. It delineates the protean 
nature of state policy in dealing with sectorial interests of the two foremost sectors of the 
country’s economy, highlighting how agriculture eventually toppled mining from the apex 
position by 1945 – both economically and politically. The chapter begins by chronicling a 
shifting mind set amongst senior government officials as they began to advocate openly for a 
replacement of the Gold Belt Title (GBT) with a more equitable land holding title. Engaging 
existing historiography on colonial agriculture, the chapter discusses the implications for the 
mining sector of changes implemented by the state in an attempt to cushion settler farmers from 
the impact of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Mining in general and gold mining in 
particular remained the chief revenue source for the colony before 1945 and the settler 
government was bent on extracting more from this sector as indicated by the levying of a Gold 
Premium Tax (GPT) on gold producers. The chapter will demonstrate how this tax system was 
detested by gold miners and how it ultimately led to a marked decline in gold mining by 1945. 
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Scholars have presented Southern Rhodesia’s mining and agricultural history and political 
history in this period from various angles. The country’s early history was written by colonial 
historians (settler apologists) who glorified the colonisation process.356 C. Leys’ study on 
Southern Rhodesia’s politics presented a homogenised settler society.357 His argument has 
sparked criticism as it flattens differences between settler factions and presented settler-state 
relations as largely amicable and fairly unchanging.358 This chapter joins this debate by 
providing a more nuanced study of state-farmer-miner relations, which demonstrates that they 
were factionalised, fractious and friable. A previous revisionist challenge was offered by I. R. 
Phimister’s (1975) doctoral thesis (and subsequent articles) on the mining history of Southern 
Rhodesia, which devotes an entire chapter to factors that led to the rise and fall of mineral 
production.359 His heterodox perspective challenged colonial historiography by contesting 
earlier notions on colonial land and labour laws. He argued that the underlying factor for a 
successful mining venture in the country was profit maximisation and cost minimisation and 
highlighted how this was achieved through the use of cheap African labour (by both big mining 
companies and small miners). One of his main conclusions was that reduced gold production 
in the 1940s was the result of a decline in the number of small miners instanced by the ever 
rising mining costs during the war period. This chapter augments and extends Phimister’s 
fundamental argument and contends that a combination of government’s fiscal measures, 
especially the mining tax policy, obstructed development and growth of bigger gold mines, 
which led to the significant decline in the country’s gold output by 1945. This is important 
because of the implications the mining tax policy on big mining companies, which were the 
worst affected. In this regard, the chapter illuminates on the centrality of taxes in underwriting 
the state’s capacity to carry out their goals and shape state-society relations in the process.360 
There are also more recent studies, by a new generation of environmental historians who use a 
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completely different approach from Phimister. Such studies by M. Musemwa361 (2009) and 
V.C. Kwashirai362 (2006) focus on farmer-miner struggles over the use of natural resources on 
the Gold Belt. Musemwa’s work illustrates how settler farmers and miners clashed over land, 
timber and water rights on the Gold Belt, while Kwashirai discusses how settler farming and 
mining caused environmental degradation and threatened the state’s efforts at conservation in 
the Mazoe District. The two studies constitute a useful historiographical intervention on the 
subject of intra-racial conflicts over natural resources amongst Southern Rhodesia’s settlers. 
Though stressing the prominence of the miner-farmer conflict, these studies, however, do not 
illustrate the state’s role and attitude towards the resolution of this dispute and its implications 
on the country’s economy. This chapter will attempt to contribute key pieces to the mosaic by 
examining previously unexamined perspectives through analysing the views of senior 
politicians and government officials on the subject coupled to actual policies which affected 
the interaction of farmers and miners. It illustrates how this represented a shifting policy 
framework from that which prevailed in the pre-1923 period. This chapter goes beyond the 
farmer-miner dichotomy over natural resources by adopting a broader scope which brings on 
board the state and the economy.   
 
Responsible Government and the improving position of settler agriculture 
The state that emerged after the 1922 Referendum was confronted with several fresh 
challenges. The fundamental obligation of the new government involved balancing up the 
different sectorial interests (mainly farmers and miners’ interests) as well as the development 
of a broader settler colonial voice, beyond the mining sector. Enhanced autonomy brought 
about by self-rule provided the emerging state with an opportunity to design policies that could 
tackle problems bedevilling the colony’s political economy with limited external interference. 
The post-1923 era therefore witnessed the emergence of a centralised state bureaucracy, 
notable for its developmental ambition for the colonial economy363, as well as the desire to 
suppress growth of African agriculture so as to eliminate competition for white agriculture. 
The prevailing scenario after 1923 exhibits what S. S. Eriksen described as the two major 
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dimensions for state formation which are domestic sovereignty and administrative capacity.364 
Effective administrative machinery enabled the post-1923 government to strengthen its tax 
collection capacity, mainly from the mining sector. This was an attempt by the settler 
government to strengthen the state’s position, the fiscal theory of state formation states that 
“strong states emerge when the ruling regime is compelled to expand its revenue base.”365 The 
state also fostered the incorporation of the Rhodesian Agricultural Union (RAU) in the 
administrative system to strengthen its position as shall be demonstrated in the chapter.  
 
The impact of the attainment of white settler government in 1923 on the country’s economic 
policy has been presented differently; some scholars argue that it brought no real change to the 
government’s view on mining and agricultural policies. D. J. Murray (1970) labels the 
prevailing scenario after 1923 as a bequest of the BSAC on which the new government made 
no radical changes by noting that “as far as agriculture was concerned the transition from 
chartered government to settler government involved no fundamental change either in policy 
towards agriculture or in the administrative system.”366 M. Loney has argued that Responsible 
Government status gave the settler state enhanced independence in determining its own 
political and economic affairs.367 This view has been challenged by I. R. Phimister368 and C. 
Stoneman369 who both give precedence to the influence of international capital and the nature 
of the world economic system in determining the course of economic policy for the new 
government. Finding that the evidence overwhelmingly supports the latter argument, this 
chapter will demonstrate that, indeed, it was the firm grip of international capital on the local 
economy that delayed the new government from implementing radical changes to mining and 
agricultural policies. Therefore, this chapter will argue that government’s inclination towards 
farmers’ interests started to gain momentum in 1923 and that it was actually the impact of the 
international economic recession on agriculture that pushed the state to make radical 
adjustments favouring this sector and at the same time disadvantaging the mining sector. A 
number of factors had colluded in strengthening the farmers’ position after 1923. They now 
had better representation in the House of Assembly and cabinet after the Unionist defeat in the 
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1924 election where Charles Coghlan’s Rhodesian Party got 26 of the 30 Legislative Council 
seats. They used this majority to their advantage in many instances to push for measures that 
favoured agricultural development. Farmers had also, by this time, developed into a formidable 
political constituency whose grievances could not be ignored by government. Their 
representatives had also amassed political clout because of improved organisation which 
enabled them to amplify the farmers’ voice and their political relevance which had significantly 
contributed to the success of the Responsible Government vote in 1922. They utilized all this 
to their favour, V. E. M. Machingaidze notes that “[t]hus the numerous measures taken by the 
government to lay a foundation for settler capitalist agriculture, must be seen not only in the 
context of the government’s desire to develop the industry but also in the context of Rhodesia 
Agricultural Union’s (RAU) political power and influence.”370 Although the change was not 
radical, 1923 marked a turning point in the government’s attitude characterised by attempts to 
please farmers and at the same time appease miners. The Responsible Government period saw 
an inclination of government support towards the farmers, a development that had a direct 
impact on the mining industry as shall be demonstrated in this chapter. 
 
When the settlers took the reins of power in 1923, agriculture and mining constituted the major 
pillars of the colonial economy. Although the dream of a Second Rand in Southern Rhodesia 
had failed to materialise, as discussed in Chapter Two, the mining sector still continued to 
generate the bulk of state’s revenue and hence offered a firm foundation for the colonial 
economy. The Mining Industry Commission of 1945 emphasized this fact by stating that: 
Gold production with its unique marketability has always exerted a stabilising effect in 
maintaining the exports of the colony. The unprecedented growth in the Rhodesian 
National Income from 1932 – 1939 was due to the large growth in the exports of the 
territory, and the increase of those exports was due to the increased production of 
gold.371 
 
 
Reports of the Commissioner of Taxes from 1919 to 1944 reveal that the mining industry 
always had the highest amount of taxable income assessed as highlighted in the graph below. 
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Graph 2: Net tax derived from agriculture and mining from 1923 to 1941372 
 
 
 
                                                            
372 Southern Rhodesia, Reports of the Commissioner of Taxes, 1919 to 1948, presented to the Legislative Council. 
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Mining remained the largest source of income tax throughout the period (up to 1944) while 
agriculture was responsible for most losses which were set off by income from other sources. 
The position for agriculture only changed when the impact of the depression no longer weighed 
heavily on the sector from 1938. When the war broke out in 1939 the position for agriculture 
improved significantly until it reached the apex position in 1945.  
 
The mining industry also occupied this prominent position in the Union of South Africa as was 
highlighted by C. W. De Kiewiet: 
Here was an industry which feared neither locusts nor cattle diseases, neither drought 
nor summer floods. Its product always commanded a ready sale in the financial centres 
of the world. War or peace, deflation or inflation - none seemed to affect the demand. 
Under an international gold standard there existed a constant and reliable demand for 
gold at established prices. Even the compromised position of the international gold 
standard after the Great War did not alter the favoured position of gold.373  
 
In light of such similarities regarding the significance of gold mining in the two countries, 
Southern Rhodesia drew lessons from the more established and prosperous South African 
mining industry. Southern Rhodesia made use of South Africa’s labour control systems and 
structured its mining laws along similar lines as the Union.374 The settler government, and the 
BSAC administration before it, always attempted to create the best environment for the 
prosperity of mining capital and even provided crucial development services through the 
Geological Survey Department. This department was revamped after 1923 as the new 
government sought to make new mineral discoveries and make mining in the colony a 
profitable venture with an ability to lure more foreign capital. Its work, as noted by the Director 
in 1926 “consisted of a systematic geological mapping to complete the geological summary of 
the country, reconnaissance surveys and the geological examination of mining properties and 
new mineral discoveries.”375 Such renewed efforts by the government were a positive 
development because they resulted in the discovery of new and important mineral deposits 
such as Chrome Ore in the Great Dyke area376, Platinum near the Ngesi River377 and numerous 
new Gold discoveries that boosted the profile of the country’s mining sector and made it a 
major attraction to investors. Although it never reached the levels anticipated by the pioneer 
settlers, gold mining came to constitute what has been referred to as the ‘golden goose’ on 
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several times by members of the Chamber of Mines and the Smallworkers and Tributors 
Association during meetings held to discuss the impact of the GPT on the mining sector. 
 
Settler agriculture, on the other hand, played an important complimentary role as it developed 
as the second leg on which the colonial economy stood. This sector was intended to be a useful 
prop mainly in the promotion of white settlement in the country, especially after the adoption 
of a formal White Agriculture Policy (WAP) in 1908. Although the interests of white settler 
farmers had always played second fiddle to mining interests during Company rule, as 
delineated in chapter 2 and 3, the growing political importance of farmers went a long way in 
strengthening their position as an interest group.378 In this regard, D. J. Murray notes that “By 
1918 the Rhodesia Agricultural Union had 46 affiliated associations and about 1 200 
members.”379 By 1921, the influence of white farmers had been further enhanced as they 
constituted the largest single group (25 per cent) of white income earners.380 The country’s 
settler population in 1921 was 33 620.381 Settler Agriculture had registered significant growth 
as shown in the table below. 
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Table 3: Growth of white agriculture 1904-1922382 
Year No. of farms Total Acreage (in 000 
acres 
1904 545 33. 2 
1911 1470 132. 1 
1914 2040 183. 4 
1915 2145 202. 9 
1916 2178 249. 0 
1917 2222 229. 0 
1918 2351 205. 4 
1919 2373 211. 1 
1920 2395 237. 3 
1921 2427 228. 0 
1922 2337 266. 6 
 
The state, both the Company administration and settler government, sponsored and promoted 
this development of white settler agriculture to promote immigration of more settlers into the 
country. V. E. M. Machingaidze’s thesis is very useful in chronicling the role of the colonial 
state in promoting settler agriculture.383 This was despite ethnic fissures which characterised 
the sector emanating from the continued immigration of British and Afrikaner farmers as 
discussed in chapter two. This was further entrenched by the 1922 voting pattern which gave 
British settlers an upper hand over their Afrikaner counterparts (most of whom desired union 
with South Africa). The settler government favoured British settlers to immigrate and take up 
land in Southern Rhodesia. There was a perennial fear that continued immigration of 
Afrikaners would result in the ‘poor white problem’ which had plagued South Africa. K. Larsen 
notes that “The Rhodesian government introduced new immigration policies and free passage 
and land settlement schemes as well as a child migration scheme and the result was an increase 
in the number of British men and women migrating to the colony.”384 The farmers were 
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therefore not a homogeneous entity. They however had more representatives in the Legislative 
Council and J. A. Edwards observed that, before the years of the depression, the Legislative 
Assembly often resembled the RAU in another guise.385 In 1930, out of the 30 House of 
Assembly members, 13 were, or had been farmers at one point or the other.386 Eddie Cross, 
Member of Parliament for Bulawayo North constituency in the current Zimbabwe parliament 
made the following remark when commenting on the complexion of Rhodesia’s as well as 
Zimbabwe’s parliament: “Some things never change.”387 Farming interests still dominate the 
legislative council like they did during the colonial period. Farmers also constituted a major 
proportion of the electorate and, therefore, their claims and demands could not be easily 
brushed aside by politicians as they been before 1923.  
 
Farmers’ lobbied the government to come to their rescue in the wake of difficulties precipitated 
by commodity price shifts on the international market and in the adjustment of legislation such 
as the country’s mining law which had a clause favouring miners at the expense of farmers. 
John Lourie, a former commercial farmer (farmed in the years 1963-2000), although not well 
versed with details of farmer-miner conflicts registered awareness of the unfairness of the 
country’s mining law during the colonial period.388 The coming of Responsible Government 
brought high hopes and expectations for the farming sector. Machingaidze sums this up by 
stating that “With the advent of the new settler government in October 1923, headed by Sir 
Charles Coghlan, settler farmers looked forward to an aggressive agricultural policy, while 
settlers in general hoped to see an end to the British South Africa Company’s monopolies in 
mining and railways. These hopes were not entirely satisfied.”389 Nevertheless there were other 
equally important considerations preventing the settler government from hastily implementing 
the anticipated agricultural reforms. First and arguably foremost, the constitution adopted in 
1923 was designed mainly to “protect the rights of capital, prevent discriminatory legislation 
against Africans without imperial sanction, and stop Southern Rhodesia from passing laws 
incompatible with the more general interests of the Imperial connection.”390 Such provisions 
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guaranteed the protection of private capital. Most mining concerns in asbestos, coal, railway 
system and the country’s mineral rights were all foreign owned. The settler government only 
took action when it became politically expedient to do so from 1929.  
 
The ‘Gold Belt Title’ and the fight to control resources 
This section explores the gradual shift of government officials’ attitude on the highly contested 
GBT. The company administration had, for the duration of its reign, supported miners’ rights 
as embodied in the title. Once the settler government was in power the major farmers’ 
representative body (RAU) did not waste time in approaching the new Ministry responsible for 
mines requesting the amendment of the GBT clause in the Mines and Minerals Act. The clause 
had privileged miners’ access to water, timber and grazing rights. The clamour by farmers 
resulted in the crafting of proposed amendments to be considered if a new title was to be 
adopted. These stipulated among other things, that timber beyond the primary needs of miners 
could be disposed of and that farmers should have the first right to take water required for 
household use, for livestock and for irrigation purposes.391 This request and the proposed 
amendments, viewed as being radical by the mining fraternity, stirred H. U. Moffat, the new 
Mines Minister into action for he started to dig deeper into the controversial land title. 
Representatives of the mining industry (Chamber of Mines, Chamber of Mines Salisbury and 
the Rhodesian Smallworkers and Tributors Association) drew up a petition to Moffat in March 
1924 challenging requests by farmers for the amendment of the GBT, a move they argued, if 
approved could threaten development of the mining industry. Their petition emphasised among 
other issues that: 
Due respect should be given to the Gold Belt Title considering that the gold areas were 
originally set out for mining purposes alone and in very isolated cases was land granted 
for farming purposes on the Gold Belt. Farmers began accessing land from 1892 after 
they raised concern that land on the Gold Belt happened to be suitable for agricultural 
purposes as well as arguing that it contained rich agricultural land and they could 
produce grain for consumption by the mines. Thereupon farms were allotted on the 
Gold Belt, but on special conditions reserving, inter alia, all timber and water required 
for bona fide mining purposes.392 
 
Moffat’s response and intervention in this clash between farmers and miners over the GBT, 
clearly highlights a shift in the government’s attitude from being sympathetic to the needs of 
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miners to one that endeavoured to introduce a new policy framework. Reacting to the mining 
industry petition the Minister observed that: 
It was naturally impossible to issue the BSAC’s form of title after the 1st of October 
last, since the company had ceased its function of administration and consequently 
certain modifications were demanded on the advent of the new government in order 
that the issue of deeds could be proceeded with.393  
 
Similar sentiments were to be echoed by A. M. Hutchinson, a farmer, who stated in 1933 that 
the title was given by the BSAC, a commercial company and thus it should be repealed in its 
entirety.394 Up to 1924, 400 GBTs had been issued in Mashonaland and 47 in Matebeleland.395 
The petition submitted by the miners’ representatives treated the entire country as a 
homogeneous entity and thus concealed variations that existed on the applicability of the GBT. 
Such inconsistencies in the petition were laid bare and criticised by the Mines Minister who 
argued that not all farms in Mashonaland situated on the Gold Belt were held under the GBT 
and that in Matebeleland most of the Gold Belt areas were pegged from end to end as farms, 
many of which were held under the Victoria Agreement Compromise Title.396 The Minister of 
Mines launched an investigation which aimed at establishing the real legal underpinnings for 
the enactment of the title, he enquired from the BSAC:  
Whether there was any declaration of policy by the company that the land on what was 
considered to be Gold Belt was not to be sold referring, if possible to applications from 
farmers expressing their willingness to take an inferior title on the Gold Belt and 
quoting, if possible, any instructions issued by the company to the Estates Office on 
this subject.397  
 
This was obviously intended to counter the argument raised by miners that farmers had taken 
up land on the Gold Belt with full knowledge of the implications that the GBT clause had on 
the utilisation of resources on the farms concerned.  
 
As Premier, Coghlan also set up consultations on the best way forward in dealing with the 
farmer-miner differences and he requested the Mines Minister to devise the best way of 
resolving the issue for the good of the country’s economy. Responding to the Premier’s request, 
the Minister of Mines made proposals on the way forward regarding the GBT, he recommended 
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discontinuation of this title and introduction of a uniform title for the whole country. He wrote 
to the Premier saying “I have no hesitation whatsoever in recommending that the alienation of 
land under Gold Belt permit and/or GBT be discontinued. In my opinion it is a blot on the 
colony’s land titles which should be remedied as soon as possible.”398 The struggle between 
farmers and miners concerning land titles on the Gold Belt thus, took a new turn after 1923 
with the Mines Minister, an influential member of government, advocating for the introduction 
of a uniform land title to replace the controversial GBT. He also recommended control of wood 
cutting on Gold Belt farms and that such authority should be vested in the Lands Department, 
in the same manner cutting in the reserves was controlled by the Chief Native Commissioner.399 
In addition to this, he highlighted that it was no longer necessary to give a prior right to land 
and grazing to miners as this had been abused. This shift in the attitude of the Minister was an 
important pointer on the direction government policy was going to take in the future.  
 
Although not representative of overall government policy, these proposals were crucial for they 
won the support of key figures in the political and administrative realm of the colony. The 
Attorney General for example supported the Minister’s proposals entirely and stated that “I 
agree almost entirely with the propositions and recommendations of the Minister. There can be 
no question but that the reservations in the Gold Belt Title constitute an unfair blot on their 
ownership.”400 Leggate, the former Minister of Agriculture, also registered his pleasure 
following the Minister’s recommendations.401 The two officials made reference to earlier 
arrangements for the introduction of a uniform land title for the colony that had gained currency 
when BSAC Directors visited the country in 1907. This had actually become the main point of 
departure for the Mines Minister when he was campaigning against continuation of the GBT. 
Leggate proceeded to use his own personal experience in explaining why, in his opinion, GBTs 
had continued to be issued despite them being outlawed in 1907. He noted thus: 
Those to whom the titles were issued would, as a result, be newcomers, who knew 
nothing of the disputes and agreements which had taken place, and without this 
knowledge considered they had no option in the matter. I myself came to this country 
in the year 1910, shortly after this agreement, and got a Gold Belt Title to my farm. I 
sent home particulars of the title I had got, and surprise was expressed to me that I had 
taken up any land in the country at all. Once however, one comes into the country and 
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spends a good deal of money looking for land – I had already spent a hundred pounds 
looking for land before I was offered a GBT – one is rather reluctant to leave the country 
and go elsewhere.402 
 
This use of deceit by the government in its attempts to attract settlers403 was heavily criticised 
for being a major hindrance stalling the farmers’ progress. P. S. Brocklehurst, a farmer from 
Umvuma stated that: 
The young man coming out here, who probably does not go thoroughly through his title 
deeds finds that there are roads through his farm for which he has to provide all material 
and the cattle of the road gangs have to be allowed to graze on the farm. When he wants 
to sell that farm he has to point out this disadvantage, which reduces the value of the 
farm. It affects him as far as the bank is concerned too. Also, he has to pay quit rent on 
the land taken up by the road or outspans.404 
 
This land title was now deemed anachronistic since agriculture was now developed. Gold Belt 
reservations had been developed when mining was still considered the country’s main 
economic activity. The settler government was therefore, encouraged to do away with the old 
legislation as a move to bolster the immigration and settlement of more whites who would then 
take up commercial agriculture. 
 
When the Company Directors visited the country on the eve of the official launch of a White 
Agricultural Policy (WAP) in 1907, available evidence reveal that they actually wanted a 
uniform land title to be introduced in the country. Dr. Jameson, one of the Directors said that 
“We mentioned when you were here before the question of a universal land title throughout 
the country. The general title will be based on the law as passed by the Legislative Council.”405 
Birchenough was also quoted saying that they “wanted to give as attractive a title as possible 
to the farmers and settlers….to give the farmer everything that they should give him consistent 
with the getting of the minerals out of the ground. They began by giving the farmer in his title 
everything that a farmer had in an ordinary civilised community.”406 This mindset amongst the 
Directors had considerably influenced the drafting of a policy proposal by the BSAC in 1907 
which outlined a universal land holding title for the entire country. In light of this background, 
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the Minister of Mines deemed the GBT as indefensible, even research that was done by the 
Ministry on the mining laws of other countries revealed that no other country except Southern 
Rhodesia had mining laws that gave miners a prior right to wood. The following examples 
from the survey can be cited: 
Western Australia: The holder of any mining tenement is not allowed to fell trees 
without the consent of the owner or occupier. 
Nigeria: No European occupation – as farmers I mean. “The Lessee has the right to 
cut……within his lease, any but protected trees. Royalty is payable 
Queensland: The miner may cut necessary timber on crown lands. He may not cut on 
private land without the owner’s permission. 
Tanganyika: In respect of private land “a mining lease…..shall not confer on the lease 
the right to cut timber on the lands the subject of the lease.”407  
 
It was therefore considered a necessity to align land laws in the country with what was 
happening in other countries the world over. The confusion caused by the GBT was a root 
cause of many problems and disputes between farmers and miners in the country. Moffat thus 
recommended the discontinuation of GBTs and that any land deemed necessary for mining to 
be reserved for that purpose and not alienated at all.  
 
In addition to these efforts by the Minister of Mines to create a rough and ready equilibrium 
between farmers and miners, two conferences had been convened in 1925 and 1926 to iron out 
differences regarding use of timber, grazing and water rights on Gold Belt farms.408 These two 
conferences failed to resolve the differences since miners were not willing to give up on what 
they considered to be their constitutional right. Musemwa’s study uses the 1925, 1926 and 1933 
conferences as a window to examine farmer-miner conflicts in the country. His conclusion on 
the role of the state is that “The state which was better positioned to be the ultimate arbiter, 
prevaricated for most of the time and left the farmers and miners to sort out their 
differences.”409 The position of the state did not remain static. Consideration should be given 
to shifting mind sets amongst senior government officials in the post-1923 period because they 
ultimately resulted in a 50 per cent timber reservation for Gold Belt farmers. Although it did 
not take sides during these farmer-miner conferences, the government of the day made real 
attempts to deal with the controversial GBT as has been demonstrated in this section. This was 
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in line with changes being effected on other landholding titles in an attempt to lure more settlers 
into the country and boost agriculture. 
 
Voices could also be heard from some miners calling for an amendment of the mining law to 
one which recognised the importance of an uninterrupted development of agriculture as a 
crucial arm of the colonial economy. An example of such ‘progressive’ elements within the 
mining sector was an old prospector who wrote to the Minister of Mines in 1924, emphasising 
that it was imperative for the country to have a uniform land title and that, government should 
not be threatened by mining people who were reacting to proposed amendments to the mining 
law. His major argument hinged on the fact that if wood on farms had belonged to farmers, 
they could have acted more responsibly. Unavailability of free wood could not be taken as 
enough justification for failure by investors to consider taking up mining claims in the country. 
He observed: 
In the past free wood has been scandalously wasted both by companies and small 
workers – usually the companies gave out wood contracts – where wood was free the 
contractor allowed his boys to cut anything and everything and usually about two feet 
above ground, thus mating hundreds of cords of wood (the stumps he cut for firewood 
timber which should have been (according to Gold Law) reserved for mining timber; 
he cut down huge trees logged off the branches suitable for his contract and left huge 
logs lying to waste. The small worker in addition to above, went one worse, taking up 
a gamble, he erected his mill, started cutting timber, his property failed, and the timber 
(cut and corded), remained in the veld, to be burnt by the first veld fire that came 
along.410 
 
In this regard, he accused both small miners and big mining companies of wasting wood 
resources which could otherwise be used by tobacco farmers or preserved for posterity. 
Highlighting the need for a concerted effort in building the colonial economy, T. Haddon, a 
miner, wrote to the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines stating that “I strongly favour a uniform title 
to land and also oppose the continued inclusion of present day servitudes in new titles, which 
servitudes operate inequitably and are not of such general necessity as may have at one time 
appeared to be the case.”411 These are examples of the few miners who advocated for the 
revision of the mining law. The majority of miners did not want the GBT clause to be tempered 
with. 
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Great Depression and shifting government policy 
Farmer-miner relations provide a useful lens for examining how the colonial economy, mainly 
predicated on agriculture and mining, fared over time and influenced overall state policy. 
Unlike gold mining, agriculture had a fitful experience characterised by booms and busts 
throughout the Great Depression, up to World War II. A price rise resulted in increased 
production whereas a decline in commodity prices spelled doom for local production. The 
agricultural sector was prone to such price shifts in the first decade of settler government. A 
higher cotton price on the international market in 1923 resulted in increased production of the 
commodity in the country so much that production reached 6 803 bales by 1926.412 Agricultural 
pests however reduced production to 639 bales in the following year. Effects of this sudden 
decline were covered by tobacco production which was on the rise.413 S. C. Rubert notes that 
in the 1922/23 season, 388 farmers grew 2 540 943 lbs. of tobacco, production further 
increased to 5 313 168 lbs. produced by 676 farmers in the 1925/26 season.414 Apart from the 
prevailing higher international price for the commodity, other stimulants to tobacco production 
were the imperial preference granted to Rhodesia’s tobacco in 1919 and 1925, the construction 
of a tobacco processing plant by the Imperial Tobacco Company in Salisbury as well as effects 
of the 1924 Wembley Exhibition which generated a lot of interest for Rhodesian tobacco in 
Britain. All these factors pushed most farmers flocking into the country to take up tobacco 
farming. The overall result was overproduction of the crop which coincided with a fall of the 
international price forcing most tobacco farmers into bankruptcy at the end of the 1927/28 
season. According to Machingaidze: 
After the disaster of the 1929 crop, which eliminated 700 growers in 1930, production 
fell to half a million pounds (weight). The problem of overproduction had indeed been 
solved but at a cost to the exchequer and to the farming which seemed crippling. Nearly 
all the progress of the previous ten years was wiped out in one season. Many of the 
hopefuls who had immigrated returned to the United Kingdom with all their capital lost, 
and all but a score of those who remained abandoned tobacco.415 
 
The prevailing circumstances pushed government to take remedial action that could at least 
keep the financial nostrils of the tobacco farmers above water.  
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Tobacco, a crucial component of the country’s agricultural sector, had succumbed to 
overproduction; millions of pounds of Southern Rhodesia’s tobacco lay unsold in Britain. The 
Parliamentary Committee on tobacco reported that there were about 11 500 000 lbs. of unsold 
Rhodesian tobacco in the United Kingdom, and in Rhodesia itself there was another estimated 
9 000 000 lbs. as at 31st December 1928, and 1928/29 production though very much reduced, 
added another 7 000 000 lbs. to the stocks.416 The 1928 tobacco crush convinced Southern 
Rhodesia’s government officials that there was need for state involvement in the marketing of 
the crop so as to restore order in the sector. Rubert notes that “The government recognised that 
if the disastrous cycles of expansion and retrenchment were to be stopped it was absolutely 
necessary that it intervene and assume the responsibility for regulating the industry.”417 The 
government was therefore left with no choice but to save the tobacco farmers from the effects 
of the debacle by extending credit facilities through the Land Bank and the Tobacco Co-
operative Warehouse to pay advances to planters and enable them to export their crop.418 The 
state expended a lot of money in this exercise, F. Clements and E. Harben note that “Directly 
or indirectly, the tobacco industry cost the Rhodesian Government over half a million pounds 
(sterling), a contribution all the more remarkable when it is remembered that the total annual 
revenue in those days was only around two and a half million pounds (sterling).”419 All this did 
not help improve the farmers’ position and therefore, a series of laws intended to redeem 
tobacco farmers were enacted, and they included the Tobacco Sale and Export Control Act of 
1930 which was superseded by the Tobacco Marketing Act of 1936, Tobacco Levy Act of 
1933, Tobacco Reserve Pool Act of 1934, the Tobacco Research Act of 1935 which established 
the Tobacco Research Board. The Government also replaced the Tobacco Control Board with 
the Tobacco Marketing Board and mandated the compulsory selling of all tobacco at Marketing 
Board operated auction floors. 
 
Most farmers who abandoned cotton and tobacco went into maize production. This intensified 
problems bedevilling the maize sector, which was already suffering because of overproduction 
resulting from the increased number of maize farmers and a dwindling local market. The 
economic downturn, triggered by a world economic recession in 1930 saw agricultural 
commodity prices on the international market plummeting, further exacerbating Southern 
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Rhodesia’s problems. The League of Nations summed up the world agricultural crisis as 
follows: “It is the lowness of prices that constitutes the agricultural crisis. It is becoming 
difficult to sell products and in many cases prices have reached a level at which they are 
scarcely if at all sufficient to cover the cost of production.”420 This state of affairs impacted 
negatively on the maize farmers who had all along been clamouring for controlled production 
to deal with the problem of a shrinking local market. The maize price on the international 
market dropped from a high of 11s a bag to 5s. 10d. in 1930 and to a low of 3s. 4d. in April 
1931.421 This massive fall in maize prices pushed the government to support the enactment of 
the Maize Control Act in 1931 to facilitate organized marketing of all maize under the pool 
system. The government also seem to have been prompted into action by the mounting political 
pressure from RAU who had sponsored Noaks’ (Secretary of the RAU) candidature in a 
parliamentary by-election for the Mazoe constituency in 1930.422 This piece of legislation 
marked a turning point in state-farmer relations as the government now widened its sphere of 
direct responsibility to include ensuring that maize farmers received sufficient income for them 
to continue farming; furthermore the government accepted the responsibility for marketing.423 
It heralded a new era in the manner that government related with the various sectors of the 
economy, especially on matters that threatened its hold on power.  
 
Difficulties in the marketing of agricultural commodities, sparked by overproduction, 
dwindling local markets and low international prices, were not confined to Southern Rhodesia. 
Parallels can be drawn from the scenario prevailing in the Union of South Africa. Unlike in 
Southern Rhodesia where farmer-miner relations were characterised by animosity when settler 
agriculture was still at an embryonic stage, farmers and miners in South Africa were co-
operating for their own mutual benefit. Depicting this relationship, R. Morrell notes that “The 
mines required a regular cheap supply of agricultural products, particularly maize, to feed their 
labourers who were housed in the compounds. The maize farmers on the other hand, had access 
to a reliable market for their crops.”424 This economic symbiosis characterised miner-famer 
relations in South Africa in the first two decades of the twentieth century and has been 
                                                            
420 League of Nations Economic Committees Report 1931. Quoted in ‘Report on Agricultural Position’, The 
Countryside, January 1934.  
421 C. F. Keyter, ‘Maize control in Southern Rhodesia 1931-1941: The African contribution to white survival’, 
The Journal of Central African Historical Association, 34, 8 (1977), 3. 
422 For a detailed discussion on the politics surrounding the passing of the Maize Control Act, see Murray, 
governmental systems.  
423 Murray, The governmental system in Southern Rhodesia, 75. 
424 R. Morrell, ‘The disintegration of the Gold and Maize Alliance in South Africa in the 1920s’, The Journal of 
African Historical Studies, 21, 4 (1988), 619-635. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 115 
 
described by S. Trapido as the “gold and maize alliance.”425 However, it collapsed from the 
mid-1920s in the wake of declining international maize price, which left the home market more 
profitable. Morrell gives an incisive chronicle of the soaring miner-farmer relations and how 
this ultimately led to a disintegration of the gold and maize alliance.426 When maize production 
exceeded demand, maize farmers lobbied the state for assistance in maize marketing to raise 
the price. This was contrary to the demands of miners who were against any attempts made by 
the state to subsidise maize production. This action by the state resulted in increased agitation 
by the miners. Maize was being sold at a loss but the settler state intervened, a development 
which incensed miners.   
 
The impact of maize control legislation on miners in Southern Rhodesia has surprisingly 
escaped detailed exposition in existing literature. This is despite the fact that the mining sector 
constituted a major proportion of the maize consumer base in the country. The home market 
was more remunerative than the foreign market so miners automatically became an important 
stakeholder. G. Arrighi discusses the Act using his class struggle analysis reaching a conclusion 
that the Act was framed in the context of competition between African and European maize 
producers.427 Closely related to this is Edwards’ argument that the law was crafted on strict 
racial lines in an attempt to cushion white maize producers from African competition.428 Keyter 
discusses how the Act’s clause on the rake-off came to be regarded as the African contribution 
to white survival.429 This body of literature succeeds in highlighting the differences between 
Mashonaland maize producers and those in Matebeleland. This chapter demonstrate how the 
Act succeeded in widening the rift between maize farmers and miners as it presented a major 
challenge to the sectorial interests of the latter. The Maize Control Act will thus be used as a 
lens to study the farmer-miner conflict and the state’s response.  
 
Section 7 of the Maize Control Act (1931) had a provision stipulating that the producer was 
not obliged to surrender to the Maize Control Board “his reasonable requirements for 
consumption by himself, his servants, employees and stock.”430 This provision made it possible 
for miners and individuals to keep maize that they produced for their own use. Many other 
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mine owners therefore, sought exemption from the operations of the Act under this clause. The 
Chairman of the Maize Control Board even noted that:  
A number of large mine owners were not growers but had secured exemption of their 
maize requirements from the operations of the act under the terms of section 9 of the 
Act by entering into contracts of purchase before the Act came into force; and it soon 
became evident that a number of the remaining mines proposed to secure a like 
exemption under the terms of section 7 by financing farmers to grow maize for them.431 
 
If this were allowed to happen then the Board could have suffered imminent collapse by losing 
the entire mining market. To address this shortcoming, an amendment No. 25 of 1933 to the 
Act was ratified and it read as follows “a producer may retain his reasonable requirements for 
consumption by himself, his dependants, farm servants, farm employees and farm stock.”432 
The addition of the word ‘farm’ automatically disqualified the miner from being a beneficiary 
under that clause; he was thus disallowed to grow maize for his own personal use. 
 
Miners challenged this piece of legislation and labelled it a major obstacle to their operations. 
A number of bigger mines in the country owned farms where they grew maize which they used 
to feed their African labourers. This was used as a cost cutting mechanism in a mining 
environment where profitability constrains were the order of the day. Addressing delegates to 
the 1933 Miners’ Conference, Burnett gave an example of such mines: “The Cam and Motor 
and the Sherwood Star applied for leave to use maize grown on their own farms, farms which 
were purchased at a time considerably prior to the Act being brought into force.”433 The logic 
behind such an argument was that such farms were acquired before the Act and therefore, their 
operations were in no way intended to counter it. 
 
L. Stone of the Salisbury Chamber of Mines reiterated the significance of the mining industry 
to the colonial economy, highlighting that it paid more tax and thus, it constituted the backbone 
of the national economy.434 It appeared that the fairest thing to do was to allow this vital sector 
to grow its own maize for feeding labourers. Miners did not favour a position whereby they 
were called upon to subsidize agriculture all the time. The government was doing a lot for the 
farmers and yet the miners bore the brunt. Stone opined that “The farmer is being spoon fed all 
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the time and escapes taxation, yet this is done.”435 Hussey of the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines 
added that “The legislation was introduced to enable maize to be sold in London at a loss. 
Supposing that they now get a substantial profit on the London market, will they give us a 
bonus on mealies we buy in this country?”436 The government’s move to support agriculture, 
both maize and tobacco, sparked sectorial squabbles as the taxpayers from other sectors were 
discontented and challenged government’s position in this regard. Edwards summed up the 
scenario by stating that “Urban voices claimed that townsmen and taxpayers were subsidising 
rural laziness and that the new policy raised the consumer’s cost of living.”437 Commercial 
people also detested the maize Control Act “because it controlled a commodity that at different 
times they had been in the habit of getting for as little as 4s bag.”438 
 
Consequently, the mining industry continued to fight against the concept of subsidies on all 
agricultural products in general and maize in particular. This was intensified when calls were 
made for an extension of the time frame for the operation of the Maize Control Act. The 
Chamber of Mines and the Rhodesian Mining Federation joined forces in denouncing the re-
enactment of this Act. In a letter to the Minister of Agriculture, the organisations argued that: 
As you will doubtless be aware this chamber in conjunction with other representative 
bodies of the mining industry has always opposed the fixation by Government of an 
artificial price for locally consumed maize as a policy which is detrimental in its effects 
not only to the mining industry and other industries but also the efficiency of maize 
growers themselves.439 
 
The concept of maize control had initially been agreed to mainly because it had been proposed 
to be a temporary measure intended to prevent the local maize price from falling below the 
international parity. The objective was to give maize farmers time to move over to another 
branch of farming which could be carried on profitably. Neither of the two was happening, 
maize producers actually increased production so as to continue enjoying the benefits of 
control. The RAU and other farmers’ associations therefore, continued to make resolutions 
supporting the continuation of the maize control system. In its place, miners were calling for 
the adoption of a suggestion made by Forester and Clay in their comments on the Report of the 
Maize Inquiry Committee calling for the restriction of acreage under maize and withdrawing 
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as far as possible from the unremunerative export trade.440 If the Act was to be maintained, 
then mining companies suggested that they be placed on the same basis by the Maize Control 
Board as individual farmers who owned mines since the latter were permitted by a special 
resolution of the Maize Control Board to use for their mine requirements maize they 
produced.441 
 
The mining industry was being handicapped by the maize control system. Davies pointed out 
that the country was exporting maize at a loss while the increase in the internal price added to 
the cost of production for the gold mines.442 The burden exerted on the mining industry by the 
Maize Control Act was viewed as a form of indirect taxation which was unfair in its nature. 
The Joint Mining Conference called for uniformity and fairness in the extension of subsidies 
by noting that “While your committee realises the importance of keeping farmers on the land, 
we feel that any assistance given to them should come to the people as a whole and not only to 
one section.”443 It was deemed unfair that the entire burden of assisting the maize farmer should 
be carried by the mining community. 
 
Farmers engaged in cattle ranching were not spared by the problems bedevilling tobacco and 
maize growers. Suggestions had been made during the early stages of the depression for maize 
growers to use their crop as cattle feed so as to realise better returns on their investment after 
selling the cattle. Such ideas however, remained utopian for the cattle industry was severely 
affected by the foot and mouth disease around that same time. The Union of South Africa, 
which was the major cattle market for Southern Rhodesia, imposed trade quotas limiting the 
number of beasts that Southern Rhodesia could export to that country.444 Such marketing 
constrains combined with low cattle prices on the international market caused by the 
depression, brought Southern Rhodesia’s cattle trade to its knees. In line with what was 
happening in other branches of farming, the government intervened to save the country’s stock 
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raisers from their impending demise by passing the Cattle Levy and Beef Bounty Act in 1935. 
This piece of legislation extended the system under which the government, on the advice of the 
Cattle Advisory Board made a levy on cattle slaughtered within the colony in order to pay a 
bounty on cattle exported.445 Edwards notes that £87 000 was paid in such bounties up to 
February 1936 making it possible to export 80 000 cattle.446 In as much as the cattle levy 
assisted the cattle ranchers in the country, it was heavily detested by the mining industry, 
especially the small miners. Mine owners slaughtered cattle on a regular basis mainly to 
provide rations for their labour and, therefore, they were supposed to pay the required 10s per 
beast. This came as an unforeseen addition to the miner’s operational costs and ate into his 
profit. With cattle and meat prices rising on the local market, the cattle levy worsened the 
burden for miners, in July 1937, the Rhodesian Mining Federation had submitted a resolution 
“that the government is respectfully requested to remove the 10s levy on slaughter cattle as this 
levy is not serving the purpose anticipated.”447 The response from the Department of 
Agriculture emphasised the fact that government was determined to support the cattle ranchers 
no matter the cost. This position was well articulated in a response by the Minister of 
Agriculture when he argued that: 
I have to advise you that no decision has yet been taken by the government on the 
subject of the continuance or otherwise, after the 31st March next, of the 10s levy on 
slaughter cattle. I would point out, however, that there is no direct evidence to support 
the statement that this levy is not serving the purpose anticipated. Aided by the fund so 
derived, export of beef and beef products has been proceeding from the colony during 
the last three years on a very considerable scale and has resulted in removal of a 
considerable portion of the surplus cattle in excess of local requirements which then 
existed.448 
 
Continuing with this system meant that the small worker out in the bush would continue 
suffering. It should be highlighted that the miners’ representatives in the Chamber or in the 
Federation sometimes misrepresented the position and opinion of the mining interests. A 
shining example of such a scenario was at the Mining Conference of 1937 where Burnett and 
Gardner (form the Smallminers and Tributors Association) attended the conference 
representing small workers but ended up defending and justifying the continuation of the Cattle 
Levy arguing that cattle farmers were supposed to be helped until such a time when cattle prices 
on the international market improve. They were now championing the cause for the Cattle 
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Owners Association of which Burnett was the President and Gardner was a member of the 
executive. This shows that even the small miners were not a homogeneous entity. Fissures 
existed between individual miners and between the miners and their representatives; these were 
fuelled by differences in objectives and interests of the individuals. 
 
The assistance extended to farmers during the economic slump in the agricultural sector 
formalised a suddenly symbiotic relationship between the settler farmers and the state. The 
government acted in consultation with farmer representatives thus making the RAU an integral 
part of agricultural administration in the country. The Dairy Control Board was established in 
1933 and eventually state intervention featured in all white agricultural enterprise except 
poultry and egg production.449 A Farmers’ Debt Adjustment Board was also created in 1935 to 
assist farmers who were at the verge of losing land to creditors with debt repayment.450 There 
was close co-operation between the farmers and the government and the latter was always 
informed on constraints affecting agriculture and helped in crafting solutions. This scenario 
ensured a wider support base from representatives of farmer interest in the House of Assembly 
and of farmers as voters. Machingaidze notes that the “Union exercised great political influence 
in settler politics and the Government was constantly looking over its shoulders lest it alienates 
itself from the settler farmers.”451  The farmers on the other hand were also keen on maintaining 
a good relationship with government and they always invited the Prime Minister or Minister 
of Agriculture to attend all of the RAU’s congresses. In 1936 a member of the Bromley Farmers 
Association proposed that “at future congresses the Minister of Government or official 
concerned should not have the right of being the final speaker to resolutions.”452 This proposal 
was shot down by other farmer representatives attending the meeting arguing that an alteration 
in this procedure would be considered discourteous and might create a rift between farmers 
and the government, a development which could have had a boomerang effect and reverse all 
the farmers’ gains to date.  
 
All this could not conceal the heterogeneity characterising the farming community in Southern 
Rhodesia. Although the RAU succeeded in exhibiting a semblance of unity, differences 
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between farmers were inevitable due to the diversity of the main products grown and the 
county’s geographical variations. Such differences manifested, for instance, as already alluded 
to, when the Maize Control Act was promulgated. The Central Executive of the RAU admitted 
this lack of unity in 1935 by stating that “Outside areas consider that their views and 
requirements are being disregarded, and that only interests of those close to the centre are 
considered.”453 The Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture echoed similar sentiments when 
he noted the lack of cohesion and co-operation between the Central Executive and various 
farmer representative organisations. Instead of the Central Executive voicing concerns of the 
farming community as a whole, it was being by-passed by Farmers Associations and they 
sought audience with government straight away, he wrote: 
An example of the situation is the recent receipt in this office of some eight resolutions 
adopted at the Annual Congress of the Matebeleland Agricultural Union held in 
Bulawayo on the 17th of October, which congress both the Hon. Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Agriculture and Lands were asked officially to attend. In submitting these 
resolutions, the Matebeleland Agriculture Union gives no indication that they are 
tentative and subject to confirmation by the Central Executive, or that the Central 
Executive has been previously consulted in any way on these questions. Similar 
positions arisen also with the Victoria District Farmers’ Association and the Macheke 
Farmers Association.454 
 
The government was more comfortable dealing with a sufficiently representative Central 
Executive which expressed the concerted opinion of the entire farming community. The 
Ministry even offered more funding for the RAU as an incentive for unity. This kind of farmer 
organisation was finally achieved in 1942 with the creation of the Rhodesia National Farmers 
Union (RNFU). This was in addition to the cultural cleavages which continued to characterise 
the sector. This was fuelled by the immigration of settlers who were not of British origin 
(Germans, Italians, Afrikaners). The settler government was mainly against the settlement of 
Afrikaners in Southern Rhodesia as already discussed. Afrikaner language, religion and civic 
culture was different to that already established in Southern Rhodesia and thus, Afrikaners were 
not deemed the ‘right type’ of settlers by colonial officials. Afrikaner immigrants therefore 
tended to settle in tight, self-contained communities such as Enkeldoorn (becoming an 
Afrikaner stronghold in a predominantly English speaking country.455 Between 1936 and 1941, 
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B. S. Schutz notes that the Afrikaner population was effectively reduced from 17. 8 per cent of 
the European population to 14. 8 per cent.456 The exclusionist settlement policy was paying 
dividend in this regard, overall, it militated against the dream of a white man’s country since it 
stopped other potential settlers (non-British) from immigrating into Southern Rhodesia.457 
 
Mining taxation in the Depression era 
Mining in general and gold mining in particular sustained the economy during a time when 
performance in the agricultural sector was at its lowest ebb. Edwards describes the period from 
1931 as an era of mining boom, characterised by an upsurge in gold prices on the London 
market as well as a rejuvenation of demand for base minerals instanced by the rearmament 
exercise.458 In the early stages of the depression the British government depreciated its currency 
to boost export trade and abandoned the gold standard.459 On 12 October 1931 Southern 
Rhodesia followed suit making her goods cheaper. This placed her in a better position than the 
Union of South Africa which maintained the gold standard for some time. This propped up the 
gold mining industry and spared it from the ruin inflicted on other economic sectors by the 
great depression. Gold prices rose and there was increased activity as many whose fortunes in 
agriculture had been eroded sought to make it in gold prospecting.460 The graph below shows 
the average price of gold in the period 1920 to 1940. 
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Graph 3: Average Gold prices for the period 1920 to 1940461 
                                                      
 
Big mining companies sought to increase their production by working on low grade ore that 
had hitherto been unprofitable. The collapse of the agricultural sector also resulted in labour 
flocking to seek employment in the gold mines, enabling mine owners to enjoy the benefits of 
cheap labour thereby minimising their operational costs.462 Rising gold prices contributed to 
the remarkable recovery of the colonial economy during the decade before the Second World 
War.463 Under these circumstances the colonial government was keen on increasing the revenue 
flow and the highly paying gold mines were the only source from which treasury could tap 
since agriculture was under strain from the depression. 
 
Gold mining was doing very well and the colonial government gave full consideration at that 
particular time to meet the financial difficulties confronting the colony by widening its tax 
bracket mainly on this sector. The first major hurdle towards this desire was that some of these 
big mining companies were registered in the United Kingdom and therefore, whatever income 
tax collected was supposed to be shared with that country. This difficult scenario was brought 
about by a clause in the country’s Tax Act which stipulated that:  
Income tax paid in the territory upon the same part of a tax payer’s income as charged 
with income tax in the United Kingdom is refunded to the tax payer there, under section 
43 of the Imperial Finance Act, 1916, upon production of proof of payment here.464  
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This issue of reciprocal tax relief was crucial and provided the basis of engagement between 
the colonial government and international mining capital. As demonstrated in the first section 
of this chapter, the settler government had been conciliatory in dealing with international 
capital but, 1930 brought a significant change in government’s attitude towards mining.  A 
good example of this tussle that can be cited was the government’s refusal to invoke the clause 
on reciprocal tax relief for Turner and Newall’s subsidiary company, African Asbestos Mining 
Company Limited (AAMCo.). The Chairman of Turner and Newall launched a complaint to 
the High Commissioner in 1932 that:  
We are put in the unfortunate position of being refused reciprocal relief in the case of 
the African Asbestos Mining Company Limited on the technical ground that the African 
Asbestos Mining Company Limited is assessed to income tax in Southern Rhodesia, 
but the shareholders, namely Turner and Newall Limited, who own the whole of the 
ordinary share capital are assessed to income tax in England.465  
 
In his letter to Southern Rhodesia’s Treasury, Downie noted that none of the Dominioms was 
reciprocating except for India and that had the AAMCo. been established in India instead of 
Rhodesia, it could have been awarded with the relief that it sought.466 
 
This engagement between the government and Turner and Newall shows how big mining 
capital attempted to use the colonial office in the United Kingdom to assist them influence 
colonial governments in Africa to implement policy changes in the mining sector. Such 
changes were intended to directly benefit international mining capital. The Secretary for 
Treasury for Southern Rhodesia outlined the differences in the territorial tax laws for the United 
Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia by stating that: 
You will see that there are certain important differences of principle between our law 
and that of the United Kingdom, e.g we do not tax dividends in the hands of 
shareholders, we tax the company before the declaration of dividends and although 
shareholders may claim relief from the United Kingdom in terms of the Finance Act of 
1920, they have no such claim on us. We tax only income derived from sources within 
the colony whereas the net of the United Kingdom is much wider.467 
 
 
Granting the relief was not an option, it would have entailed upsetting the country’s tax laws 
in an attempt to accommodate the wishes of mining capital. It also had the undesired 
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consequence of significantly cutting a considerable amount of revenue which the country 
desperately needed.  
 
In an endeavour to improve its revenue prospects the government made an instantaneous 
reaction to the rise in the gold price on the London market through the promulgation of the 
Gold Premium Taxation Act in 1932 which enabled it to levy a Gold Premium Tax (GPT) on 
all gold produced in the country. The GPT, defined as a tax on turnover (output), there were 
also instances where it constituted a tax on loss,468 aimed to appropriate the excess profits 
accruing to the gold miners and deemed by the government to be fortuitous. This introduced a 
levy of 15 per cent on monthly outputs exceeding 300 ounces from mines realising more than 
2. 5 dwts. per ton.469 Levying this tax on gold miners to prop up the colonial economy ignited 
a lot of resentment from the gold producers who were against, first and foremost, the principle 
of sectorial taxation targeting a single sector while the agricultural sector was being spared. 
The amount of tax paid was determined by the price of gold on the last day of each month and 
this made it difficult for gold producers to determine liabilities in advance. A Joint Mining 
Conference of 1936 included on its list of resolutions the point that “In the first place the 
conference respectfully wish to point out that they wish to disagree with the policy of singling 
out the gold mining industry as against other industries for differential taxation, on a higher 
basis.”470 Apart from the GPT, the mining sector was also subjected to the payment of income 
tax and royalty. Miners had anticipated a repeal of the latter once ownership of the mineral 
rights had been transferred from the BSAC to the government. Royalty payment, however 
continued to weigh down on the mining sector and coupled with the GPT, became a major bone 
of contention between government and the mining industry and went a long way in determining 
their relations. 
 
Mining representatives held periodic meetings and conferences plotting the way forward and 
drafting ways of dismantling the government’s vicious taxation grip. Resolutions adopted at 
such meetings were deemed to be the official position of the entire industry, although it should 
be noted that there were other discerning voices of individual miners who had diverging 
opinions or whose views were sacrificed on the altar of uniformity of the industry as shall be 
                                                            
468 S916 Taxation, 1944 to 1945. Letter from L. D. Fereday (Minister of Mines) to the Prime Minister, 4 March 
1944. Gold Premium Tax. 
469 Phimister, ‘History of mining in Rhodesia’, 158. 
470 NAZ S482/349/39/1, Joint Conference of representatives of the Chamber of Mines Salisbury, Chamber of 
Mines Bulawayo and the Rhodesian Mining Federation held at Gwelo, 7 October 1936. 
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highlighted. The operation of the GPT and royalty ate into the mining companies’ profits, 
especially the low grade mines and the result was so bad that the government tasked the Low 
Grade Committee to ascertain the genuineness of the miners’ plight in this regard. Although 
the government appeared to be paying a deaf ear to the industry’s tax concerns, the 1937 
Mining Conference resolved to continue knocking and keep the matter before the 
government.471 This was after a vehement resolution adopted at the second conference held in 
1936 calling for a complete abolition of the GPT at the earliest possible date.472 At this 
conference Burnet of the Salisbury Chamber highlighted how bad the situation had become by 
giving figures of tax paid by the bigger mining companies as documented in Table 1. 
 
Table 4:  Tax paid by five big companies in the first six months after the introduction of 
the Gold Premium Tax473 
Mine Tax paid in six months (includes premium 
tax and royalty) 
Cam and Motor 33% 
Sherwood Star 44, 98% 
Bushtic 27, 12% 
Lonely 37, 3% 
Wanderer 36, 65% 
 
 
The government was now taking a significant portion from profits made by mining companies, 
a position that was to be continuously challenged by the mining industry. 
 
The government attempted to deal with this problem of mining taxation and thus tasked the 
1937 Commission into the Taxation of Low Grade Mines, to look into the issue and make 
recommendations on the way forward. The Commission’s main proposition was the scrapping 
                                                            
471 NAZ S246/93, Proceedings of the Mining Conference held at Gwelo, 2 March 1937. 
472 NAZ S482/349/39/1, Joint Conference of representatives of the Chamber of Mines Salisbury, Chamber of 
Mines Bulawayo and the Rhodesian Mining Federation held at Gwelo, 7 October 1936.  
473 NAZ S246/93 Proceedings of the Mining Conference held at Gwelo, 2 March 1937. 
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of premium tax and a reversion to use of an income tax system based on the actual profits made. 
Repeated protests from the mining industry however, resulted in the government succumbing 
and it repealed the hated tax in 1937. The Committee’s report noted the overall opinion of 
witnesses pointing to the fact that “The system of taxation as a whole is inequitable in incidence 
and that the cumulative effect of the different taxes is to retard the development and expansion 
of the mining industry.”474 The mining industry hated and wanted government to do away with 
the GPT, royalty and claim licences. The report noted that the general opinion of the industry 
was that the GPT was wrong in principle and objections were raised on the following points: 
Owing to the high exemption limit of 300 ounces, the burden of the tax is concentrated 
upon a comparatively small number of producers. In arriving at the monthly profit on 
which the tax is based, no allowance is made for depreciation or capital redemption. 
The tax is based on a formula which discriminates against low grade mines. 
The tax being levied on a monthly basis causes expense and inconvenience in the 
preparation of returns to those who are liable to it.Losses made in any one month are 
not permitted to be set off against the profits of subsequent months.475 
 
The committee’s report also highlighted the implications on the mining concerns of Royalty 
payment. The report defined royalty not as a tax but “compensation paid to the owner of 
mineral deposits for the re right of exploiting them.”476 This payment weighed heavily on low 
grade mines than it did on higher grade mines, the following figures were cited as an example:  
Total value of monthly output………………………………. £10 000 
Profit derived therefrom before payment of Royalty……….…£1 000 
Royalty at 2,5% of value of gross output………………………. £250 
 
The royalty in this case represented 25 per cent of gross profit and 33. 5per cent of the net 
profit. This scenario was compared with another example intended to represent the case of a 
mine producing an output of the same value from rich ore and paying royalty at a higher rate: 
 
Total value of monthly…………………………………….…£10 000 
Profits derived therefrom before payment of Royalty…………£5000 
Royalty at 5% of value of gross output…………………………£500. 477 
 
 
Royalty in the second case represented 10 per cent of the gross profit. These two cases clearly 
revealed how royalty payment was undercutting profit margins for low grade mines. Combined 
with the GPT, the two led to the closure of many gold mines. The GPT was subsequently 
                                                            
474 NAZ ZBN 2/1/1 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the taxation of low grade mines, 24 February 1927. 
475 NAZ ZBN 2/1/1 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the taxation of low grade mines, 24 February 1927. 
476 NAZ ZBN 2/1/1 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Taxation of Low Grade Mines, 24 February 1937. 
477 NAZ ZBN 2/1/1 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Taxation of Low Grade Mines, 24 February 1937. 
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abandoned in 1937, although the move by the government may not entirely be attributed to the 
report by the 1937 Commission, it perhaps arguably added weight to the validity of the mining 
industry’s concerns. 
 
The Second World War and the reintroduction of the Gold Premium Tax 
The outbreak of World War II in 1939 was followed immediately by an empire-wide call to all 
countries under the crown for a concerted effort to ensure victory. Southern Rhodesia was 
supposed to contribute towards the war effort in the same manner as it had done during the 
First World War. There were major dynamics at play regarding the country’s political economy 
at this particular time. These went a long way in influencing the course of events. Farmers were 
recovering from the effects of the depression and still struggling to find markets for agricultural 
products. The war situation however, turned around misfortunes of the industry overnight. The 
country’s agricultural sector was not only expected to meet local food requirements increased 
by stationing of the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS) and prisoners of war, but was also 
supposed to make a contribution to the war effort by exporting maize, tobacco and beef/cattle 
to areas in need. The war situation instanced an increased demand for strategic minerals and 
gold resulting in the price of gold leaping from 148s to 160s per fine ounce on 1 September 
1939 and reaching a record 168s per fine ounce on 5 September 1939.478 Instead of this sudden 
rise in the gold price contributing to the continued and sustained growth of the sector, it actually 
spelt doom and caused its decline as shall be demonstrated in this section. Manufacturing 
industry also got a shot in the arm after the curtailment of import supplies of manufactures 
when hostilities erupted in 1939. The urban population propelled by the EATS, RAF personnel; 
internees and refugees (mainly Germans and Italians) expanded the market for manufactured 
products. South Africa remained the major source of immigrants. There was an increase in the 
proportion of British immigrants compared to Afrikaners, this was mainly because of the 
progressive strengthening of Afrikaner nationalism which ultimately resulted in Afrikaner 
nationalists emerging victorious in 1948.  The state moved to support the emerging Import 
Substitution Industrialisation,479 offering various incentives chief amongst which were the tax 
holidays to manufacturing companies which were later on detested and contested by gold 
miners. 
                                                            
478 NAZ ZBN 2/1/1 Memorandum titled, Outline of the history of the Gold Premium Tax: Southern Rhodesia, 5 
November 1944. 
479 A. S. Mlambo, E. S Pangeti and I. R. Phimister, Zimbabwe: A history of manufacturing 1890 to 1995, (Harare: 
University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2000). 
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Gold miners quickly made adjustments in response to the new price in an endeavour to return 
a consistent annual profit. Just like what had happened during the First World War and the 
depression period, they started working on low grade ores. In an important memorandum to 
the Prime Minister, the Mines Minister stated that:  
This is the normal policy of any such concern and fluctuations in the market price of 
gold are reflected in the grade of ore sent to the mill, and in the ore taken into or released 
from ore reserves. This policy has a marked influence on the life of a mine, as any 
appreciable rise in the price of gold, provided that this is not offset by a corresponding 
increase in production costs, enables a competent management to take into reserves and 
to crush a lower grade of ore than was hitherto economically treatable.480 
 
Gold miners sought to derive as much benefit as they could from the prevailing high gold price. 
This goal was not realized due to a government directive which forbade fortuitous profiteering 
as a result of the war situation. In this regard, government reintroduced the Gold Premium 
Taxation Act on the 11th of September 1939 empowering it to appropriate the proceeds of gold 
above the basic price of 150s.481 The Minister of Mines was granted authority to review the 
price paid to gold producers over time and in relation to rises in the cost of production. In this 
guise the GPT represented a war tax with which government intended to finance the war effort.  
It was this fiscal move by government which the Mining Commission of 1945 apportion blame 
for the decline of gold production. Miners could not even concentrate on low grade ore because, 
as stated by the commission: 
If however, the tax is not an income tax but a tax on the product – even this policy of 
working low grade ore may not be practicable, because such a tax by reducing the value 
of the low grade ore automatically excludes the whole or portion thereof from the range 
of ore which can be profitably extracted.482 
 
Under these circumstances most gold producers were forced to cease operations since the 
premium tax was taking away most of the profits made. 
 
The immediate response by small workers to the re-enactment of the GPT was creation of the 
Freedom Press in December 1939. The Freedom Press was a vocal miners’ press which claimed 
to represent interests of small miners. It aimed to foster unity and spread information to all 
                                                            
480 NAZ S472 Gold Premium Tax 1939. Memorandum addressed to the Prime Minister, titled: Effects of gold 
price on grade of ore treated by the large mines, 4 November 1939. 
481 NAZ S472 Gold Premium Tax 1939. Notes on gold buying business in Southern Rhodesia. 
482 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia 7 November 1945, The 
Hon. Leslie B. Fereday, Minister of Mines. 
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members of the Mining Federation who could not attend all meetings because of distance.483 
The Freedom Press adopted a more confrontational stance in challenging the principle of the 
GPT which it referred to as ‘gold theft by the government.’ In their inaugural protest open letter 
they made the following statement: 
The unpatriotic attitude of the non-mining community fills us with disgust. They are 
prepared to let the young men fight and the gold mines pay. We do not question that 
the war must be paid for. We will even pay 20/- in the pound and go on paying provided 
the money is spent efficiently on defeating Hitler, and not squandered. But we demand 
that the other industries do their share equally, in fact, an equal income tax on profits 
irrespective of how they are made.484 
 
Apart from other industries contributing to the war effort, the Freedom Press voiced a major 
concern of the entire gold mining industry that other minerals, enjoying more profits as a result 
of the war situation should also contribute towards financing that war, they stated this in one 
of their numerous letters in 1940 that:  
The price of gold has risen approximately 15% since the war, whereas the price of 
asbestos has risen over 25%. The interest return of asbestos output is £99 000. 25% of 
this amount is due to increased price on account of the war. Therefore, the Asbestos 
Corporation contribution to the war effort should be £24 750 instead of which it is nil.485  
 
Many District Small Workers Associations supported the Freedom Press in challenging the 
mining policy pursued by government. The Kwekwe Miners and Farmers Association even 
proceeded to attack the Royalty Review Committee (RRC) labelling it a useless body, only 
created to provide jobs for pals. The state had created the RRC to assess the position of mining 
companies that qualified to apply for exemption from the harsh tax. This Committee, however, 
was unpopular and was accused of throwing away genuine cases were exemption was really 
needed and thus contributing to the decline of gold production. The Association further noted 
that the government’s policy on gold should move from one based on strangulation and 
confiscation to encouragement and co-operation.486 
 
The role of the gold mining sector as the lynchpin of the colonial economy continued although 
during the Second World War period, government’s over reliance on proceeds from gold sales 
ended up chocking the industry as it led to curtailment of development work and operations on 
many mines. A number of factors militated against successful and profitable mining ventures 
                                                            
483 NAZ S472 Gold Premium Tax 1939. Letter from The Freedom Press, 30 December 1939. 
484 Letter from The Freedom Press, 30 December 1939. 
485 Letter from the Freedom Press, 17 February 1940. 
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and the improved gold price could have redeemed the industry had it not been for the effects 
of the GPT. The war situation triggered increased production costs and labour shortages, all of 
which were diminishing mining profits. Most development enterprises in the country and all 
the subsidies that were being extended to agriculture during the depression period had been 
financed by revenue generated by the mining sector. Government was prepared to go that far 
in assisting farmers stand on their feet when their fortunes had been eroded by the great 
depression. The same could however, not be said for the mining sector when it was reeling 
under the effects of the GPT. Government was fully aware of the significance of continued 
gold production if the colony was to adequately finance its war effort, yet it was not prepared 
to assist mines that were facing production constraints. This was highlighted by the Mines 
Minister while defending government’s position during a meeting with representatives of small 
miners. His argument was “Now you may say that for the prosecution of the war it is necessary 
to produce gold. The production of gold is of very great importance to the prosecution of the 
war, but I do not think we have yet got to the stage when the state should subsidise uneconomic 
production.”487 Such pronouncements resonated with the Prime Minister’s statement in the 
following year. Responding to calls by mining representatives in the House of Assembly for 
the government to aid gold miners in 1941, the Prime Minister gave an important hint on 
government’s position regarding this request, he noted thus: “So do not let us get morbid about 
gold, important though it may be there must be a limit to the extent to which the other 
taxpayer’s money should be used for the benefit of individuals engaged in the gold mining 
industry.”488 Such a statement was paradoxical – after all, the gold mines had sustained the 
country’s budget and all sectors had actually benefited more from revenue generated by mining 
enterprise. Therefore, concluding that gold miners were thriving at the expense of tobacco 
farmers and merchants was erroneous and can be used to best explain how government’s 
attitude towards mining had radically changed. 
 
It did not take much time for the ruinous effect of the GPT on the mining sector to show. Even 
principal government officials were raising alarm and informing the Mines Minister on the 
negative implications the tax had. The Registrar of Claims wrote to the Minister a month after 
the tax was reintroduced explaining that government was the sole beneficiary of the improved 
                                                            
487 NAZ S472 Gold Premium Tax 1939. Report of a meeting between the Minister of Mines and a deputation from 
small workers, 13 March 1940. 
488 Legislative Assembly Debates, 26 May 1941, 764. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 132 
 
gold price and miners themselves were struggling, he gave the following scenario as an 
example: 
If the view is adopted that the price of gold before the 3rd of September was 148/6, 
around which it has been for the month of August, then the premium becomes the 
difference between that figure and 168/-, that is 19/6, reduced by charges to 16/6. Of 
this amount the producer is receiving 1/6 at the basic price of 150/- and the government 
receives 15/-. This means that the government takes 92% of the excess profit accruing 
to the producer, on account of the present war conditions.489 
 
Such observations and advice on the tax policy pushed government to make some changes in 
an attempt to improve the condition of gold miners. An amendment to the Act in 1940 allowed 
for a premium refund to small miners so as to lessen the burden for this class who were already 
under strain from the high productive costs instanced by their inability to stock provisions 
before the war.  In addition, the basic price paid to producers was raised to 152s in January 
1940, to 154s in June 1940, to 156s in March 1941 and to 159/6 in April 1944.490 All these 
changes were necessitated by the ever increasing cost of production caused by war conditions 
and clamouring by the mining sector for government to do away with the war tax and royalty 
completely for the two were causing a severe decline on the fortunes of the industry.  
 
Towards the end of the war, even the Mines Minister had accepted that the tax had inflicted 
harm on the industry and was in the forefront calling for its repeal. Arguing that the tax was 
justified when it was introduced, it had outlived its usefulness since it was now causing more 
harm than good. Many Mines had ceased operations and many others had their production 
levels severely reduced. He opined that other allied leaders were preparing for post-war 
conditions and it was vital that Southern Rhodesia followed suit and its first port of call was to 
be a revision of its mining tax laws.491 He further noted that, “I am convinced that many of the 
remaining mines which will inevitably close down in the near future, under our existing policy, 
can and will be saved if we take reasonable steps now.”492 The Minister made a very important 
criticism of government policy when he stated that, “Some new manufacturers are being 
allowed certain relief from taxation. Surely this is not in any sense parallel with our treatment 
                                                            
489 NAZ S472 Gold Premium Tax 1939. Letter from the Registrar of Claims to the Minister of Mines and Public 
Works, 4 January 1940. 
490 NAZ ZBN 2/1/1 Memorandum titled, Outline of the history of the Gold Premium Tax: Southern Rhodesia, 6 
November 1944. 
491 S916 Taxation 1944 – 1945.  Letter from L. D. Fereday (Minister of Mines) to the Prime Minister, 4 March 
1944. 
492 Letter from L.D. Fereday (Min of Mines) to the Prime Minister, 4 March 1944. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 133 
 
of the mines, and I suggest that our policy for the mining industry need some adjustment.”493 
The nascent manufacturing industry was offered incentives to boost production just like what 
had happened to the agricultural sector during the depression years and in both cases, gold 
miners did not receive adequate government support. The tax, together with the 1942 Excess 
Profits Tax significantly contributed to the resignation of  J. Smits, the Finance Minister.494 He 
vehemently opposed the two and consequently left office after failing to put up with the ruinous 
effect of the policies on the country’s economy. 
 
The Mining Federation engaged the Minister of Mines on the subject of mining taxation and 
attempted to push government to change its policy of using gold revenue to finance the war, 
but ignoring developmental needs of the sector. Some delegates at the meeting denied being 
responsible for the mass meeting which denounced government’s policy and called for this 
meeting with the Minister. Stowe for instance even denied that he had any links with the 
Freedom Press. This stance revealed that not all miners supported the Freedom Press and the 
existence of genuine fears of victimisation by the state. The small workers however, maintained 
that they were lock, stock and barrel against government’s mining policy and called for the 
removal of the GPT and its replacement with an income tax.495 They even pleaded with the 
Minister to present their case in the House of Assembly since they did not have proper 
representation. The meeting also laid bare the fact that miners no longer had faith in the 
country’s legislature. The Minister however tried to reassure them that the House of Assembly 
did not work on a partisan basis. Similar calls for the removal of the GPT were also being made 
by the Chamber of Mines, The Rhodesia Herald reported in 1944 that “The mining 
representatives reiterated the urgent necessity for the GPT to be abolished and for the full 
London market price of gold to be paid to producers, also for the tax on mines to be based on 
normal income tax rates.”496 
 
Evidence submitted to the Mining Commission noted the GPT as the major cause in the decline 
of gold mining. The number of gold producers had fallen from 1574 in 1939 to only 770 
producers in 1943, meaning that 50 per cent of the country’s gold mines had ceased operations 
during the war. Meanwhile, agricultural production was registering considerable growth as a 
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result of renewed growth ignited by the war conditions. Revenue generated by agricultural 
production surpassed mining revenue for the first time in the country’s history in 1945. 
Meanwhile, base minerals mining registered significant expansion during the war period, 
unlike gold production which was on the decline. Agriculture also registered tremendous 
growth during the same period and the state did not attempt to assist gold producers using 
money generated by other sectors. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the protean nature of government policy in its engagement with 
farmers and miners since the inception of Responsible Government in 1923. The chapter has 
used state-miner-farmer relations to explore Southern Rhodesia’s history in the first two 
decades of Responsible Government. It has gone beyond earlier works describing miner-farmer 
contests over natural resources and instead demonstrated how the state that emerged after 
Company administration interacted with the country’s fledging primary industries and how this 
in turn shaped the country’s political economy. The chapter has thus outlined the ever-shifting 
government policies and responses by farmers and miners. A departure by the new government 
from policies favouring the mining sector, which had been the norm during the time of 
Company administration, characterised the country’s political economy as the settler 
government was inclining more towards farming interests in the post-1923 era. Considering 
the significance of the two sectors to the colonial political economy, the government was 
caught up in a dilemma between supporting farmers whose political stature had been greatly 
enhanced after 1923, or favouring miners whose contribution to the national purse provided 
fiscal stability. Farming and ranching generated losses that were offset by mining and other 
sectors until about 1940 when new and better paying markets were opened up for Rhodesia’s 
farm produce by the war. Government officials, however, sought political support first as 
highlighted by their supporting farmers who had been significantly affected by the depression, 
by redeploying financial resources generated by the mining and other economic sectors. 
Although the country’s mineral resources could neither match the levels anticipated by pioneer 
settlers, nor be compared to the Rand, this chapter has illustrated that gold still remained central 
to the growth and development of Southern Rhodesia’s colonial economy. 
 
The chapter has also demonstrated how the government’s fiscal policies hindered sustained 
growth and ultimately led to a decline of gold mining by 1945. Through levying a premium tax 
on gold producers, first between 1932 and 1937 and then during the World War II, government 
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was able to cushion cattle, maize and tobacco farmers from effects of the great depression and 
to finance the war effort. This was, however, to the detriment of gold producers, especially 
those working low grade ores, most of whom thus severely reduced production or were forced 
to curtail operations altogether. These policies pursued by the settler government almost “killed 
the goose” which had long laid golden eggs. By its own admission, government had succeeded 
in running down gold mining, whose revenue generation capacity was for the first time 
overtaken by agriculture in 1945. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
“It is nobody’s baby so why should I worry?” – Farmers and 
miners in the era of formal conservation, 1939 to 1961. 
 
 
The year 1939 was a watershed in Southern Rhodesia’s history. Not only did it witness a fillip 
to the country’s economy through war-inspired growth, but it also saw novel attempts by the 
state to institute an official conservation policy.497 Development and growth of the agriculture 
and mining sectors, the country’s twin drivers of economic activities since the pioneer days, 
had been the main vectors of environmental degradation. By examining miner-farmer relations 
in the post-1939 period, this chapter will demonstrate how this move by the government 
of Godfrey Huggins to adopt a formal conservation policy through the enactment of a Natural 
Resources Act of 1941, reshaped the miner-farmer controversy that had raged since the 1890s. 
It focuses on how state initiatives to conserve the country’s natural resources, and how the 
changes in the country’s mining sector, impacted on the state-farmer-miner relations up to 
1961.  
 
Previous chapters have highlighted how the government’s desire to develop the colonial 
economy resulted in the promotion of legislation that encouraged rapacious cutting of timber 
by the mining sector. Settler farmers, especially those on the Gold Belt, although guilty of 
similar crimes, protested against this privilege enjoyed by miners with very limited success. 
The only useful concession that the farmers secured was a 50 percent timber reservation for 
agricultural use by a 1935 amendment of the Mines and Minerals Act. This amendment on the 
mining law, together with better financial concessions extended to settler farmers by the settler 
government to cushion them from the effects of the great depression, indicated a shifting policy 
by the new government, as discussed in Chapter Three. This chapter will examine the factors 
leading to the passage of the Forest Act in 1949, which aimed at controlling timber cutting by 
miners. Subsequent miner-farmer interaction and the state’s response shall be examined in the 
light of changes that had occurred within the country’s economy, with particular reference to 
                                                            
497 The evolution of a formal conservation policy in the country has been discussed by a number of scholars. See, 
for instance, S. Maravanyika, ‘Soil conservation and the white agrarian environment in colonial Zimbabwe, c. 
1908-1980,’ PhD Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2013. See also I.R. Phimister, An Economic and Social History 
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contestations over the mineral as well as agricultural significance of land in areas were the two 
overlapped.  
 
Apart from an examination of the impact of formal conservation in Southern Rhodesia on 
Africans, there is limited scholarly work directly related to the new policy framework and its 
implications on white settler farmers and miners. Available literature has examined the 
implementation of conservation initiatives either on settler farms or African reserves. Literature 
dealing with the Forest Act focuses mainly on how it affected Africans. S. Maravanyika deals 
with the eviction of the Shangwe people from the Mafungautsi State Forest. He examines their 
response which involved squatting in demarcated areas, poaching and illegal harvesting of 
forest production.498 Again using the case of Mafungautsi Forest Reserve, E. Mapedza traces 
Southern Rhodesia’s forest policy focusing on its ‘oppressive nature.’499 J. McGregor’s study 
on woodland resources in Shurugwi documents the impact of deforestation “on strategies of 
woodland use and management in Zimbabwe’s communal areas.”500 Her study is indispensable 
for anyone studying the subject of forestry and provides a useful background on the 
development of Southern Rhodesia’s forest policy. It however, does not say much on how the 
Forest Act impacted on miner-farmer contests over access to timber. She argues that during 
this period there was improved availability of coal, timber and electricity which reduced the 
need for timber.501 Although this was true for some miners, timber remained a critical resource 
for undercapitalised miners who could not afford the new energy sources as shall be illustrated 
by this chapter.  
 
There are also scholars who have looked at the history of natural resources management in the 
country.502 W. Beinart (1984) argued that “the set of ideas and prescriptions associated with 
conservationist thinking, although partly generated outside the region, were invoked, 
elaborated and applied in specific contexts, first in relation to settler, then also peasant 
                                                            
498 S. Maravanyika, ‘Local responses to colonial evictions, conservation and commodity policies among Shangwe 
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501 McGregor, Woodland resources’, 50. 
502 A. Chingwenya and D. Manatsa, The history of natural resources management in Zimbabe: A chronicle of how 
sustainable resource management has remained an elusive concept’, Journal of Sustainable Development in 
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agriculture.”503 This argument has over the years been subjected to rigorous scrutiny by 
scholars who argue that the reverse is actually true.504 S. Maravanyika505 (2013) and M. 
Musemwa506 (2015) trace the development of environmentalism with particular reference to 
the white settler community. Musemwa’s article is the only study to date which provides more 
detail on the impact of the Natural Resources Act (1941) on settler farmers and miners. 
However, his study focuses more on miners’ access to timber after the Forest Act was 
promulgated in 1949. This chapter goes beyond Musemwa study by tracing the impact of 
formal conservation policy on miner-farmer interaction. It will also demonstrate how changes 
in the mining sector in the 1950s extended the farmer-miner tussle to include contests over 
land. The chapter will thus elaborate on the state’s role as a referee in terms of property rights. 
It argues that the enactment of the conservation and forest legislation represented attempts by 
the colonial state to pose as a “neutral and disinterested arbiter”507 regulating sectorial interests 
to ensure uninterrupted growth of the colonial economy.  
 
The 1939 Natural Resources Commission 
It is imperative to give a brief background to the passing of the 1941 Natural Resources Act. 
From the days of Company administration, no policy existed to promote conservation on settler 
farms.508 The same applied regarding the mining sector. The state placed emphasis on making 
the colonial project profitable in line with the desires of pioneer settlers who had anticipated 
finding a second Rand in the country The slow build-up of awareness to the environmental 
degradation caused by settler agriculture and mining, as well as overstocking and soil erosion 
in African reserves culminated in the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Preservation of the Natural Resources of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia by the Huggins 
government in 1938. Meanwhile, Southern Rhodesia’s economy had not been spared from the 
                                                            
503 W. Beinart, Soil conservation, conservationism and ideas about development: A southern African exploration, 
1900-1960’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 11, 1 (1984), 82. 
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‘Conservation, control and ecological change: The politics and ecology of colonial conservation in Shurugwi, 
Zimbabwe’, Environment and History, 1, 3 (1995), 257-279; E. Kramer, ‘A clash of economies: Early 
centralisation efforts in colonial Zimbabwe, 1929-1935’, Zambezia, 15, 1 (1998), 83-98; Mwatwara, ‘A history 
of state veterinary services.’ 
505 S. Maravanyika, ‘Local responses to colonial evictions, conservation and commodity policies among Shangwe 
communities in Gokwe, Northwestern Zimbabwe 1963 to 1980’, African Nebula, 5 (2012), 1-20. 
506 M. Musemwa, ‘Sic utere tuo ut alienam non laedas: From wanton destruction of timber forests to 
environmentalism: The rise of colonial environmental and ‘sustainability practices in colonial Zimbabwe, 1938 
to 1961’, Environment and History, 22, 4 (2016), 521-559. 
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impact of the great depression. Agriculture was the worst affected and for the decade spanning 
from 1929 to 1939, the sector reeled under effects of the economic recession.509 Mining on the 
other hand benefited from favourable conditions brought about by the depression, especially 
high international gold prices which prevailed when Britain went off the gold standard in 1931. 
The state relied on revenue generated by the sector to restore fiscal stability. Maize and tobacco 
production as well as other branches of agriculture were sustained by heavy state subsidies 
through facilities like the Land Bank and the Farmers’ Debt Adjustment Scheme, as mentioned 
in Chapter Four. Legislation such as the Maize Control Act (1931) was even passed to assist 
farmers through the depression years. Despite all these efforts to restore profitability of the 
agricultural sector, very little was being done by the government of the day to contain the 
increasingly evident problem of soil degradation which was also suspected to be contributing 
to the problem of low agricultural productivity. This section shall provide the contextual basis 
for the chapter by highlighting evidence collected by the Natural Resources Commission, 
leading to the Natural Resources Act of 1941.  
 
There were few government officials from the Agriculture Department and conservationists 
who had raised alarm and warned successive governments on the dangers of soil erosion and 
the excessive cutting of trees caused mainly by agricultural and mining activities. L. Cripps, 
leader of the Rhodesia Agricultural Union, had noted the problem of soil erosion as early as 
1909 and the Rhodesian Agricultural Journal issued its first bulletin on soil erosion by M. Watt 
in 1913.510 Tobacco farmers, driven by a ‘get rich quick’ mentality, did not realise the 
importance of production per unit area and kept increasing acreage.511 This process involved 
clearing vast tracts of land to create the required farming land and destroying woodlands in the 
process. This was in addition to the timber cut for curing flue cured tobacco, usually without 
replacement. Miners enjoyed a legal right to timber for use as fuel and mining timber, enshrined 
in the Mine and Minerals Act (1904) and its subsequent amendments. This right was, all along 
detested and contested by farmers as a major handicap to bona fide farming activities. As 
highlighted in Chapter Two, this conflict over timber and farmers’ disgruntlement over 
agricultural land spoiled by mining activities constituted the heart of the miner-farmer 
controversy. 
                                                            
509 For a detailed discussion of the impact of the economic depression see, V.E.M. Machingaidze, ‘The 
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Meanwhile, environmental degradation was not only limited to white settler farms. Although 
colonial officials blamed African methods of farming for the ecological disaster in the reserves, 
the root cause lay in colonial policy itself. The Native Affairs Department which was 
responsible for development in the African areas embarked on a policy shift after 1923, 
deviating from its earlier view that “reserves were temporary enclaves which would vanish as 
the peasantry was drawn into the exchange economy.”512 This changed after 1923 when the 
new government sought to pursue a new policy based on separate development, this policy 
shift entailed pushing more natives into the reserves. According to McGregor, this policy shift 
was necessitated by successful evasion of tax payment by the Africans in the reserves.513 This 
change in policy resulted in an influx of Africans into the reserves and resulted in overcrowding 
which triggered land degradation and reduced yields for the Africans. The colonial 
government, instead blamed African methods of production for this state of affairs and 
launched the extension and the centralisation programmes in 1927 and 1929 respectively in an 
attempt to increase the reserves’ carrying capacity through improved agricultural output.514 The 
new policy was further entrenched by a more oppressive and segregationist land policy, the 
1930 Land Apportionment Act, which:  
divided the country’s 96 million acres into 49 million acres for settlers (who were a tiny 
minority) 29 million acres for Africans (who formed the vast majority) and the 
remainder was either unassigned to any racial group or was designated game reserve or 
state forest.515 
 
This land law increased the number of Africans in the reserves causing further environmental 
deterioration. The colonial policies of extension and centralisation, spearheaded by E. D. 
Alvord, failed to yield desired results and environmental degradation and overstocking 
worsened. There was therefore a perceived need to solve this – to find a solution to this problem 
in the African reserves. 
 
                                                            
512 E. Punt, ‘The Development of African agriculture in Southern Rhodesia with particular reference to the inter-
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Unlike the Company administration, the post-1923 government attempted to reconcile the two 
sectors but failed. The two successive governments were driven as much by the profit motif 
and paid no regard to the environmental degradation caused by agriculture and mining. The 
government had not passed any restrictive legislation to combat the degradation. It was only in 
1939 that the Huggins government paid heed to calls being made by officials in the Department 
of Agriculture concerning the looming disaster if the farmers’ and miners’ abuses, as well as 
environmental deterioration in the reserves were not halted. Native Department officials also 
raised alarm and noted the deteriorating environmental conditions in the African reserves. A. 
C. Jennings, Assistant Director of Native Lands, registered his concern by stating that: 
For some years past I, also, have been greatly concerned about the deterioration which 
I have seen going on from one end of the country to the other, consisting of the 
destruction of timber, the mis-use of natural vleis or sponges, overstocking and general 
destruction of pasturage.516 
 
In this case Jennings was blaming Africans for the land degradation as well as overstocking in 
the reserves, ignoring the fact that the overcrowding in these areas was a result of the land 
policy pursued by the colonial government.517 Jennings went on to criticise the right to timber 
enjoyed by mining companies by noting that “the rights of an individual will have to be 
curtailed in the interest of the national well-being.”518 Miners had a prior right to cut timber for 
their operations and Jennings’ was blaming this miners’ privileged and uncontrolled access to 
wood as one of the major cause of excessive deforestation. Such sentiments resonated with 
what R. Mcllewain, a Water Court Judge, had also written in 1937: 
I have lived in this colony for nearly forty years and the most painful experience has 
been to witness the wicked waste of the natural resources of the country. This wealth 
must, in my view, be regarded as a trust belonging to the country as a whole and should 
not be destroyed or impaired by those into whose temporary charge it comes.519 
 
His sentiments pointed to the need for a monitoring and regulatory mechanism to oversee 
natural resource utilisation by the settler farmers, miners and the Africans. White famers 
enjoyed guaranteed individual tenure, and miners, a constitutional right to access timber on 
Gold Belt farms and in the reserves. There was a growing need for the government to play the 
role of arbiter on property rights and ensure sustainable use of resources for the benefit of the 
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colonial economy. The government therefore adopted a policy shift by appointing the 
Commission to Enquire into the Deterioration and Preservation of the Natural Resources of 
Southern Rhodesia in 1938. Chaired by R. Mcllwaine, the Commission’s mandate was to 
investigate: 
How the resources of the colony were being wasted through soil erosion, destruction of 
trees, grasses and other vegetation, whether taking place in the course of farming and 
mining operations or otherwise, overstocking and improper or undesirable methods of 
farming or treatment of the land.520 
 
The Commission was supposed to make recommendations on how best to handle the situation 
and avert an ecological disaster in the country. It carried out interviews across the country and 
collected information on the problem confronting the country. 
 
Evidence presented to the Mcllwaine Commission expanded on the problem of environmental 
degradation facing the country and the need for immediate remedial action before more damage 
was done. R. H. B. Dickson, former Member of Parliament in Southern Rhodesia, blamed the 
recklessness that characterised use of timber by both farmers and miners. Explaining the 
prevailing scenario concerning access to timber by both farmers and miners, Dickson observed 
that: 
It means there is very little incentive for the landowner to preserve the timber because 
he never knows when that timber is going to be taken. In opposition to that the miner 
gets the timber free. So a state of mind is set up, vulgarly speaking, the landowner thinks 
“it is nobody’s baby so why should I worry” It is a state of mind. A psychological 
effect.521 
 
As noted, miners were given a prior right to cut timber lying on farms located in Gold Belt 
areas. Since the trees were on land belonging to farmers, they could have even embarked on 
preservation of the trees. Both farmers and miners wasted the country’s natural assets in a quest 
to derive more profits from their enterprises, a situation that was compounded by the absence 
of any restrictive legislation. K. Edwards, Forest Officer in the Forestry Department under the 
Agriculture Ministry, blamed white commercial farmers and labelled them as chief culprits in 
destroying timber resources. According to Edwards the farmer “is mining the soil and 
increasing the destruction of forests in order to get more agricultural land for his crop.”522 Both 
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settler farmers and miners were indeed cutting more timber in the pursuit of their different 
commercial enterprises. It was difficult at this particular stage to determine who was causing 
more damage because of the non-existence of statistical data regarding actual amounts of wood 
cut. Transportation of mining timber from the woodlands also contributed immensely to soil 
erosion. This was exacerbated by the fact that most miners moved their timber during the rainy 
season and therefore, created numerous tracks in the process as the original ones were easily 
rendered impassable by the rains. These old roads used to move timber away usually developed 
into huge dongas due to erosion.523  
 
This excessive deforestation and soil erosion was said, by a number of informants to be 
affecting the rainfall pattern since it resulted in siltation of the major rivers. The argument 
behind this reasoning was that forest areas facilitated infiltration and therefore, their presence 
promoted the development of a permanent water table accessible even during the dry season. 
McGregor however questioned the correctness of such theories that tried to explain the 
relationship between deforestation, hydrology and the climate, arguing however, that their 
alarm strengthened the basis for intervention.524 The most likely solution that was forwarded 
for this problem was afforestation. Since indigenous timber was proving to be insufficient for 
curing Virginia tobacco, Edwards suggested that it was high time tobacco farmers considered 
“the production of fuel as a necessary part of ordinary tobacco operations.”525 Eucalyptus was 
considered to be the best form of substitute for indigenous timber, although burning more 
readily than indigenous timber, it had the advantage of growing faster and yields per acre were 
much higher than it was for indigenous timber. The few tobacco farmers who planted timber 
tended to relegate the practice to be an off season activity, not central to the entire farming 
operation. 
 
Witnesses who gave evidence before the Commission were drawn from agriculture as well as 
the mining fraternity as well as government officials. The Commission wanted to get a balanced 
opinion from the two sides.  Witnesses from the mining industry, defended miners’ timber 
rights as laid down in the original Gold Belt Title (GBT) (1904), arguing that – since mining 
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was the country’s prime economic activity – it ought to be supported through unlimited access 
to timber. A. Harworth, Manager of the Phoenix Prince Mine in Bindura, opined that “As a 
mine becomes established and a reasonably long future is assured then power supply by the 
Electricity Supply Commission (ESC), or power from coal, can replace the earlier stage of 
power from wood.”526 His major argument was that small mines were supposed to be allowed 
access to timber until such a time when they were fully developed because they lacked the 
requisite capital with which to switch to other sources of fuel like electricity and coal. This was 
contrary to views shared by the Commission’s chairman who registered displeasure at the fact 
that most mines that were being opened up proved to be failures yet they continued to use 
timber.527 Such mines inflicted harm on the country’s resources yet they had shorter lives and 
therefore, could not benefit the country more. D. Abrahamson, a small miner, argued against 
this notion completely. He believed small miners were supposed to be given unlimited access 
to timber, mainly because they had limited capital resources and also because they were not a 
loss to the country. He said “There are seven hundreds of these small workers and that is what 
the country is living on today.”528 Although individual small miners were not making much 
profit, the country benefited more from their production. Abrahamson equated their position to 
that of the maize grower who, during the depression years, grew maize at a loss but was saved 
by the state’s imposition of a forced price. The country benefited more from fresh money 
generated through exporting mineral and this is what was considered important. Even if an 
individual small miner incurred loses, he was sacrificing for the country’s benefit. Such 
arguments by witnesses representing the mining industry showed that the sector was not willing 
to relinquish its timber rights. It became necessary for the state to assume the position of referee 
between the settler farmers and miners and regulate, through legislation, the use of the 
country’s timber resources. 
 
The Natural Act of 1941 and the birth of the Natural Resources Board 
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The Mcllwaine Commission Report was presented to parliament in April 1939 and it 
“substantiated the need for positive remedial and preventive action to combat the growing 
dangers of soil erosion and impoverishment.”529 The Commission noted in its report that: 
The conservation of the natural resources of the country is the concern of every member 
of the community. Those who, during their short lifetime are encountered with the 
handling of the land or other assets of the country should not be denied the right to use 
it reasonably, but they should be regarded as trustees neither entitled to mistreat, 
squander or destroy it regardless of the consequences to future generations.530 
 
The Commission’s report contained recommendations that were supposed to be implemented 
with haste so as to curb further wastage and deterioration of the country’s natural resources. It 
was on the basis of such recommendations that the Natural Resources Act was enacted in 
August of 1941. The Act was to become the overriding legislation for the protection of all 
natural resources in the country. To ensure a successful conservation programme, Mcllwaine 
stated in a memorandum that: 
The commissioners were of the opinion that the carrying out of such of their 
recommendations as the government might adopt, and the consideration of the 
problems to which they directed attention, were of such vital importance to the colony 
and concerned so many interests that, in order to avoid the danger of these questions 
being overlooked or obscured, owing to a variety of causes, they recommend that a 
standing body should be set up to deal with these questions and all matters touching 
natural resources. The name suggested for this body is the Natural Resources Board.531 
 
Such recommendations by the Commission resulted in the creation of a Natural Resources 
Board (NRB) that was to preside over the conservation of the country’s resources. 
 
The Board became a trustee of the country’s resources which included water, soil, minerals, 
vegetation, animal and fish life. All the members were appointed by government. It had wide-
ranging powers for it could subpoena witnesses and issue orders to landowners, occupiers and 
users of land restricting or prohibiting the use of resources whenever necessary in adherence 
to conservation rules.532 Mainly because of the diversity of subjects coming under its purview, 
the Board had direct access to ministers directly concerned with the question under 
consideration.533 Its main functions were to exercise general supervision over natural resources, 
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to advise government on the nature of legislation and policies relating to conservation and 
proper use of the resources.534 The Board’s first objective was the improvement of soil fertility. 
No further delay could be permitted while soil and water, the life blood of the country was 
being drained away.535 The Board was going to be assisted by a network of Intensive 
Conservation Area Committees (ICACs), made up of various landowners in the country. These 
became the Board’s principal executive agents since they were in direct contact with land 
occupiers. The first ICAC was formed in the Inyazura district in 1944 and by 1958 all European 
farming areas had been incorporated within Intensive Conservation Areas ICAs.536 I. R. 
Phimister argues that it was the desire to improve the country’s food production capacity that 
pushed government from its gradualist approach towards soil conservation practices.537 In this 
regard the 1942 drought had been serendipitous for it led to an intensification of 
conservationism in an attempt to boost food production to improve self-sufficiency during the 
war period. It was only in 1949 that the NRB turned to the mining industry and timber cutting. 
It took close to a decade for the Forest Act to be enacted. Its promulgation was going to interfere 
with the mining industry. Considering the significance of the mining industry around 1941, 
when the Natural Resources Act was passed, tempering with the industry’s timber supplies 
could have had a negative impact on the industry as well as the country’s contribution towards 
the war effort.  
 
The Forestry Act of 1949 
Formal conservation legislation was extended to incorporate the mining sector in 1949 when 
the Forest Act was promulgated. Access to timber resources had been a major concern for white 
settler farmers, miners and Africans residing in the reserves. Miners had enjoyed privileged 
access to timber at the expense of their farming counterparts and Africans. This miners’ 
privilege, however, did not stop settler farmers and Africans from cutting trees to get timber 
for the curing of flue cured tobacco, for domestic purposes and for construction of huts by 
Africans. The Forest Act was thus intended to ensure controlled cutting by miners and settler 
farmers. Wood cutting in the reserves was governed by the Native Reserves Produce Act of 
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1929 which stopped Africans from cutting trees for anything else except for their subsistence 
needs. 
 
Africans were not on the side-lines when this facet of the miner-farmer controversy unfolded. 
Although they did not get more land allocated to them by the 1930 Land Apportionment Act 
(LAA), quite a number of Africans remained on land belonging to Europeans as rent-paying 
tenants. In the year 1930, when the LAA was passed there were 919 000 Africans in Southern 
Rhodesia, 587 000 lived in reserves, 300 000 lived on Crown land and 220 000 lived in urban 
areas.538 The LAA stipulated that such Africans, living on land belonging to white farmers 
were supposed relocate into reserves by 1937. As noted by Kramer, H. U. Moffat was following 
advice from the Native Department to end the labour and rent tenancy system.539 Usually these 
African tenants paid their rent by providing labour to the landowner for a specified number of 
days in year, while others paid their rentals in monetary value. The number of such Africans, 
residing on European owned land was therefore progressively reduced. In this regard, claims 
by some white farmers that Africans were also responsible for causing soil degradation through 
excessive cutting of trees should be scrutinised. For example, A. R. Syfret claimed that he 
failed to find suitable farmland in the Umtali district mainly because most of the land, occupied 
by African tenants was in a very bad state. He complained to the Department of Agriculture in 
1938 that: 
Practically all the indigenous timber had been cut. The use of sledges had encouraged 
soil erosion. The owner does not farm this farm. He told me that 96 tenants each paid 
£2 a year rent. For this amount they were allowed to plough up as much land as they 
could, and take as much water as they wanted. The result is that quite a good farm has 
been ruined.540 
 
Although Africans needed wood for domestic purposes, they did not cause extensive damage 
comparable to what settler farmers and miners did. Syfret might have just used Africans as a 
scapegoat. Very small clashes with African mine employees cutting wood for firewood were 
reported after the Forest Act was passed.541 
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Farmers in the major tobacco producing districts of the colony which included Lomagundi, 
Mazoe, Salisbury, Mrewa, Marandellas and Makoni were blamed for what has been termed 
wholesale destruction of timber by the Senior Inspector of Lands in 1938.542 As a result many 
tobacco farms were cleared of timber. A common practice that was noted amongst tobacco 
farmers was the stumping of fresh land every year mainly to obtain timber with which to fire 
their tobacco barns and also to clear virgin land as advance preparation for the succeeding 
tobacco crop. The situation became so serious that even the sheltered timber belts were cleared 
in order to secure fresh timber and soil, thus exposing vast tracts of land to destructive agents.543 
 
The wastage of the country’s timber resources emphasized the need to add upon the authority 
of the NRB, control over not only owners and occupiers of land but over users as well. 
Although the Board could succeed in compelling landowners to stop wasting their resources 
“the person who has no stake in the land and is simply exploiting its resources for commercial 
gain needs different treatment and should be brought under a measure of control.”544 Mcllwaine 
therefore, observed that “More comprehensive legislation is, however, urgently necessary to 
provide for the protection and control of the forest resources of Southern Rhodesia.”545 Similar 
sentiments were echoed by the Conservator of Forest’s annual report for 1948 that the forestry 
bill should be passed into law without delay for the benefit of both farmers and miners.546 The 
Forest Act No. 37 was promulgated on the 12th of August 1949 and came into force on 9 
December that same year. Modelled along well established forest laws of the Commonwealth, 
it provided for “the setting aside of demarcated forests and nature reserves which are free from 
servitudes and which may not be withdrawn or alienated without the consent of parliament.”547 
The most important feature of the Act was the recognition of indigenous forests as “part of the 
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land” – farmers were a granted a 50 percent wood reservation. This clause was designed to end 
the contention between farmers and miners emanating from miners’ rights to free timber. Prior 
to 1949, landowners had little incentive to protect their timber reserves for they did not know 
when the wood might be taken away by miners. However, the Act’s provisions in this regard 
were still far from eliminating the struggle for wood, as shall be highlighted. The Act however 
empowered the state with regulatory authority which enabled it to superintend over the use of 
the country’s wood resources for mining and agricultural purposes.  
 
The Forest Act was intended to foster the preservation of timber just like a similar piece of 
legislation passed in 1913 in the Union of South Africa. However, the ultimate objectives of 
the two laws differed. A. Grundlingh discussed operations of the Act (South Africa) in relation 
“to a particular group of poor whites who eked out an existence in the Southern Cape forest 
belt.”548 This Act provided for the registration of all woodcutters working in the indigenous 
state forests, with each registered wood cutter expected to work on his wood allotment only. It 
also created a Woodcutters Board which could strike off the register names of woodcutters who 
failed to adhere to the woodcutting rules. The 1913 Act set in motion the elimination of 
woodcutters, a process which was ultimately achieved by the Woodcutters Annuity Act of 
1939. By this Act, woodcutters “were granted an annuity of £25 and at the same time forfeited 
the rights to work in the forests.”549 Forest legislation in South Africa was intended to reduce 
and ultimately curtail wood cutting whereas similar legislation in Southern Rhodesia was only 
intended to control the cutting of timber (by miners) without necessarily taking away that right. 
 
Section 13 (2) of the Act aimed at eliminating conflicts between farmers and miners over the 
latter’s access to roads or power lines on privately-owned farms. There were cases as discussed 
in Chapter Two, when farmers could block miners’ access to roads for the transportation of 
felled timber. This section stipulated that: 
The Mining Commissioner may, after consultation with the owner of a private protected 
forest, authorise a miner to cut, fell use and remove any forest produce if such forest 
produce interferes with the development work or the erection of buildings for mining 
purposes.550 
 
                                                            
548 A. Grundlingh, “‘God het ons arm mense die hautjies gegee’: Towards a history of the ‘poor white’ woodcutters 
in the southern Cape forest area c.1900-1939”, History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987, 1. 
549 Grundlingh, ‘God het ons arm mense die hautjies gegee’, 17. 
550 Forest Act 1949. 
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Although the Act provided for the Mining Commissioner to consult the landowner first before 
ruling on a misunderstanding, it failed to meet the expectations of landowners who had been 
clamouring for such cases to be handled by a neutral arbitrator, not the Mining Commissioner. 
The Act also provided for the creation of Mining Timber Permit Board (MTPB)551 which was 
expected to regulate the cutting of mining timber. 
 
The Mining Timber Permit Board and controlled timber cutting 
Section 15 of the Forest Act dealt with the control of mining timber rights and provided for the 
establishment of a Mining Timber Permit Board (MTPB). The timber board was to be chaired 
by G. M. McGregor who was the Assistant Chief Conservator of Forests.552 It also consisted 
of a senior member of the Department of Mines, an officer appointed by the NRB and a 
nominee appointed jointly by the Chamber of Mines and the Rhodesian Mining Federation and 
a permanent secretary.553 Farmers were not represented on the Board. Overall, miners retained 
their original right over timber usage. However, the new system that was brought about with 
the coming of the MTPB introduced a control mechanism intended to curb uncontrolled cutting 
of indigenous timber for mining purposes. McGregor clarified the position of the new Board 
during its inaugural meeting that “it was not the purpose of the Mining Timber Permit Board 
to hinder the mines but nevertheless to safeguard the natural resources of the country.”554 The 
protection of indigenous timber had thus been incorporated within the framework of the NRB 
and for the first time in the country’s history, a formal attempt had been instituted to control 
what all along had been perceived as an unquestionable right by miners to timber. The next 
section discusses whether the good intentions of the timber board were achieved and to what 
extent they succeeded in silencing farmer protests over wood cutting by miners. 
 
Operations of the Mining Timber Permit Board 
Miners were only allowed to cut indigenous timber after obtaining a special permit from the 
MTPB granting them such permission.  A miner wishing to cut timber was supposed to make 
an application to a Mining Commissioner of the concerned district. It therefore became a 
punishable offence to cut wood without a valid permit and defaulters were prosecuted as shall 
                                                            
551 Hereafter referred to as the timber board 
552 NAZ S2731/5 Mining Timber Permit Board, Minutes, 24-4-50 to 26-1-53.  Annual Report for the Mining 
Timber Permit Board for the year ending December 31st 1950. 
553 S/FO668 Report of the Chief Conservator of Forests for the year ended 1950 Presented to the Legislative 
Assembly, 1951 C.S.R. 22 – 1951. 
554 S2731/5 Mining Timber Permit Board, Minutes, 24-4-50 to 26-1-53. Inaugural meeting of the Mining Timber 
Permit Board held on the 24th of April 1950. 
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be highlighted. The Mining Commissioner issued out a temporary permit which remained valid 
until confirmed, amended or cancelled by the Board. The Board could only cancel a temporary 
permit if the taking of timber was going to result in undue damage to the locality or adversely 
affect the timber supplies of the country as a whole. A permit could also be suspended or 
cancelled for failure by miners to adhere to the set conditions. In addition to this the MTPB 
also had powers to: instruct relevant officials to examine places from which timber was being 
cut, take evidence and conduct investigations to facilitate the suspension, cancellation or 
refusal of permits and to determine the validity of a permit, place from which timber may/may 
not be cut, quantity and class of timber to be cut as well as the method to be used in cutting the 
timber.555 The MTPB held monthly meetings where all permit applications were considered. 
Powers granted to the Board (as stated above), placed it in a better position to deal with the 
miner-farmer conflict which previous governments had failed to resolve since the occupation 
days. The formal conservation policy therefore had some potential, at least on paper, to 
minimise clashes between miners and farmers over wood cutting. 
 
The MTPB’s timber application system was not implemented immediately; a twelve months 
reprieve was extended to all applicants who were already engaged in mining prior to the 
promulgation of the Forestry Act. This was clarified when a report was made to the MTPB of 
a miner who was not following the set parameters when cutting wood. Blackburn, a landowner 
in the Gatooma district had his complaint forwarded by the Mining Commissioner to the 
MTPB. Responding to the complaint, J. Rademeyer, Secretary of the MTPB stated that: 
Since the miners concerned were operating before December 1949, they do not come under the 
jurisdiction of my Board until December next. If this cutting has been carried out by the miners 
concerned in contravention of mining regulations, it is purely a case of Mr Blackburn or the 
offenders.556 Blackburn’s instant report to the Timber Board showed that farmers were hoping 
for an immediate solution to their problems with miners over timber cutting. Farmers were 
anticipating a quick solution to the problem that had confronted them for the past fifty years. 
The report by Blackburn showed farmers’ confidence in the newly crafted control system, 
although they were not part of the Board. 
 
                                                            
555 Annual Report of the Mining Timber Permit Board for the year ending December 31st 1950. 
556 S2731/5 Mining Timber Permit Board, Minutes, 24-4-50 to 26-1-53. Letter from J. Rademeyer, Secretary of 
the Mining Timber Permit Board, to the Mining Commissioner, Gatooma, 28 June 1950. 
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The Board registered awareness of the significance of the mining industry to the country’s 
economy but at the same time it remained committed to reducing wastage of the country’s 
timber resources by the sector. Inspection of timber cutting was necessary especially when it 
was being done by timber contractors, except in instances when the timber contractor happened 
to be the landowner.557 The appointment of an Inspector was therefore necessary to facilitate a 
comprehensive execution of the Board’s mandate. Available manpower could not perform the 
required tasks fully as highlighted in the Board’s 1951 annual report that: 
In the case of the first few applications received, various government officials, 
particularly soil conservation and forest officers were consulted. While they cooperated 
as far as possible, it soon became clear that they had neither the time nor the transport 
to report on more than occasional cases.558 
 
The lack of an inspector remained a major handicap affecting the operations of the Board. The 
temporary permits issued had to be extended by six months pending the appointment of an 
inspector.559 This delay was actually retrogressive. It had the potential to reverse all the 
momentum gathered since the constitution of the MTPB. It meant that miners could violate the 
set rules governing the cutting of wood on farms and go unpunished because of the lack of a 
thorough monitoring mechanism. The appointment of an inspector was supposed to be 
expedited if the timber board was to live up to its expectations in the enforcement of set 
regulations guiding timber cutting by miners. 
 
Wood contractors in the Que Que district were already manipulating this loophole in the 
system. Prior notified the Board of what was happening in the area because of the absence of 
an inspector, he noted that: 
At a meeting of the committee of the executive of the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines held 
on the 16th instant the matter of the issue of permits by the Mining Timber Board came 
up for discussion. A member from Midlands stated that he considered the inspection of 
timber cut by contractors in the Que Que area was very necessary as only a portion of 
the timber which was cut under permit for the mines was actually going to the mines. 
The balance being retailed in the Que Que Township.560 
 
The appointment of an inspector was expected to improve compliance by the miners and their 
wood contractors to permit conditions. Without an inspector the Board served no purpose 
except for the collection of statistical data on the timber requirements of the mining sector in 
                                                            
557 Sixth Meeting of the Mining Timber permit board held on the 25th of September 1950. 
558 Annual Report for the Mining Timber Permit Board for the year ending December 31st 1950. 
559 Tenth Meeting of the mining Timber Permit Board, held on the 29th of January 1951. 
560 Tenth Meeting of the mining Timber Permit Board, held on the 29th of January 1951. 
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the country. An Inspector for the Board was finally appointed in 1951, to the delight of the 
MTPB members. In an attempt to deal with a practice by some wood contractors who were 
selling wood to non-mining clients, the timber board imposed a condition compelling wood 
contractors to display their names on vehicles that they used to transport wood.561 
 
Even when the MTPB was in full operation proposals were being made for the Timber Board 
to issue timber permits for longer periods than the official twelve months. Such proposals 
succeed in showing that the mining community was not willing to relinquish timber rights that 
they had enjoyed since the days of Company administration. The Mining Commissioner for 
Gatooma district wrote to the MTPB stating that: 
I have been asking applicants who have established mines and who consider that the 
area for which a permit is required will supply their needs for many years, to ask for 
permits to cover “the life of a mine” as there is no suggestion in the Act that the validity 
of permits is to be restricted to a 12 months period.562 
 
The Rhodesian Mining Federation had also inquired from the MTPB if the duration of mining 
timber permits could be extended to a lengthy timeframe. This might have been an attempt to 
create loopholes in the system and evade constant monitoring and review of timber permits by 
the Board. The MTPB’s response to such queries was quick and crafted in a manner intended 
to promote adherence to the set conditions governing the cutting of mining timber. At its 
February meeting in 1951, the MTPB endorsed Aylen’s suggestion to reward miners who had 
good reports with permits valid for an indefinite period.563 It was within the Board’s powers to 
alter the duration of timber permits, but for the maintenance of good conduct by miners, 
renewable permits with one year validity allowed it to monitor the system better. There is no 
known report of a permit that was renewed with a new validity period beyond the normal twelve 
months. 
 
As early as 1950 the Conservator of Forests reported that the timber board was scoring 
successes as there was a marked improvement in the methods of timber felling for fuel 
purposes.564 In the first 9 months of 1951, permits were issued covering approximately 
                                                            
561 Eleventh Meeting of the Mining Timber Permit Board, held on the 26th of February 1951. 
562 NAZ S2731/5 Mining Timber Permit Board, Minutes, 24-4-50 to 26-1-53. Letter from the Mining 
Commissioner, Gatooma to the Secretary, Mining Timber Permit Board, 5 January 1951. 
563 Eleventh Meeting of the Mining Timber Permit Board, held on the 26th of February 1951. 
564 Report of the Conservator of Forests for the year ended 1950. 
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1 183 000 cubic feet565 and in 1953 permits of timber covering 2 191 827 cubic feet566 were 
issued. In addition, intensified publicity campaigns by the NRB, ICAs and the Department of 
Conservation and Extension (CONEX) led to a growing observance of the of Section 24 of the 
Forest Act which called upon owners of private land to notify the Minister of Mines and Lands 
before cutting wood for sale.567 However, conflicts over wood cutting did not come to an end 
even after the establishment of the timber board. Around the same time when the initial success 
of the MTPB was being acknowledged, reports were also being received from farmers 
concerning bad cutting practices by miners. In 1950, S. Jackson of Marandellas complained to 
the timber board about bad cutting of timber on his farm by Mssrs Umtali Tributors Limited.568 
The matter had been referred to the Mining Commissioner for Salisbury who had adjudged that 
Jackson was entitled to payment since his farm was not on the Gold Belt. A case had also been 
reported in the same year of a miner cutting wood in an African reserve and the Native 
Department. The MTPB could not deal with this particular case since it involved the Native 
Department.569 This inability of the MTPB to deal with miners accused of taking timber from 
the reserves was a major weakness and presented a loophole for miners to continue cutting 
wood in such areas with impunity.  
 
It became possible to calculate mining timber requirements and make plans for the future 
regarding afforestation because of the permit system. By 1953 most mines cutting timber had 
been issued with permits. It was also in this year that the Forestry Commission was created for 
the purpose of considering of “all matters and questions arising out of or relating to general 
forest policy and the making of reports and recommendations thereon to the Minister, (Minister 
of Mines, Lands and Surveys).570 Offenders did not go unpunished; out of the 708 cases 
reported in 1953, 560 were concluded after offenders paid different fines. Persistent bad cutting 
of timber by wood contractors led to the cancellation one permit while two temporary permits 
were not confirmed in 1953.571 The timber board was determined to deal with non-conforming 
miners and intended to use this licence cancellation to save as an example to other miners and 
wood contractors involved in similar practices. 
 
                                                            
565 NAZ S/FO668 Report of the Chief Conservator of Forests for the year ended 1951. 
566 Report of the Chief Conservator of Forests for the year ended 1953. 
567 Report of the Conservator of Forests for the year ended 1951. 
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A successful timber cutting control system was a leap towards the resolution of farmer-miner 
disputes. Uncontrolled timber cutting by miners on, especially Gold Belt farms had been the 
major source of friction between the two groups so its resolution was likely to ease the tension. 
A peaceful coexistence of farmers and miners demanded many other concessions from both 
parties of which a resolution of the dispute over timber cutting was just, but a part of. The NRB 
congratulated the MTPB in 1956 for the successful reduction of wasteful exploitation of timber 
resources for mining purposes.572 This showed that the timber board was registering some 
successes in the execution of its mandate. Miner-farmer conflicts related to timber cutting were 
thus being reduced through the control system. 
 
Expansion of base minerals mining and its implication on miner-farmer relation 
The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 had resulted in major structural shifts to the 
country’s economy, as noted in Chapter Four. Gold mining received an impetus after a 
devaluation of sterling in September 1939, resulting in a price rise of approximately twenty 
shillings an ounce.573 This increase in the price of gold however, did not benefit gold producers 
because of the levying of a Gold Premium Tax on gold produced by the state. As demonstrated 
in the previous chapter, the tax led to the closure of many big mining companies because the 
government was taking away the bulk of the profits to finance the war effort. This was in line 
with Huggins’ declaration during the 1939 election campaign that “no one as far as within 
reason and as far as it was humanly possible to do so would be allowed to make a bigger income 
during the war than they had previously enjoyed.”574 This was just an excuse by the government 
to appropriate money from the mining industry. The overall result was a major decline in gold 
production and by 1945 the export of agricultural products replaced gold exports from being 
the country’s top revenue earner. Agriculture had been exempted from the war tax mainly 
because prices of agricultural products were under control since the onset of the economic 
recession. 
 
Base minerals mining in the country was also boosted by the outbreak of the war and replaced 
gold mining in the post war period as the major mining activity. After the curtailment of 
shipments from the Far East sources, Southern Rhodesia was inundated with requests for such 
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minerals as chrome, tungsten, tin, tantalite and mica from the United Kingdom, United States 
of America and South Africa. D. Johnson argues that the Mines Minister viewed the rise in 
demand for the country’s base minerals as an opportunity to place the industry on a firmer 
footing ahead of gold.575 The minister noted that: 
Our future, so far as it concerns minerals depends, I believe, not on gold but on base 
minerals. Hitherto, the successful development of base minerals has been retarded by 
overwhelming factors – high railway rates, lack of local markets for absorption of local 
products fabricated from raw materials and completion from non-British countries.576 
 
Various mechanisms were put in place to ensure the development of the country’s base 
minerals mining which included among others, loans to finance successful development. These 
minerals were mainly needed to make metals and alloys used in the manufacture of armaments. 
Development of this sector, which was sparked by the war, did not lose momentum even in the 
post-war period. Base mineral exports continued to play a significant role in the country’s 
economy. Base mineral prospecting and mining therefore, became a major issue affecting the 
country’s conservation initiatives and thus impacted on miner-farmer relations. 
 
The war period also resulted in the development and expansion of the country’s manufacturing 
industry. This was mainly due to the influx of foreign immigrants (from South Africa and 
Europe)577 and the development of import substitution industrialisation. Mlambo summed up 
the factors leading to the development of a manufacturing sector in the country by stating that: 
The Second World War and its impact on the Rhodesian economy, in combination with 
specific economic policies and strategies adopted by the colonial state to deal with the 
economic challenges posed by the war resulted in the relatively rapid growth of the 
country’s manufacturing sector which transformed the economy from heavy 
dependence on agriculture and mining to a diversified one.578 
 
Such changes to the country’s economy reverberated to all sectors as there was a need to keep 
abreast with the latest developments. The Electricity Supply Commission (ESC) was 
reorganised in an effort to increase electricity generation to keep up with the expanding 
manufacturing, as well as the base minerals mining sector. The development of a robust mining 
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industry, especially base minerals mining was encouraged because it also led to a further 
development and expansion of secondary industry in the country. 
 
These shifts in the country’s mining industry also had a bearing on the relationship of farmers 
and miners. Methods of extraction for base minerals were not similar to gold production, 
neither were the claim sizes of gold similar to base minerals claims. Claims for the latter were 
more expansive and thus covered more land that farmers claimed could have been used for 
agricultural production. The country’s mining laws had been crafted mainly to cater for gold 
production, which however, did not reach the anticipated levels. The country’s base minerals 
industry attracted bigger mining companies with huge capital outlays who also purchased 
bigger mineral claims. The Doma ICA forwarded the following resolution on base minerals 
mining to the 1956 ICACs Conference: 
That this conference views with increasing concern the operations of the very one-sided 
mining laws as a result of which some farmers are being forced into using land for 
cropping on erodible slopes due to more suitable arable land having been pegged.”579 
 
L. Honey, the Secretary for Lands and Mines, told the same conference of ICACs in 1956 that 
such big companies “…particularly those interested in base minerals which, by virtue of the 
size of the claims tended to spoil a large acreage of land. Big companies could however afford 
to buy land which then became their property.”580 Such concerns were being raised in light of 
the conservation discourse. The operation of big mining capital was in this way contributing to 
land degradation by confining farmers to areas prone to erosion after taking away all suitable 
arable land for mining purposes. The main argument behind such ideas was that the mining 
law had been crafted during the days of the small miners and therefore it was due for review in 
the wake of changes occurring in the mining sector. The big mining companies usually acquired 
huge mining claims to be used for many years to come; this was done to keep competitors at 
bay. Although serving the mining sector well, the practice was affecting farming activities. 
 
Even the miners acknowledged the structural changes that had happened to the country’s 
economy and were not resisting farmers’ proposals to alter the country’s mining legislation. 
The miners themselves were aware of the fact that farmers detested the manner in which 
prospecting and mining were being done on private land with very little consideration of the 
farmers’ opinion. This was made clear when the Chamber of Mines president stated that: 
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It seems the farmers’ main objection to prospecting and pegging on reserved land is 
what appears to be the right of miners to apply direct to the Mining Affairs Board. I 
think I can say the mining industry would be prepared to agree that negotiations should 
in the first place be between landowner and miner, as long as there is the ultimate right 
of the miner to appeal to an independent court if private negotiations fail.581 
 
It was the miners’ right of commencing prospecting without prior notification to the 
landowners against which the farmers were battling against. The issue received more attention 
and dominated the debate for amending the Mines and Minerals Act spearheaded by a working 
party as shall be discussed in the next section. 
 
In an effort to promote the processing of base minerals in the country and promote secondary 
industry growth, the government imposed a premium tax on all unprocessed base minerals sold 
outside the country. This was also a move by treasury to increase the country’s revenue 
considering that gold was no longer as lucrative as it used to be. This move by government was 
heavily criticised by miners as being unfair. A. H. Gilmour, President of the Chamber of Mines 
argued that: 
We appreciate the difficulties of the Minister of treasury but consider that an unfair 
advantage has been taken of our industry which I think I am correct in saying is the 
only one in the colony which is subjected to direct taxation on the value of its product 
irrespective of the profit margin of the individual mining propositions.582 
 
Base minerals producers were being subjected to similar treatment as that meted out to gold 
producers during the Second World War. The Chamber of Mines argued that even if the 
government continued levying the tax on the sector, it was not likely to achieve the intended 
results because of two major obstacles. These were, first the marketing of processed mineral in 
the face of strong competition from established processors overseas and the ever rising cost of 
electric power in the country. Under such circumstances, it was difficult to move away from 
wood to other more efficient but expensive sources of fuel such as electricity. 
 
For a country advancing the discourse of conservationism entailing protection of timber 
resources, provision of electricity at affordable tariffs could have been a useful remedy. In 
Southern Rhodesia the case was different. Use of electricity remained a preserve of the highly 
capitalised mining companies, and even for them, the ESC could raise the tariffs at any given 
time. This was cited as one of the major reasons hindering investors to come and commence 
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mining operations in the country. F. Elliot of the Chamber of Mines highlighted this concern 
by the mining industry: 
It is so disheartening to say the least of it, after entering into a long term price agreement 
and basing mining costs on such an agreement, to find the tariffs can be considerably 
increased every few years although a company has faithfully carried out its side of the 
bargain regarding its consumption of power. Uncertainty regarding power charges is 
not the atmosphere in which to encourage outside capital to invest in an already 
speculative undertaking such as mining and it will pay the government to remove this 
uncertainty as soon as possible.583 
 
It was even suggested by the mining industry that the ESC should consider providing electricity 
at a loss to miners to promote growth of the country’s economy. The base minerals were so 
strategic to the country’s economy in the period after WW II for their exploitation influenced 
what was happening in all other sectors of the economy. More importantly it was the activities 
of base minerals miners that pushed the Mines Minister to put in place a working party to look 
into the amendment of the Mines and Minerals Act as shall be discussed in the next section.  
 
The Mineral Resources Committee and farmer-miner conflicts 
The NRB had in place various mechanisms and committees meant to deal with the problem of 
environmental degradation caused by agriculture and mining and in the process, end the 
contests over timber. The NRB made attempts to utilise the context of conservation set out by 
the Natural Resources Act to deal with farmer-miner conflicts. One of such committees which 
was intended to be a major vehicle through which the colonial state sought to deal with the 
miner-farmer tussle (and its spin-off deleterious effects on the environment) was the Mineral 
Resources Committee (MRC). The Intensive Area Conservation Committees shall also be 
considered later in the chapter, but it was the MRC which played the most crucial role as will 
be demonstrated in this section. Established in October 1949, the committee’s major function 
was “to advise the Board on matters concerning the mineral wealth of the colony and to enable 
it to carry out its obligations to exercise a general supervision over minerals.”584 It was made 
up of officers drawn from the Mines Department, the Geological Survey Department and the 
NRB itself. 
 
One of the most important recommendations made to the NRB by the MRC concerned the 
conservation of the country’s gold resources. Informed by this proposal, the NRB 
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recommended to the Mines Minister in 1858 that marginal gold producers were supposed to be 
subsidised to enable lower grade ore to be mined.585 This was in line with difficulties 
bedevilling the gold mining sector during the period emanating from a fixed price regime. 
Earlier on, concern had been raised by A. M. McGregor, a geologist who had observed that: 
Very few mines have been discovered within the last 40 years and the prospects of 
finding new important producers are too small to be depended on. The gold resources 
on which southern Rhodesia must rely are in the existing mines.586 
 
He proposed that the mining policy of the country should be structured in such a way that it 
could avoid the ripping of most of the better grade ore first leaving behind low grade ores. This 
had also happened when the premium tax on gold was operational during WWII. The NRB 
noted that: 
In the gold mining industry were the price of the final product is fixed the proportion 
of low grade ore mined must decrease with the increase in the cost of production and it 
is unlikely that the low grade ore will ever be mined with the resultant loss to the colony 
of a valuable natural resource.587 
 
Gold miners were expected to conserve the actual gold reserves by engaging in planned 
exploitation. Conservation practices were not only limited to timber resources but also included 
the actual minerals as recommended by the MRC. 
 
The MRC made attempts to devise ways to obviate conflicts between farmers and miners 
arising from the mining law. It therefore, repeatedly asked farmers and miners to approach any 
difficulties constructively from the standpoint, not of sectional interest, but of national good.588 
For instance it recommended an amendment to the Mines and Minerals Act in 1953 to avoid 
waste of timber on gold belt farms cleared during the course of bona fide farming operations.589 
The MRC encouraged dialogue between farmers and miners as a way of reaching common 
ground and therefore, it promoted farmer-miner meetings where various concerns of the two 
industries were discussed. It was during such meetings that grievances from both sides were 
discussed with an intention to reach a compromise. Representatives from the RNFU, Chamber 
of Mines and the Rhodesian Mining Federation compiled their grievances and sent them for 
consideration by the MRC. 
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African mine labour residing on mine compounds situated on private land were sometimes a 
source of conflict between farmers and miners. In certain instances, these mine labourers 
cultivated their own small plots on prohibited land. The MRC made attempts to eliminate this 
problem in an attempt to maintain good relations between the farmers and miners. 
Consequently, in 1954 the MRC negotiated an agreement under which miners could apply for 
permission for their mine employees to cultivate Crown land falling within their mining claims 
under proper safeguards.590 Such land was to be subjected to frequent monitoring by CONEX 
to ensure adherence to conservation principles. African employees also cut timber for firewood 
on land belonging to farmers. The also MRC recommended to the NRB to encourage the use 
of coal by mine employees for cooking and heating purpose.591 
 
In addition to dealing with matters concerning the mining industry, the MRC also deliberated 
on farmers’ grievances brought before it. These included a call by the farmers for the 
appointment of a Royal Commission to work towards the enactment of a new mining law.592 
The need for such new legislation had been necessitated by conflicts between farmers and 
miners sparked by prospecting of minerals, especially base minerals, on reserved ground. An 
example of such conflicts occurred when M. J. de Vos had pegged and registered Rea claim 
situated upon R. Smith’s farm at Wollendale. The claim was cancelled in February 1954 and 
registered by Smith as Malabar Reef but he did not do any development work leading to the 
forfeiture of the claim.593 De Vos pegged the claim again saying it had good prospects, his 
solicitor, Mr Gray argued that the area was not suitable for farming.594 This was contrary to 
Smith’s argument that the area suited his proposed farming operations and that the mine was 
situated in his farm compound where five of his African labourers billeted. Smith also made 
known his intentions to work on the mineral claim himself in the future and he labelled de Vos 
a trespasser.  
 
The major grievance that can be discerned concerned the mineral value as well as the 
agricultural value of the land. The above case was ruled in de Vos’s favour setting a precedent 
                                                            
590 Annual Report for the Mineral Resources Committee for the year ending 1954. 
591 Report of the Natural Resources Board for the year ended 31 December 1958. 
592 Annual Report of the Mineral Resources Committee for the year 1955. 
593S2751/4 Mining Affairs Board Minutes – 1955. Minutes of the 61st meeting held in Salisbury, 11 February 
1955. 
594 S2751/4 Mining Affairs Board Minutes – 1955. Minutes of the 61st meeting held in Salisbury, 11 February 
1955. 
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that farmers did not wish to see being carried forth. Farmers became even more determined to 
protect surface rights on their land, miners were therefore, expected to pay compensation for 
using land that otherwise would be have been used for agricultural purposes. T. Mitchell, a 
farmer, told the Rhodesia National Farmers Union (RNFU) Congress of 1958 that “We are 
asking for the proper and complete control of prospecting which is going to save the farmer an 
immense amount of trouble in the future if we can obtain it.”595 He further stressed that “we 
are not going to make our farms become worthless.”596 Farmers’ intentions were not to stop 
mining nor were they claiming to be compensated for minerals extracted from their land. 
Mitchell proceeded to note that: 
We do not own the mineral rights therefore; we are not arguing on the lines that we 
must receive compensation with regard to the value of the mineral in the ground. We 
want to put forward a completely just argument that we can justify in every way. We 
want compensation to be complete to take in every possible facet of compensation.597 
 
Farmers were not willing to back track on this issue of compensation. It was argued that 
compensation would restore value lost through land being worked by miners. C. E. A. Bunn, a 
member of the Macheke Farmers Association, proceeded to draw parallels to circumstances 
prevailing in the Union of South Africa where farmers were compensated for loss of farming 
land.598 Farmers vowed to protect their farm land and promised to continue safeguarding their 
rights as a duty to posterity. 
 
The need for the appointment of a Royal Commission to deal with the problem of compensation 
for land lost to miners was reiterated in 1955599 and in 1956600 by various ICAs attending annual 
conferences of the ICAC for the two years. The Minister of Mines however set up a working 
party that was expected to look into the farmers’ grievances. It consisted of miners as well as 
farmers’ representatives tasked to investigate the problems raised by farmers and propose 
recommendations for their solution. Any amendments to the mining law were therefore stalled 
pending the working party’s report. The working party was thus consulted farmers and gathered 
all the practices enunciated in the mining law were deemed to be unfair and oppressive by the 
                                                            
595 NAZ F324/1084/F3 RNFU Congress Resolutions. Rhodesia National Farmers Union Annual Congress Report 
June 1958. 
596 NAZ F324/1084/F3 RNFU Congress Resolutions. Rhodesia National Farmers Union Annual Congress Report 
June 1958. 
597 NAZ F324/1084/F3 RNFU Congress Resolutions. RNFU Annual Congress Report June 1958. 
598 NAZ F324/1084/F3 RNFU Congress Resolutions. RNFU Annual Congress Report June 1958. 
599 The 7th Annual Conference of Intensive Conservation Area Committees, 1955, replies to resolutions. From R. 
D. Spitteler, Secretary to NRB to Secretaries of all ICA Committees. 22 February 1956. 
600 NRB, ICA Annual Conference 1956, Addenda to Agenda. 
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farming community. Eddie Cross noted that during this particular time, the government’s 
concern on the determination of primary land use functions intensified.601  For the first time in 
the country’s history consultations were being made for the sole intention of improving the 
Mines and Minerals Act, something that was never attempted in the pre-1939 period. The 
inauguration of a formal conservation dispensation in 1941 therefore brought an opportunity 
for the elimination of farmer-miner differences. Input from the two industries was to be 
considered and incorporated in the framing of a new mining law for the country. 
 
The RNFU submitted a list of grievances for the consideration of the working party. These 
grievances included, inadequate compensation for deprivation of the use of land occupied by 
mining claims, timber rights granted to miners and excessive pegging of land.602 In considering 
these grievances, due regard was given to the significance of the mining industry, especially 
base minerals mining which was expanding and providing a lot of revenue for the government 
as well as promoting growth of secondary industry. The working party’s interim report was by 
and large informed by two major changes that had happened to the country’s economy and 
these were: 
The great expansion of base mineral pegging and mining activity and falling off in the 
number of gold producers and the increased cost of all aspects of mining. A similar 
expansion of farming activity coupled with more intensive and more expensive methods 
of cultivation and conservation calling for greatly increased capital outlay.603 
 
Basing on these structural changes in the county’s economy, the working party proposed two 
schemes for possible compensation to be paid to farmers for their land that was used for mining 
purposes by the various mining companies in the country. One of their recommendations 
stipulated that compensation in the form of a fixed rental per acre (payable in advance) for the 
deprivation of use of land. Under this provision the farmer had the right to appeal to 
government for a rise in the amount paid as compensation after the claim had been held for two 
years. Rentals of this nature were only to be paid to farmers in respect of beneficially occupied 
land.604 This recommendation applied to smaller mine operations that did not have longer life 
spans. Miners were expected to convince the Mining Affairs Board of the probable presence 
                                                            
601 Interview with Eddie Cross, Movement for Democratic Change Member of Parliament for the Bulawayo North 
Constituency, Ambassador Hotel in Harare, 15 April 2014. 
602 Interim Report prepared by the Working Party set up by the Minister of Mines to consider the amendment of 
the Mining Law. 
603 Interim Report prepared by the Working Party set up by the Minister of Mines to consider the amendment of 
the Mining Law. 
604 Interim report of the working party set up by the Minister of Mines to consider the amendment of the mining 
law. 
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of an economic mineral deposit. If the land concerned did not contain the expected mineral 
deposit the mineral venture was deemed to be an expensive one. Farmers were therefore 
expected to reap financial rewards for loss of their land to mining interests. 
 
For larger mines with a comparatively longer life span, the working party’s report 
recommended the creation of a new form of tenure to be known as a mining lease. This form 
of title was to be granted after the discovery of a substantial mineral discovery that could be 
exploited for a period extending beyond five years. The primary objective of granting this form 
of lease was the merging of individual claims into one title.605 This was to be approached at an 
individual level since mines dealt with in this category were  large-scale, having a longer life 
span of at least five years. Consideration had been given to the importance of the mining 
industry when the working party made the recommendations.  The question concerning the 
mineral or agricultural significance of land had been tackled head on and these 
recommendations were expected to substantially deal with miner-farmer disagreements on the 
matter. 
 
Mining men on Intensive Conservation Area Committees 
ICACs were the government’s major agents in the implementation of the conservation policy. 
Their formation was spelled out by the Natural Resources Act as highlighted in the previous 
section. They became a very useful and convenient forum for members of the farming 
community to discuss major points of conflict with miners in the country. This was done in the 
spirit of combating land degradation caused by miners, as well as a way of finding common 
ground with the mining sector in an attempt to end the rift between the two industries. Although 
miners were not part of the committees when they were started, farmers always discussed 
mining concerns. The Gatooma ICAC for instance, registered its discontent at the manner in 
which government had handled conflicts between farmers and miners, they noted in 1946 that: 
Another point which is a great handicap to the landowner is the refusal of the 
government to enforce the carrying out of the mining law. Roads made by the miner in 
the old days and today are one of the main erosion bugbears that will have to be coped 
with in this district – and we farmers feel that the expense of recovering the gullies 
made by the old roads should not be a charge on us at all.606 
 
                                                            
605 Interim report of the working party set up by the Minister of Mines to consider the amendment of the mining 
law. 
606 NAZ F 151/ICA/GAG Gatooma Group ICA File 1945 to 1952. Letter from the Acting Secretary for the Natural 
Resources Board to the Director, Irrigation Department, 31 January 1946. 
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This was the result of sheer ignorance of the mining law by miners as well as the nature of the 
mining law itself, which required some amendments to keep it abreast with latest developments 
in the country’s economy. Some of the offenders were also small workers with very limited 
financial resources and “were therefore, not worth powder and shot.”607 John Lourie 
substantiated this claim by stating that small miners usually left open pits and roads after 
realising that a claim was not productive.608 The Mineral Resources Committee made a 
recommended to the NRB for the inclusion of representatives of mining interests on ICAs in 
areas where there was mining activity.609 This proposal was accepted at the 1954 annual 
conference of the NRB. It was expected to reduce friction between miners and farmers 
considerably. Although their work encompassing both agriculture and mining cannot be 
compared to that of the MRC, they represented a useful initiative within the context of 
conservation, which made attempts to deal with the farmer-miner controversy. They succeeded 
in facilitating dialogue between the farmers and miners which was useful in cultivating some 
understanding of the operations of the two industries, something which was non-existent in the 
pre-1939 period. 
 
By the year 1956, it was estimated that there were about 30 mining men sitting on ICACs 
throughout the country and the NRB noted in 1956 that this inclusion of mining men on ICAs 
was paying dividend as indicated by the helpful co-operation between ICACs, the Mining 
Department and CONEX.610 The inclusion of Mining men on the ICACs in some instances 
assisted in ending conflicts between farmers and miners before they were even reported to the 
NRB. There were some problems in Umvukwesi over chrome mining, miners were concerned 
with the way chrome miners were conducting their activity and a conflict ensued.611 The 
problem was amicably resolved by the conservation committee in the area and the chrome 
miners agreed to certain conservation proposals proposed by the ICA.612 
 
The 1961 Mines and Minerals Amendment Act 
                                                            
607NAZ F 151/ICA/GAG Gatooma Group ICA File 1945 to 1952. Letter from the Acting Secretary for the Natural 
Resources Board to the Director, Irrigation Department, 31 January 1946. 
608 Interview with John Lourie, former commercial farmer (1963-2000), Avondale in Harare, 17 April 2014. 
609 SRG2 Report of the Natural Resources Board. CSR 4 1954 Presented to the legislative Assembly in 1954. 
610 Annual Report for the Natural Resources Board for the year ending December 1956. 
611 F151/ICA/MAZ Mazoe Group ICA File 2. Group conservation and extension quarterly report – Mazoe group 
July, August, September 1957. 
612 F151/ICA/MAZ Mazoe Group ICA File 2. Group conservation and extension quarterly report – Mazoe group 
July, August, September 1957. 
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The new Mines and Minerals Act and Mining Regulations No. 38 which came into effect on 
the 1 November 1961 spelt the dawn of a new era for farmers and miners in Southern Rhodesia. 
The Act was crafted in a new environment of friendliness created by the various agents (such 
as ICACs, NRB and the MRC) set up by the state to foster the preservation of the country’s 
natural resources. The basis for the new law was laid by a Working Party set up by the Mines 
Minister in 1959 to examine the Mines and Minerals Act and come up with recommendations 
to be considered in amending the country’s mining law. Although the major recommendations 
made by the Working Party (discussed in the previous section) were not accepted by both 
farmers and miners, its creation and composition was a step in the right direction. It facilitated 
dialogue by the representative bodies of the two economic sectors, the Chamber of Mines and 
the RNFU, until they reached a compromise on the form the amended law was supposed to 
take. The new law significantly eradicated the farmer-miner conflict, it eliminated the use of 
mining timber permits in cases where agreement would have been reached by the concerned 
farmer and miner. It also provided for a 50 percent reservation of indigenous timber for the 
land owner and the miner A clause in section 5 stipulated that:  
A prospector or miner shall be entitled in the exercise of prospecting or mining rights 
in the area of the reservation to cut and use for his own purposes such indigenous wood 
or timber and no more within that area as may be necessary for clearing purposes and 
shall pay for such indigenous wood or timber at such tariff rate as may be prescribed.613 
 
The 1961 Act was a result of major sacrifice and extreme compromise by both farmers and 
miners. The emerging diversified post-WWII economic environment in the country had made 
the two protagonists, farmers and miners to bury the hatchet and cooperate for their mutual 
benefit. The Act did not satisfy all the disgruntled elements on either side, but overall, it 
succeeded in forging some form unity. Eddie Cross contended that the amended mining law 
although upheld as being progressive, created an uneasy truce between the two sectors because 
conflicts continued well into the post-colonial era. His argument was based on the fact that 
farmers felt that they got the “short hand of the stick” since they felt like they were not 
adequately protected by the mining and environmental legislation.614 The new amendment de-
escalated miner-farmer tension, the two sectors managed to achieve what all along seemed 
impossible. 
 
                                                            
613 Mines and Minerals Act No. 38, 1961. 
614 Interview with Eddie Cross, Movement for Democratic Change Member of Parliament for the Bulawayo North 
Constituency, Ambassador Hotel in Harare, 15 April 2014. 
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Conclusion 
The chapter has discussed the implications of the adoption of a formal conservation policy by 
the state on miner-farmer interaction. It has contributed a new dimension to existing 
historiography which mainly focuses on how the Forest Act led to the eviction of African 
farmers who resided on areas that were declared as forest reserves.615 As demonstrated by the 
chapter, the Forest Act also affected intra-settler relations as the government effectively 
regulated farmers and miners activities ultimately leading to the 1961 amendment of the Mines 
and Minerals Act. By providing a brief background to the development of formal conservation 
in Southern Rhodesia, the chapter laid a foundation for a discussion of the interaction of 
farmers, miners and the colonial state in the post-1939 period. The promulgation of the Natural 
Resources Act of 1941 ushered in an era punctuated by initiatives aimed at curbing 
environmental degradation which had been triggered by settler agriculture, mining activities as 
well as the government’s repressive land laws in African areas. The chapter has demonstrated 
that the era of formal conservation reshaped farmer-miner relations as the legislative 
instruments and control measures that were brought about by the new dispensation created 
committees such as MRC and the MTPB. Such committees as has been argued created a new 
platform of engagement as they attempted to bring to an end excessive cutting of indigenous 
timber for mining and agricultural purposes, thus narrowing the rift between farmers and 
miners in the process. The post-1939 period was also characterised by structural changes in the 
country’s economy which, together with conservation discourse facilitated the eventual 
enactment of the 1961 Mines and Mineral Act which, for the first time in the country’s history 
succeeded in achieving a compromise between farmers and miners. The study has therefore 
demonstrated how the introduction of formal conservation policies saw the state assume the 
role of regulator of property rights in its attempts to ensure the prosperity of capital.  
  
                                                            
615 Maravanyika, ‘Local responses to colonial evictions’ and Mapedza, ‘Forest policy in colonial and post-colonial 
Zimbabwe.’ 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
African labour for settler agriculture and mining in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1906 to 1948. 
 
The incorporation of indigenous Africans into the settler capitalist system as labourers was not 
easily accomplished in British colonial Africa. Southern Rhodesia is a classic case where the 
development of a vibrant and successful colonial economy heavily depended on the use of 
cheap African labour. This prime resource remained scarce from the time of colonial 
occupation (1890s) and, therefore, successive governments expended a lot of effort in attempts 
to secure adequate labour for the country’s fledging primary industries and later on secondary 
industry. Previous chapters dealt with the interaction of the state, settler farmers and miners, 
highlighting the numerous contestations which characterised the relationship of the triad. This 
chapter provides previously absent facets in the explanatory model by introducing indigenous 
Africans, who, as labourers, constituted a major subject of contestation between the settler 
farmers and miners during the colonial period. The chapter will start by giving a brief overview 
of the labour supply situation at a time when the colonial economy was still at an embryonic 
stage. It will then explain the conflict surrounding the financing of the Rhodesia Native Labour 
Bureau (RNLB) which was discussed by the 1925 conference, highlighting how this created a 
rift between farmers and miners before giving a brief overview of African labour distribution 
and direction up to about 1948.  
 
The procurement of cheap labour, first for the gold mines and then for settler capitalist 
agriculture in Southern Rhodesia has attracted serious scholarly attention over the years, with 
particular focus on the methods employed by the colonial administration to ensure an adequate 
supply of cheap African labour for the budding capitalist sector. G. Arrighi’s seminal paper616 
(1970) provided a benchmark on labour historiography. He challenged W. J. Barber’s whiggish 
and triumphalist economic model which credited the development of capitalism in Southern 
Rhodesia for advancing the position of Africans.617 He argued that, Barber and Lewis 
conceived “of the underdevelopment of the African peoples as an original state which the 
                                                            
616 G. Arrighi, ‘Labour supplies in historical perspective: A study of the proletarianization of the African peasantry 
in Rhodesia,’ Journal of Development Studies 6, 3 (1970), 197-234. 
617 W. J. Barber, The economy of British Central Africa (London: Longman, 1961). 
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development of a capitalist sector gradually eliminates.”618 Arrighi promoted the significance 
of extra-economic forces in the mobilisation of African labour for the capitalist sector. Arguing 
in a similar vein, A. H. Jeeves and J. Crush discuss how state intervention facilitated growth of 
settler capitalist agriculture to rival African production.619 Use of state power to prop up the 
white agricultural sector was also common in Southern Rhodesia and it took the same form to 
that prevailing in South Africa. D. Johnson expanded on the use of coercion and state power 
for the recruitment of labour for Rhodesia’s agricultural sector in the post-depression era.620 I. 
R Phimister also disproves the Lewis-Barber contention of unlimited labour supplies in 
Southern Rhodesia during the early years of colonial rule by highlighting that Africans did not 
have prospects of becoming labourers mainly because of the profitability of their agricultural 
enterprise.621  By focusing on the experiences of mine and farm labourers, C. Van Onselen622 
and a generation later S. C. Rubert623 presented an important dimension to Southern Rhodesia’s 
labour history by discussing the experiences of mine and farm labourers, an aspect that had all 
along been neglected by scholarship. Another group of scholars has situated Southern 
Rhodesia’s labour dynamics within a regional perspective by discussing labour flows within 
the Southern African region.624 Conforming to the argument on the diverging sectorial interests 
of farmers and miners discussed in previous chapters, this chapter will explore the squabbles 
over access to cheap indigenous, as well as migrant African labour for use by settler farmers 
and miners. The chapter seeks to demonstrate that, apart from land and timber resources, cheap 
African labour constituted a subject of contestation between settler farmers and miners in the 
period 1906 to 1953. After the creation of the Central African Federation in 1953, African 
                                                            
618 Arrighi, ‘Labour supplies in historical perspective’, 199. 
619 A. H. Jeeves and J. Crush, ‘Introduction’ in Jeeves and Crush (eds), White farms, black labour: The state and 
agrarian change in Southern Africa, 1910-1950 (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1997), 2. 
620 D. Johnson, ‘Settler farmers and coerced African labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1936-46,’ Journal of African 
history 33, 1 (1992), 111-128. 
621 I. R. Phimister, ‘Peasant production and underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1914’, African Affairs, 
73, 291 (1974), 217. See also K. Rennie, ‘white farmers, black tenants and landlord legislation: Southern Rhodesia 
1890-1930’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 5, 1 (1978) 86-98; C. Bundy, ‘The emergence and decline of a 
South African peasantry’, African Affairs, 71, 285 (1972), 369-388; C. Bundy, The rise and fall of the South 
African peasantry, (California: University of California Press, 1979). 
622 C. van Onselen, Chibaro: African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1903-1933 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 
1980). 
623 S. C. Rubert, A most Promising Weed: A History of Tobacco Farming and Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890 
to 1945 (Athens: Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 1998). 
624 B. Paton, Labour export policy in the development of Southern Africa (Harare: University of Zimbabwe 
Publications, 1995); F. P. Bonner, J. Hyslop and N. Van der Watt, ‘Rethinking worlds of labour: Southern African 
labour history in the international context’, African Affairs, 88, 2-3 (2007), 137-167; F. E. Sanderson, ‘The 
development of labour migration from Nyasaland, 1891-1914’, Journal of African History, 11, 2 (1961), 259-
271and E. P. Makambe, ‘The Nyasaland African labour “ulendos” to Southern Rhodesia and the problem of the 
African “highway-men”, 1903-1923: A study in the limitations of early independent labour migration’, African 
Affairs, 79, 317 (1980), 548-566. 
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labour ceased to be a problem as major districts in the country started recording surpluses and 
influx control mechanisms were put in place to limit the number of northern immigrants 
entering the country to seek employment.  
 
Earlier period: Labour for emerging capitalist economy 
Hopes by the pioneer settlers to discover gold deposits in Southern Rhodesia comparable to 
those found on the Rand remained a pipe dream as discussed in Chapter Two. Reality soon 
dawned on the British South Africa Company (BSAC) administration that the country did not 
have phenomenal gold deposits as portrayed by earlier newspaper reports and propaganda 
campaigns that aimed at boosting investor confidence on the London Market.625 After this 
realisation, mining companies began to slowly move away from speculative tendencies and 
embark upon actual mineral production.626 This move was however supposed to be 
complimented by an abundance of cheap African labour to minimise operational costs and at 
the same time ensure maximum profits from mining enterprise in the country. On the other 
hand, European agriculture in the colony did not develop at the same time as gold mining did 
and its hope for success was also hinged on the availability of cheap African labour. This 
scenario was also prevalent in the entire sub-region and farmers became a major competitor for 
the available labour resources with mining capital.  
 
The labour situation in Southern Rhodesia must therefore be situated within the broader 
regional context characterised by fierce competition for labour between richer South Africa’s 
Transvaal mines and Southern Rhodesia.627 Southern Rhodesia’s Company administration 
made attempts to mobilise labour for the nascent mining sector and as early as 1895, provincial 
labour bureaux were formed to direct the flow of labour to the mines.628 This early attempt was 
hit by financial constraints and the effect of the 1896 uprising (when the administration 
committed most funds to suppress the rebellion), which ultimately brought the bureaux to their 
knees. This was followed by the creation of the Labour Board of Southern Rhodesia in 1899 
which managed to supply 6 000 workers to Matebeleland mines in the first six months of 
1899.629 These earlier efforts assisted mining companies with labour at crucial moments. It 
                                                            
625 I. R. Phimister, ‘History of mining in Southern Rhodesia to 1953,’ PhD Thesis, University of Rhodesia, 1975. 
626626 I. R. Phimister, An economic and social history of Zimbabwe: Capital accumulation and class struggle, 
(London: Longman, 1988), 22. 
627 For a detailed discussion of the regional labour politics see, B. Paton, Labour Export Policy in the Development 
of Southern Africa. 
628 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 22. 
629 Van Onselen, Chibaro, 78. 
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must however be noted that such supplies were not reliable and fluctuated seasonally. These 
earlier efforts were in addition to the labour that was supplied to the mines by the Native 
Department. Africans were not willing to take up jobs and therefore, the Native Department 
used compulsion to recruit labour for the mines. Soon after the South African war (1899-1902), 
competition for Rhodesia’s African labour was resumed by the more resourced Witwatersrand 
gold mines and Rhodesian authorities reorganised recruitment with the aid of government 
funds and set up the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) in 1903.630 
 
Historians have dealt with the development of the colonial economy in Southern Rhodesia and 
elaborated on the prevailing situation in the first two decades of colonial occupation as 
discussed in Chapter Two.631 A notable feature of the early colonial economy was the 
development of a mining sector in the absence of a settler agricultural sector. This created a 
complex relationship between the Company administration, mining capital and Africans, in the 
wake of an emerging capitalist system and its extensive labour requirements. It was very 
difficult for the undercapitalised mining companies to attract African labour, settler farmers 
faced much serious problems as shall be highlighted in this section.632 Indigenous Africans 
enjoyed financial independence derived from selling their agricultural produce, an occupation 
far more remunerative than working in mines. A Compound Inspector commented in 1903 that 
“The high price of grain was spoiling the local labour market and a woman cultivating one or 
two acres could make as much money in one month than her husband in three.”633 The Native 
Commissioner for Matobo also noted that Africans enjoyed a pleasant life as peasants and were 
therefore not willing to be engaged as labourers in the emerging capitalist system.634 The 
scattered nature of Southern Rhodesia’s mines as well as the proliferation of small independent 
miners after 1903 provided a ready market for Africans’ meat and grain, in the process spoiling 
labour supplies for the emerging mining sector.  
 
                                                            
630 Gann, A History of Rhodesia, 179. 
631 V. E. M. Machingaidze, ‘The role of settler capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesia with particular reference 
to the role of the state to 1939,’ PhD Thesis, University of London, 1980, B. Raftopoulos and A. S. Mlambo (eds), 
Becoming Zimbabwe, (Harare: Weaver Press 2012). 
632 Phimister, ‘Peasant production and underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia’, 217. 
633 NAZ LO1/2/25 British South Africa Company Minutes of 22 July 1923. Report by the Inspector of Native 
Compounds for the year ended 31 March 1903. 
634 NAZ NBE1/1/2 NC Matobo and Malema Districts, 1901. 
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Under such circumstances it became increasingly difficult to covert African peasant635 
producers to become full time labourers on  European farms and mines. Mechanisms were put 
in place to try and push them to move out of the reserves and seek work, but this met limited 
success. Commenting on the prevailing situation in 1904 the Chief Native Commissioner wrote 
that: 
To accustom the native of this country to steady work is a task which will take years to 
accomplish; more particularly as they have no desire to become rich. Their one idea is 
to obtain money to pay tax which can be obtained in two months, and then return to 
their homes, and loll about in idleness and drinking beer.636 
 
Such pronouncements by colonial officials emanated from a misunderstanding of the Africans’ 
work regime which was characterised by seasonal variations in the intensity of work done, as 
well as the division of labour amongst the males and females at different times of the year. 
Peasant production was sustainable and the few Africans who sought work in the capitalist 
sector only committed for a few months so as to earn money with which to pay tax before 
returning to work on their land during the wet season, from October to April every year. 
Consequently, Europeans were always complaining about the lack of a regular supply of 
labour, F. E. Sanderson summed this up by stating that:  
unless under some form of direct or indirect compulsion labour tended to be in short 
supply when it was most needed – in the months immediately before and after the 
advent of the rains when work in preparing village gardens for subsistence crops was at 
its peak.637  
 
This was a major cause for concern because it affected labour supplies for the mining and 
agricultural sectors thus militating against the desires of the BSAC to derive profit from their 
investment in Southern Rhodesia. The Company’s London office made suggestions for the 
collection of hut tax in January or December when most African labourers left wage 
employment to go and work on their own fields, leaving a significant labour shortfall on the 
farms and mines.638 This had the intended objective of pushing as many Africans as possible 
into the labour market in response to the tax squeeze. 
 
                                                            
635 “Peasants are those whose ultimate security and subsistence lies in their having certain rights in land and in the 
labour of family members on the land, but who are involved through rights and obligation in a wider economic 
system which inlcudes the participation of non-peasants.” J. S. Soul and R. Woods, ‘African peasantries’ in T. 
Shanin (ed), Peasants and peasant societies, (London: Penguin, 1971), 105. 
636 Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year ended 1904. 
637 Sanderson, ‘The development of labour migration from Nyasaland’, 261. 
638 NAZ A1/2/8/21 Letter from The British South Africa Company, London to British South Africa Company 
Administrator, Salisbury, 16 December 1905. 
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When it became abundantly clear that the labour needs of the country’s mining industry could 
not be met by local Africans, the Company administration looked northwards for a solution. 
They decided to make up for the labour deficit by bringing in migrant labourers from the 
northern territories where the colonial capitalist system was still undeveloped. This was after 
failed attempts to import labour from north Africa and Asia.639 The Northern territories of 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia as well as Portuguese East Africa became the country’s 
main source of labour. Ensuring a regular inflow of labour from the northern territories 
therefore became a major point of departure for the country’s labour policy as noted by, B. 
Paton that “Successive administrations therefore played a curious dual role, negotiating with 
South Africa to control outflows on the one hand while negotiating with Nyasaland and 
Northern Rhodesia to secure maximum inflows on the other.”640 Unlike indigenous labourers 
who worked monthly contracts, the immigrants could be engaged for longer contracts. Van 
Onselen aptly summed up the advantage of using migrant labour by observing that cheap 
foreign labour increased labour supplies during times of the year when supply was low.641 In 
this regard most of the colonial period (1890-1953) was marked by attempts to maintain a 
favourable balance of labour inflows by the colonial administration 
 
Failure to find gold in the anticipated amounts pushed the Company administration to cast its 
net wider and embark upon the development of settler agriculture in an attempt to make the 
colonial adventure profitable from 1908. A successful agricultural sector was also envisaged 
to lure more settlers into the country, who could take up land and start farming. Consequently, 
a Department of Agriculture was set up in 1903 to facilitate the development and expansion of 
settler agriculture. As noted in earlier chapters, a White Agricultural Policy was launched in 
1908 after a visit to the country by the BSAC Directors to the colony.642 This agricultural 
development also required the availability of cheap labour as highlighted by R. Hodder-
Williams that “A plentiful supply of labour, cheap if possible  was therefore required by those 
who aspired to something higher than mere subsistence farming.”643 White farmers were 
therefore set on collision course with mining companies over access to cheap African labour. 
Relations of the two sectors did not have a harmonious history as the two also clashed over 
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access to water, timber and land rights as chapters 2,3,4 and 5 have shown. African labour thus 
became another reason for conflict between the two economic classes. The colonial 
administration was thus placed in the uncomfortable position of acting as the arbiter if any 
conflict erupted over the labour question. 
 
When agriculture was still at this embryonic stage before 1910, most farmers were 
undercapitalised. Although attempts were being made to recruit farmers with start-up capital, 
most of the farmers lacked the requisite financial resources to facilitate the development of a 
successful farming venture. This was especially true for the Afrikaner settlers as noted by K. 
Rennie that “the treks of the 1890s into Southern Rhodesia comprised of men who had little 
more than possessions in an ox-wagon and debts at home.”644 Such men were not willing to 
pay high wages for wage labour and resorted to using the labour tenancy system. Their 
resistance to regularise their labour contracts by specifying the periods for which their labourers 
would be required sparked opposition from miners and those engaging in commerce who also 
wanted to have access to the same labourers being held under labour tenancy.645 The wage 
scale of the various industries during this particular time reveal that agricultural work paid the 
least wages and was therefore “less attractive than mining compounds, railways and other 
towns where wages were higher and excitements greater.”646 The CNC reported in 1903 that: 
Farm labourers are paid from 15/- to 30/- per month. Natives on railway work from 15/- 
to 30/- per month. On mine work; Drill boys 35/- to 60/- per month; surface boys 25/- 
to 40/-; engine boys 25/- to 50/-; specially employed 70/- to 130/- and boss boys 80/- 
to 100/-.647 
 
Given this scenario, it was clear that out of most of the European capitalist enterprises, farms 
paid the least wages and therefore, could not attract more labour. Besides the poor 
remuneration, treatment of labour at farms was somehow bad. After consultations with chiefs 
in his district, Native Commissioner for Marandellas, Ernest Morris concluded that. “It appears 
to me that the farmer is a far harder task master than the mine manager.”648 Farmers ended up 
employing the inexperienced workers who made themselves available and this affected 
production pattern on most farms. 
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RNLB labour for the farms or mines? 
The RNLB which had been formed in 1903, initially with the intention of recruiting labour for 
the miners (and later farmers), did not produce the intended results. Labour woes for the miners 
continued because it was difficult for the Bureau to mobilise adequate labour supplies. A 
committee appointed to look into the country’s labour problems and the Bureau’s operation, 
reported in 1906 that “the RNLB had failed to meet the requirements of the country as an 
organisation for the collection and distribution of native labour for Rhodesian industries.”649 
As a result the Bureau was reconstituted in 1906 under the same name and mandated to recruit 
labour for the country’s mining and agriculture industries locally and from the northern 
territories. 
 
In spite of the Bureau operating, farmers continued to face serious labour shortages. Tobacco 
farms had extensive labour demands, and yet labour supplies were diminishing and the 
situation was becoming precarious with each passing day. The Secretary for Agriculture 
acknowledged this problem when he opined that “This is a big question with the farmers who 
are very much handicapped by not having a continuous supply of native labour for carrying on 
their operations.”650 Due to limited capital, many farmers could not attract labour by matching 
up wages that were paid by mining companies. Under such circumstances, labour was therefore 
bound to take up jobs on the mines. Be that as it may, a different explanation to this scenario 
was provided by the Secretary for Agriculture when he stated that:  
It is generally believed that a considerable percentage of labourers from the north would 
prefer to work on a farm at a lower wage than they can get on the mine. It seems to me 
the labourers recruited by the labour bureau should be given the opportunity of choosing 
whether they will go as farm labourers or to the mines.651 
 
The logic behind this kind of thinking was that some immigrant labourers, given a chance to 
choose, would to opt to work on farms regardless of the lower wages being paid in this 
particular sector. This might have been triggered by reports of high mortality rates on mines. 
However, most labourers seem to have been channelled by the Bureau towards the mines, 
without due regard for the farmers’ requirements. 
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Although the Bureau was supposed to recruit labour for both miners and settler farmers, there 
appeared to be a bias in its operations. It should be stressed that labour remained a problem, 
but farmers’ needs appeared to have been the least priority for the Bureau. The Rhodesia 
Agricultural Union (RAU) had even stressed out the point that the “Bureau’s arrangements 
were for recruitment of mine labour, and apparently no provision was made for farm 
Labour.”652 Farmers blamed the continued shrinkage of alien labour available for farmers to 
the RNLB. Calls were therefore made for the formation of a recruiting agency, specifically for 
the recruitment of farm labour, under the auspices of the RAU. This proposition was in line 
with a “concession made to the Matebeleland farmers by Mr Birchenough (a BSAC Director) 
and the Administrator of North-Western Rhodesia, to allow farmers to send a representative to 
that territory to recruit boys for farm work.”653 Government responded to this proposition by 
granting an assurance that it would consult with the RNLB with the intention of forging an 
arrangement capable of meeting the farmers’ requirements. Supporting this idea, the Secretary 
for Agriculture made the following suggestion: 
As however, the farmer cannot afford to pay the same recruiting fee as the miner, 
naturally it is to the interest of the bureau to place all recruited labour with the mines. 
It seems necessary therefore to establish a separate organisation for recruiting farm 
labourers and I would suggest that the Native Labour Bureau and the RAU each be 
invited to nominate 3 representatives to attend a conference for the purpose of 
discussing some arrangement.654 
 
The newly created labour recruitment agent, it was argued, would be modelled along similar 
lines as the RNLB, but would instead supply the labourers at a lower recruiting fee and 
minimum wage than that charged for mine labourers. This was hoped to increase the labour 
available for employment on farms and eliminate the competition of mining capital. 
 
A farmers’ deputation met up with the Administrator to register their concern on the labour 
problems confronting the sector. Since the new RNLB was formed in 1906, the labour problem 
had become acute for the farmers as they were facing a continuously “increasing acreage and 
fewer boys to assist them to work their land.”655 The indigenous natives usually worked on the 
farms just for a few months before returning to their own fields. It seemed, however, that the 
only way that farmers were going to get enough labour was through offering better wages for 
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their workers. The Herald summed this up in 1908 by stating that “But after all the question 
would appear to be one of finance and unless the farmers are prepared to put their hands in 
their pockets, and put them in deeply too, they will always have  the labour trouble facing 
them.”656 Farmers were still grappling with capital constrains and had hoped to use cheap 
labour to leverage their position through reduced operational costs. 
 
A snap survey conducted in Umtali to ascertain the cause of labour shortages for farmers 
produced results that somehow contradicted the farmers’ claims. Native Commissioners in the 
Umtali district were instructed by the Civil Commissioner to encourage Africans to go out and 
seek work on the farms.657 This was in response to a request from the Administrator’s office 
which stipulated that: 
His honour (the Administrator) desires that you should immediately endeavour to 
ascertain on what farms the most serious shortage of labour exists, and if the 
representations of the NCs are successful, to arrange for any natives offering to work 
to be distributed with strict impartiality according to farmers requirements.658 
 
Unharvested crops, either ripe or ripening, were supposed to be given the first claim to labour 
before any other concerns were considered. In 1911, eleven farms that were reported to be 
facing a serious labour shortage in the district paid very low wages ranging from 10/- to 15/- 
per month.659 Given this very low pay rate, it is not surprising that farmers were facing serious 
labour shortages. Labour opted to go and seek work at mining companies were the wage scale 
was slightly higher. The Civil Commissioner reported that he interviewed 119 workers who 
were seeking work in the district during the month of October and they all refused to work on 
farms.660 One of the main reasons for their refusal was the very low wages being paid on the 
farms. 
 
The 1912 labour tax and the changing circumstances 
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The RNLB ran into numerous financial difficulties during its lifespan. The Bureau started on a 
low financial note after recording a £2 821 loss in its first year of operation.661 The RNLB was 
financed by the BSAC and had the commitment of financial assistance from the mining 
industry, but this did not come in the expected amounts. Miners continued to subsidise the 
Bureau’s operations and this became a root cause of resentment in the future as shall be 
highlighted. I. Henderson described the Bureau as  
An appendage of the Chamber of Mines, and therefore of the company; most of its 
labour was supplied to the bigger mines while the farmers and Smallworkers continued 
to complain of a labour shortage, and of the inferior specimen supplied to them by the 
Bureau.662 
 
Farmers were not major beneficiaries of bureau labour in the period before 1911 as noted. This 
state of affairs led to the farmers’ revolt of 1911-12.663 The dwindling supplies of immigrant 
labour from the north had some of its origins in the northern territories themselves. The 
Nyasaland government for example was considering methods of dealing with the mass exodus 
of its labourers in a southward direction. For instance, it was estimated that about 18 000 
Nyasas emigrated (most of them clandestinely). In most instances these were never heard of 
again, either by the government or their families.664 Reported deaths of those working in either 
southern Rhodesia or South Africa were on the rise, prompting the Nyasaland government to 
minimise emigration of its citizens. The Nyasaland government also called on Southern 
Rhodesia’s government to provide proper care for Nyasaland workers and discouraged the 
engagement of undocumented labourers by Southern Rhodesian companies. All these factors 
contributed to the declining supplies of northern labourers entering the country. 
 
Around this same time, the Company administration announced its intention to improve the 
fortunes of the RNLB by levying a labour tax of one shilling per labourer per month to be paid 
by all employers. This call angered most farmers, who by this time were undercapitalised and 
also did not receive many labourers from the Bureau. This call by the government had been 
preceded by a farmers’ meeting on the 11th of September in 1911 calling for the government to 
provide “at once a minimum number of boys, sufficient to relieve temporarily, an 
unprecedented crisis which otherwise will prove of the ruin of the whole farming 
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community.”665 This tax issue revealed the fissures existing within the farmer class itself for 
the elected members of the Legislative Council, who represented farming interests, voted in 
favour of the tax. This culminated in a massive and well-orchestrated tax rebellion on February 
1912666, led by farmers and smallworkers who were also against the imposition of a tax that 
they considered being a subsidy to bigger mining capital which received most of the Bureau 
labour. This rebellion was typical of D. A. Brautigam O. Fjeldstad and M. Moore’s discussion 
of taxation as a stimulus for rebellion.667 
 
When the Company’s intention to impose the tax was announced, the immediate response was 
a revolt led by farming men such as Patrick Fletcher who argued that it was not proper for a 
government to tax the people for the benefit of a private company (RNLB).668 The overall 
leader was John McChlery, a farmer who, together with six others (who included three 
Afrikaner farmers) published the ‘Manifesto of the seven’ which stressed the non-responsibility 
of the RNLB to tax payers’ money.669 All the elected members of the Legislative Council voted 
for the tax. In the 1911-12 wet season farmers in the country’s remote areas refused to pay the 
tax and in February 1912 about 2-3000 farmers confronted the Company. In May the crisis 
worsened and the Company administration was forced to make a compromise. 
 
The Company administration could not allow the tax revolt to degenerate into chaos and it 
capitulated. An agreement was reached whereby farmers were exempted from paying the newly 
introduced labour tax, but continued to pay a capitation fee for RNLB labour that they got.670 
This arrangement however set an unfair precedent which haunted the settler government 
thirteen years later. Miners continued to pay the tax and thus subsidised farmers through paying 
a capitation fee of £4/10 while farmers paid only £2. Henderson summarised the farmers’ 
position by stating that “The farmers had the best of both worlds. They continued to employ 
voluntary labour (some of whom were tenants on their own farms) and could tap the resources 
of the RNLB when they required to supplement their own supply.”671 Farmers had won the 
battle against the miners and the state. 
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The RNLB was therefore reconstituted in 1912 and continued with its task of recruiting labour 
for Southern Rhodesia until its termination in 1933. From 1913 onwards, the Bureau supplied 
most of its labour to farmers while miners only took a smaller fraction. Van Onselen observed 
that “what Chibaro-labour had done for the mines prior to 1912, it was now called upon to do 
for the poorer agricultural sector.672 This demonstrated the protean nature of state policies. On 
one end, it promoted the growth of mining through the Gold Belt Title which protected miners 
land, water and timber rights on Gold Belt farms as discussed in Chapter Two. Yet, it also 
facilitated the supply of African labour to the settler agriculture sector (after 1911) to promote 
the growth of capitalist agriculture and undermine African peasants in the process. The 1911-
12 events demonstrated the homogeneity and fluidity of the settler community in southern 
Rhodesia. Although from one angle, a semblance of unity amongst European capital against 
the prosperity of African peasant production aided by the Company Administration, the 
European sector had numerous fissures which revealed themselves as the struggle to have 
access to more labourers continued to unfold. 
 
Due to economic pressure, the number of Africans seeking work was higher than the usual 
which prompted some employers to take advantage of this temporary surplus to reduce wages. 
This however had the implications of reducing labour supplies after the resumption of normal 
conditions. A serious warning on the looming labour crisis confronting the country was made 
by the CNC in his 1920 Annual report.673 Reference was made to the transforming economic 
environment in the sub-region, characterised by growing economic activities in the northern 
territories which resulted in the creation of new labour markets. The development of Northern 
Rhodesia’s copper works can be sighted in this regard. The CNC further noted that “The native 
is being educated to a realisation of the demand for his labour and its economic importance; 
consequently, he will only offer it in that market which Promises the best return.’674 Such a 
development called for the improvement of conditions of service by all employers, farmers and 
miners as well as other sectors. It was only this improvement which could guarantee the 
country’s industries a continuous adequate labour supply in the wake of the latest threat as well 
as the ever existing attraction from the Rand Mines. Such warning however was ignored by 
many as subsequent events in the country, as demonstrated in the next sections will show. 
                                                            
672 Van Onselen, Chibaro, 116. 
673 Annual Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1920. 
674 Annual Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1920. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 181 
 
 
The significance of Bureau labour to farmers 
The significance of Bureau labour to the farms was clarified and elaborated upon by various 
witnesses who gave evidence to the 1921 Committee of Inquiry on the supply of African labour 
in Southern Rhodesia. A crucial fact emerging from the evidence provided was on the rising 
importance of Bureau labour for the farming community in the period from 1913 when 
circumstances in the recruitment and distribution of Bureau labour had been altered. As noted 
earlier, settler farmers became the major beneficiaries of bureau labour. It was also during this 
particular time that settler capitalist agriculture was undergoing significant expansion. Mining 
companies were no longer relying on African peasant producers for their grain and meat 
requirements, but turned more to European farmers. Bureau labour therefore kept operations 
on most farms in the country going. It should however be noted that indigenous African 
remained a key proportion of the labour force for both farmers and miners. They however 
remained temporary as they returned to work on their land in the rainy season, leaving the 
farmer to rely on the migrant labour more. E. G. Howman, the Native Commissioner for 
Lomagundi noted that in his district, “A large number of farmers do employ Bureau labour and 
cannot do without it.”675 For the promotion of settler agriculture it seemed imperative to 
maintain Bureau labour. 
 
It did not serve the farmer best to recruit more local labourers and rely on a small number of 
immigrant workers. Some settler farmers even went to the extent of turning away local 
labourers who searched for work independently without the Bureau’s assistance. The main 
reason for this action, as elaborated by M. Smith, a tobacco farmer, was that: 
You see that the indigenous native is a farmer and I am a farmer. The native must return 
to his land at the time when the crops require cultivating. His interests to him are as 
important as mine are to me, and he goes at the time that I must have labour. If I cannot 
get bureau labour for twelve months then I cannot recommend my company to go in 
for a large expenditure on tobacco, because at the time I want labour the indigenous 
labourers will go back and become a farmer instead of a labourer.676 
 
Smith was described as one of the best employers of labour in the district by the NC, the main 
reason why local labourers flocked to his farm almost on a daily basis. In this regard, farmers 
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really depended on immigrant workers and Howman described then as a great stand-by to the 
country. The absence of Bureau labour could have spelled disaster for the whole country’s 
agricultural production. 
 
In as much as this labour was so paramount to the farmers’ operations countrywide, there were 
farmers who took advantage of the absence of a supervisory mechanism to abuse Bureau labour 
for their own advantage. The situation on farms was different from what prevailed on the farms 
where compound inspectors provided some form of inspection, which to a limited extent forced 
the mining companies to adhere to some of the prescribed requirements regarding the working 
environment, rations as well as living conditions in the mine compounds.677 It should, however, 
be noted that the Compound inspectors were not introduced by the Bureau and therefore, cannot 
be said to have provided adequate capacity to inspect. On the farms, no form of monitoring or 
inspection of Bureau labour existed, the Bureau did not follow up on its labourers once they 
were signed up. Howman opined that the Bureau was not a known personality to the workers 
where they could go and make reports concerning abuse and ill-treatment by the employer.678 
This left Bureau labourers on farms susceptible to various abuses by farmers, who took 
advantage and capitalised on this loophole. It was also for this particular reason why many 
farmers came to like this kind of labour more. 
 
Most of the labourers supplied by the Bureau were immigrants who signed up longer contracts 
of employment. This was unlike the local labourers who only worked for about a month or two 
before going back to farm on their own land. Farmers thus took advantage of this and allocated 
most of the unpopular jobs to the Bureau labour.679 For example, such work of being herd boys 
was highly detested by locals mainly because of its oppressive work schedule, this task was 
therefore, given, in most cases to Barotses. Howman described the work regime of these 
labourers as follows: 
They have to milk the cows in the morning and again in the evening and on Sundays. 
Sunday is a stock day for natives to go visiting or for a beer drink but it is not so for the 
boy looking after the cattle. He must stay there on the Sunday morning and afternoon. 
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He cannot have a free day, go out and return on the following morning, and many have 
not a complete day’s holiday.680 
 
If this kind of work was given to indigenous labourers who usually worked on a monthly basis, 
they simply left and moved to the next farm to look for another job. In this way, Bureau labour 
succeeded immensely in stabilising the work force on the farms. They became a crucial 
component of the labour system in the country’s farming sector. 
 
Some farmers were very unpopular and could not attract local labourers who knew about their 
behaviour. Such men did not stand a chance on the open market since they lacked the incentives 
with which to attract labour. Most of these farmers earned a bad reputation for many reasons, 
chief amongst which were poor and insufficient food given to the labourers, low wages as well 
as outright brutality towards the workers. If there was no Bureau to provide labourers for such 
men, they could have ceased operations for a lack of labourers. However, the Bureau just 
supplied labourers to whoever made a request, regardless of his background or bad reputation. 
This was one of the major reasons why the Bureau was very unpopular with employees. 
Howman recommended to the Committee that:   
A man with a bad character, with a police record should never be given labour in any 
circumstances whatever. If a man is unpopular with his servants through his 
temperament, well the natives should not be bound to him for 12 months.681 
 
There was therefore the need (raised by Native Commissioners) to conduct thorough inspection 
and background check before labour could be sent out to the farms. The Bureau’s habit of 
sending out labourers willy-nilly, although benefiting unpopular employers, was damaging the 
Bureau’s reputation. Good treatment was a factor that labourers considered when choosing the 
next employer and in some instances it took precedence over a higher wage. Information about 
unpopular employers was spread amongst the workers by those who had worked for such 
employers before. The treatment of the Bureau labourer ultimately had a bearing on the 
country’s future labour supplies. If a Bureau labourer had a lot of grievances when he returned 
to his country, he could simply influence his friends and relatives back home not to seek work 
in Southern Rhodesia, either through the Bureau or independently. In this regard, although ill-
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treatment meted on the Bureau labourers might have had immediate short term benefits, it had 
the potential to ruin the country’s future labour supplies, especially after the era of the Bureau. 
 
Miner-farmer conflict over universal labour tax: The 1925 Native Labour Conference 
The introduction of a labour tax payable by all employers of labour in the country in 1909 
resulted in furore as farmers staged a revolt in 1911-12 declining to pay the tax which was 
expected to assist in financing the Bureau’s operations. The main reason cited, then, by the 
farmers was that it was mining capital which derived more benefits from the Bureau’s 
operations. Under such circumstances farmers were not willing to subsidise an institution 
which was not making any significant contribution to their own labour needs. They were 
successful, as highlighted in the previous section, for they were ultimately exempted from 
paying this tax in 1912. But however, as highlighted in the previous section, from 1913 
onwards the tables had turned. Use of Bureau labourers by mining companies was dwindling 
significantly, whereas, agriculture, which was at that particular time expanding, made use of 
more Bureau labourers than before. This was despite the fact that farmers had denied to 
contribute towards financing the RNLB and the situation prevailing was one whereby miners 
were subsidising the farming sector significantly. 
 
A RAU and Chamber of Mines meeting held in April 1925 pointed to the fact that farmers had 
benefited more from Bureau labour in the past decade and that this benefit had been heavily 
subsidised by mining capital. It was noted that “in the past ten years the mining industry had 
paid a total of £150 000 in excess of the amount paid by farmers and had taken 14 600 boys 
less.”682 It was further noted that in the year 1924 the cost of recruiting and delivering a Bureau 
labourer was £6.17.6, but the farming community was getting such labour at a capitation fee 
of £3 per head, resulting in a loss of about £4 made up at the expense of the mining industry.683 
The mining sector was no longer comfortable with this state of affairs and made representations 
to the government in this regard. Such protests were done mainly by the Mineworkers 
Association of Gwelo which represented a considerable proportion of smallworkers and the 
Salisbury Chamber of Mines. They only salvaged an exemption of miners that employed less 
than 200 labourers (mostly smallworkers). This exemption, described by the Premier as a 
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temporary measure was effected by a Bill passed in April 1925, which amended the Labour 
Tax Ordinance. 
 
It was mainly because of such differences existing between the country’s major employers of 
labour, mining and farming, that an all employers’ conference was convened in August 1925 
with the sole objective of mapping the future of the RNLB and the country’s labour policy at 
large. The Premier had already set the parameters for any kind of discussion and conclusion to 
be reached at the conference by ruling out any possibility of a government take-over of the 
Bureau’s financial burden. He had noted thus: 
It is equally impossible for the government to be responsible for the financing of the 
bureau and at the same time leave it in the hands of people who are not responsible to 
the government. It would be wrong in principle to have the responsibility of providing 
the needed revenue and at the same time not to have the responsibility of control and 
of accounting to the country for the expenditure of funds devoted on behalf of the 
taxpayer.684 
 
So any resolution to be reached at the conference was not expected to include government as 
the major stakeholder in financing the Bureau. This conclusion by the Premier was also 
influenced by earlier pronouncements by the colonial office against attempts by the 
government to be directly involved in the recruitment of labour. On this subject he noted that: 
To make the bureau a government concern would be to discredit ourselves in the eyes 
of the Imperial Government, and lay ourselves open to a charge of forcing labour. A 
government institution would be equally unpopular with the natives as the present 
Bureau. For the same reason nowhere in the Empire is anything of the sort done.685 
 
This was, however, more rhetorical because the government, mainly through the Native 
Department had, in many instances, been involved in the recruitment of labour. The 
government had played a crucial role in facilitating availability of labour in some cases through 
coercive means. Although the Chairman of the August conference tried to clarify the Premier’s 
position and steer the course of discussions in that direction, he did not succeed. The Premier’s 
position was vigorously challenged by delegates, mainly those who represented farming 
interests and hoped to see the government taking over financing for the Bureau. McChlery, a 
business man and member of the executive of the RAU was a vehement critic of the position 
presented by government. He had risen to prominence by defying the imposition of the labour 
                                                            
684 NAZ S253/ 409 Memorandum from the Premier to H. U. Moffat (Minister of Mines and public Works) on the 
meeting of various interests to consider the future of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau. 
685 Memorandum from the Premier to H. U. Moffat (Minister of Mines and public Works) on the meeting of 
various interests to consider the future of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau. 
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tax on farmers in 1910. McChlery’s opposition to the tax had not faded in 1925. His major 
argument hinged on the fact that the Bureau was a national institution, undertaking a national 
duty and was therefore supposed to be assisted financially by the government.686 McChlery 
reminded the conference that he had proposed in 1910 for the dissolution of the Bureau, and 
this was ignored and criticised by those in support of its continuance who argued that it had 
brought in more labourers and thus cannot be done away with. He elaborated his argument by 
stating that “I am inclined to believe the Bureau has kept out as many boys as it has ever brought 
in.”687 It was only a matter of time before the Bureau ran its course and efforts were, according 
to McChlery supposed to be focused  more on how to improve efficiency of local labourers, 
rather than looking up to immigrant workers. 
 
In refuting the stated government position as outlined in the Premier’s memorandum, Noaks 
of the RAU argued that the Bureau should actually be sustained by a government subsidy in 
the same way as other departments were benefiting from the benevolence of treasury. Noaks 
argued that: 
I think it is in the Premier’s statement that he points out that this is impossible, but 
surely there is a precedent which has only recently been introduced here which would 
cover that, that is, in the export of meat £15 000 a year was first put forward as a bonus 
on export, and now, I understand, a guarantee has been given to the Imperial Cold 
Storage Company in the event of their not obtaining a reasonable return on their capital, 
so that in neither of these cases did the government ask for complete control of the 
companies they were assisting and we feel there was no reason why they should ask for 
any more control than they have asked in these cases with regard to the bureau.688  
 
Government was thus asked to exercise equality in the extension of financial resources for 
departments considered to be crucial for the development of the country’s economy. Although 
acknowledging the miners’ role in subsidising labour provision by the Bureau for the farming 
sector, Noaks was totally against the introduction of an equal universal labour tax to be paid 
by all employers of labour in the country and help finance the Bureau. A survey was conducted 
around the Mazoe, Lomagundi and Umvukwes districts, areas which employed a high number 
of Bureau labourers, to find out their views regarding the proposed labour tax. All farmers 
interviewed, except those in the Umvukwesi district, were against the extension of the labour 
                                                            
686 NAZ S1561/23 McChlery speaking at the Native Labour Conference held in Salisbury on the 31st of July 1925. 
687 NAZ S1561/23 McChlery speaking at the Native Labour Conference held in Salisbury on the 31st of July 1925. 
688 Noaks speaking at the Native Labour Conference held in Salisbury on the 31st of July 1925. 
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tax to farmers. As argued by Noaks, the RAU felt that government should use part of the money 
they collected as alien tax to finance the Bureau’s operations.689 
 
Various representatives of employers of labour in the country present at the conference wanted 
the Bureau to continue, but differences emerged on how best to provide its finance if it was to 
be continued. Miners’ representatives on the other hand registered their displeasure with the 
prevailing set up where they were being forced to subsidise the farmers’ labour needs. Watson 
of the Mining Association of Southern Rhodesia stated that there was a genuine need to 
“continue with the Bureau as a national insurance for districts where labour supplies are 
difficult to obtain.”690 He however stated the position of his association that miners were not 
going to pay the tax anymore. Instead he proposed that the Bureau should be revamped and its 
operations run on commercial lines, with all employers of labour paying a similar amount and 
any shortfall was supposed to be covered by the government. Similar sentiments were echoed 
by Burnett and Hynde who also suggested that the tax burden needed to be taken off the 
shoulders of the mining sector and distributed equally amongst all employers of labour.691 This 
proposal was made on behalf of the Salisbury Chamber of Mines and the Gatooma 
Smallworkers Association. 
 
The Bureau’s representative present at the conference attempted to defend the Bureau’s 
position under the barrage of criticism from all angles. Hawkesley admitted that the Bureau’s 
capacity to secure adequate labour for the country’s industries was deteriorating and as time 
progressed the Bureau kept recording fewer labour recruits. Labour reserves in the north were 
also being tapped by the developing copper works in Northern Rhodesia which, at that 
particular time, employed 8 000 labourers.692 In view of the looming position whereby the 
Bureau was being called upon to make do only with capitation fees paid by those who used 
Bureau labour, the institution was facing imminent collapse. This was because the RNLB 
would, in such circumstances be forced to charge a capitation fee of £5/10, which was beyond 
the rich of many farmers.693 If that happened, then very few or no farmers at all were going to 
apply for Bureau labour, thus spelling doom for the RNLB. At that particular time the Bureau’s 
                                                            
689 Native Labour Conference held in Salisbury on the 31st of July 1925. 
690 Watson speaking at the Native Labour Conference held in Salisbury on the 31st of July 1925. 
691 Native Labour Conference held in Salisbury on the 31st of July 1925. 
692 Hawkesley speaking at the Native Labour Conference held in Salisbury on the 31st of July 1925. 
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role in bringing in extra labourers was considered crucial because such labourers filled 
significant gaps in the local labour market. 
 
A representative of the railways, another employer of labour in the country also voiced his 
institution’s desire for the continuation of the Bureau as a form of safeguard against labour 
shortages in the country. Chapman highlighted that the railways employed between 12 000 and 
14 000 labourers and that they rarely face labour shortages similar to those confronting the 
country’s primary industries.694 This position was made possible by the fact that the railways 
took good care of their labourers. Chapman added that the railways fed their employees well 
and made adequate provisions for medical supplies. As a result, labourers kept returning to 
seek employment with the railways. The railways company was implementing 
recommendations forwarded by Hawleskey that the only way of retaining labour and avoid 
labour shortages was through the extension of good working conditions to the labourers. 
 
The 1925 meeting exhibited the raging conflict between the major employers of labour in the 
country, agriculture and mining. Just like conferences convened for the settlement of the miner-
farmer conflict on the Gold Belt Title, it was characterised by disagreement and the government 
did not take a firm stance on the subject under discussion besides registering its position, a 
curtailment of continued government funding of the Bureau’s operations. Employers 
representatives present at the conference finally resolved to retain the Bureau, scrapping of the 
labour tax that was being paid by mining companies, that the Bureau was supposed to charge 
a uniform capitation fee and that the RAU representatives at the conference were supposed to 
take the question on the levying of a universal labour tax for consideration to their organisation 
for deliberation. 
 
Distribution and direction of labour 
Recruitment of labour for Southern Rhodesia’s industries had failed to provide adequate 
numbers to meet the ever increasing country’s labour demand instanced by the growing 
economy. It became increasingly difficult to recruit adequate labour from the northern 
territories because of the expansion of economic activities in the northern countries, which also 
required more labour. Copper mining in Northern Rhodesia and tobacco production in 
Nyasaland in the 1930s resulted in many labourers who could have migrated southwards to 
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take up jobs in their own countries. The situation was even worse after the outbreak of World 
War II. Each country was expected to contribute towards the war effort, thus making labour 
export from the northern territories extremely difficult. Southern Rhodesia passed the Native 
Compulsory Labour Act in 1943 which allowed the use of coerced labour mainly for food 
production. 695 It however appeared as if much of the labour shortages in Southern Rhodesia 
were a direct result of a perceived imbalanced distribution of labour in the country. Some 
districts experienced extreme labour shortages whilst in some districts there was actually 
wastage of surplus labour going on. The Acting Commissioner for native labour elaborated the 
concept of “maldistribution of labour”, providing a useful summary of what was prevailing in 
the country. He observed that: 
Maldistribution is always from the point of view of the employer or the industry which 
is shorter than another but does not take into account the views of the worker who 
prefers one industry or one employer over another because of conditions of service are 
better or that his father and friends have worked there, or the views of the employer or 
industry which provides better conditions of service and went out of its way to attract 
labour.696  
 
Labourers who came independently had the freedom to choose where they intended to work 
and the only way any employer could influence this kind of decision was through the provision 
of better conditions of service as well as a better wage. When farmers and miners failed to 
attract labour they appealed for state aid in acquiring labour to make up for the short fall. The 
state’s response to such calls was usually dictated by the prevailing conditions at a given time.  
 
Considering that Southern Rhodesia was competing for northern labour with the well-
established Witwatersrand Native Labour Bureau (WNLA), it was imperative for employers in 
the country to improve conditions of employment so as to lure more labourers who otherwise 
would have been taken by WNLA. This was emphasised by the President of the Chamber of 
Mines in 1936: 
If we are to retain the smooth inflow of Nyasaland natives and increase the numbers, 
then undoubtedly the government and other employers of labour will have to see that 
conditions are improved. In the light of the Nyasaland committee’s report, I think it can 
safely be said that the Nyasaland government would prefer their natives to be employed 
                                                            
695 See K. P. Vickery, ‘The Second World War revival of forced labour in the Rhodesias’, The International 
Journal for African Historical Studies, 22, 3 (1989), 423-437. 
696 NAZ S3304/17 The Native Labour Advisory Board, 1949 minutes. Memorandum by the Acting Commissioner 
for Native labour for the select committee of native labour, 13 January 1948. 
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in Southern Rhodesia than further south. But unless, we in Rhodesia, do our part, we 
cannot hope to be favoured.697 
 
Good treatment of labourers was the only way that labour could be retained and avoid major 
shortfalls by holding on to the labour that was already available. Explaining labour shortages 
in relation to figures alone also proved problematic, Kenworthy argued that: 
One employer when asked what his shortage is, gives as the figure his existing labour 
force, meaning that if he had twice as much he could double his income (This applies 
especially to tobacco). Another employer when he states that he is short of so many, 
means that unless he can procure that number he is unable to make a living. Any return, 
therefore, which calls upon employers to state how many more natives they would like 
to employ at current wages, if such workers were available, does not help us to arrive 
at the true shortage.698 
 
By holding on to a few labourers over a lengthy period of time an employer stood to benefit 
more from the development of an efficient labour force. In this way numerical shortages could 
have been averted by improved efficiency of the farm or mine labourers. 
 
Some employers of labour in Southern Rhodesia failed to take heed of warnings to stop abusing 
and ill-treating labour each time there was a surplus of labour. This happened in 1914 and again 
during the depression period. Addressing a conference on native labour in 1938, the Governor 
noted that: 
It was a truism to say that if they wished to attract labour and keep it, they must make 
labour conditions attractive. During the recent depression when most employers were 
hard pressed, and when many natives were seeking employment, some unscrupulous 
people had taken advantage of the situation and underpaid and underfed their natives, 
giving an unfortunate name to the employer.699 
 
What happened when the labour shortages resumed was simple: labourers shunned such 
employers and created shortages in the process. To try and remedy the situation, attempts were 
made to obtain an even distribution of labour and ensure availability of adequate labour in all 
districts. The Supervisor of facilities for the passage of northern natives asked the Colonial 
Secretary for permission to make use of the police in getting information on the labour supply 
situation of the colony, he stated that: 
                                                            
697 NAZ S482/349/39/1. Extract from the President’s speech at the Annual Meeting of the Chamber of Mines, 
Salisbury (Incorporated) held on the 26th of June 1936. 
698 Memorandum by P. J. Kenworthy, the Acting Commissioner of Native Labour for the Select Committee on 
Native Labour, 31 December 1948. 
699 NAZ S482/20/1939 Rhodesia Agricultural Union. Rhodesia Agricultural Union. Report of the proceedings of 
the Conference on Native labour held at Meikle’s Hotel, Salisbury, on 7 June 1938. 
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If regular monthly reports of the labour position were received by us from police it 
would be possible at that port of entry to direct labour to where it is required, may also 
indicate a coming shortage. I would request that arrangements may be made where by 
every police camp in the colony, should, on the first day of each month, without fail, 
dispatch by post a report on the labour situation in their respective districts.700 
 
The police made it clear that it would be very difficult for them to re-direct labour, but 
committed to furnishing the Supervisor with information related to the general labour position 
in all districts regarding shortage, surplus or adequate labour supply for miners and farmers 
alike.701 The Native Department had failed to perform this task adequately and hence the 
assistance of the police was sought after. This information was sent to ports of entry and was 
intended to assist officials receiving labourers in distributing and redirecting labour to areas 
where it was needed most. 
 
All these efforts did not yield the intended results because Southern Rhodesia’s primary 
industries continued to experience labour shortages. More labourers who came to Southern 
Rhodesia were usually in transit going southward to South Africa. The situation improved after 
Southern Rhodesia signed a Tripartite Labour Agreement with Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia in 1937 “which guaranteed Southern Rhodesia first call on all surplus labourers for 
hire in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.”702 This was followed by the 1948 Workers Migrant 
Act which provided a guaranteed supply of a stabilised labour force for Southern Rhodesia 
while Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia’s labourers would in turn benefit from family 
remittances as well as a deferred pay system.703 These inter-territorial labour agreements 
succeeded to some extent in warding off WNLA’s access to labour from Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland. It must however be noted that even with such legal frameworks in place, 
clandestine migration to the Union of South Africa continued. Negotiations and amendments 
continued as attempts were made to make the operations of these agreements water tight. 
 
The Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission  
                                                            
700 NAZ S246/696 Rhodesia Tobacco Association: Re: Facilities for Northern Natives. Letter from the Supervisor 
of facilities for the passage of Northern natives (Mt Darwin) to the Secretary, the Department of Colonial Secretary 
22 January 1932. 
701 Letter from the Commissioner of Police to the Supervisor of Facilities for the Passage of northern neighbours 
17 February 1932. 
702 Paton, Labour export policy, 117. 
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The Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission (RNLSC) succeeded the RNLB which had 
been dissolved in 1933. It was formed in 1946 under an Act of parliament and had a similar 
mandate to its predecessor. L. Malaba notes that its duties included, “recruitment of foreign 
contract labour from bordering countries and its transportation through recognised routes, 
distribution of the contractees to members of the organisation according to the demand.”704 
Although the RNLSC was supposed to recruit labour for both farmers and miners, the Minister 
of Mines stated in 1948 that, since its inception, it had been recruiting for the food production 
industry only.705 As a result of this bias, the number of labourers employed in the mining 
industry fell by 10 000 in less than one year.706 This was not a healthy state of affairs especially 
considering the dollar earning capacity of gold in the post war period. The Minister stated that 
the RNLSC was supposed to act fast to avoid disaster, he noted, “This may have the effect of 
closing down may mines, which with a sufficient number of natives would remain in 
production for many years to come.”707 Arrangements were made for the stationing of a 
recruiting agent for the mining industry in Nyasaland so as to improve the labour supply 
situation on the mines. 
 
The RNLSC was accused by mining concerns of either failure in its mandate or overtly 
favouring recruiting labour for farmers and neglecting miners in the process. In a letter to 
Huggins, Burnett noted that:  
During the past ten years the mining industry has consistently employed less labour. 
During this period the decrease has been 20 000. During the same period the 
agricultural industry has gained 60 000.” In view of these figures it is doubtful whether 
The RNLSC has justified its existence.708 
 
LOHNRO limited also complained over the progressive decline in the number of Africans 
employed in the mining sector. The company’s general manager complained to Huggins that 
“The labour position on six of our mines is such that we have lost some 1350 natives out of a 
total of 5000.”709 The loss of labour was having a negative impact on the company’s operation 
and required urgent attention. It seemed as though most labour was being snatched away by 
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tobacco farmers who offered higher wages than gold miners and maize producers. All this was 
happening in full view of the RNLSC. It was somehow failing to effect an even distribution of 
African labourers to all sectors, one objective that it had been formed to achieve. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how African labour, just like land and timber resources, became a 
subject of contestation between settler farmers and miners in Southern Rhodesia. The chapter 
gave an overview of the African labour situation for the two significant industries of the 
colonial economy and proceeded to demonstrate how funding for the RNLB sparked conflict 
between farmers and miners in the period under review. The chapter has elaborated on the 
significance of taxation in influencing state-society relations in Southern Rhodesia. By 
delineating government’s desire to tax farmers and miners to provide funding for the RNLB, 
the chapter has demonstrated the centrality of taxation issues (with regards to labour) in shaping 
state-miner-farmer relations in Southern Rhodesia. This chapter has elaborated on the study of 
sectorial interests evolving in the thesis by introducing Africans who do not feature in most 
studies of this nature. The chapter has shifted the focus (on taxation) matters from Africans to 
settlers and highlighted that Europeans were also subjected to taxation which they detested and 
and constantly challenged. The RNLB recruited labour for the country’s primary industries 
mainly from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and preference for the sector that received more 
labour always shifted as demonstrated by the chapter, in response to economic circumstances 
prevailing at a particular time. The chapter also explored the distribution of recruited labour 
across the country and how an uneven distribution of labourers resulted in shortages in some 
districts while others were in surplus. The chapter has thus demonstrated that labour shortages 
in Southern Rhodesia could not be limited to merely numerical terms only, but that several 
factors colluded in creating labour shortages. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined state-miner-farmer relations in Southern Rhodesia from 1895 to 1961. 
It has demonstrated how the different policies adopted by succeeding settler governments 
during the period 1895-1961, both responded to and shaped the sectorial interests of farmers 
and miners. This protean nature of state policies towards the country’s foremost primary 
industries was informed by different circumstances that prevailed at different junctures of the 
country’s history. The desire by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) administration to 
promote its commercial interests through the promotion of a mining-led economy in the early 
colonial period laid the foundation of miner-farmer interaction characterised by numerous 
contestations. The study has delineated the role of labour, political, economic and 
environmental policies as well as the significance of taxation in shaping the constantly shifting 
state-miner-farmer interaction. 
 
The study joins a long historiographic exchange on Southern Rhodesia’s political economy. It 
offers a fresh contribution to the more recently emergent historiographical conversation on 
intra-racial relations of Southern Rhodesia’s settlers. It significantly contributes to the 
understanding of state-miner-farmer interaction and provides, for the first time, a broader 
analysis which takes on board economic, political as well as environmental considerations and 
how these impacted on the interactions of the triad. Existing literature on farmer-miner 
relations has been previously confined to farmer-miner contestations over the utilisation of 
resources such as water and timber on Gold Belt farms and how this resulted in the development 
of environmentalism in the colonial period. This farmer-miner tussle over resources resulted in 
the excessive cutting of timber and land degradation, which has been attributed largely to the 
farmers and miners’ cupidity by such literature.710 This thesis challenges this argument by 
arguing that the root cause of miner-farmer contestations over the utilisation of natural 
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resources stemmed from the nature of the economic policy that was crafted by the BSAC 
administration. Subsequent government policies, dictated by prevailing economic 
circumstances at a given time, continued to shape farmer-miner interactions. The government’s 
mediating role constantly shifted and significantly influenced the nature of policies which 
regulated farmer-miner relations up to 1961. 
 
The study has sought to contribute to a deeper understanding of governmental systems and 
white settlers in Southern Rhodesia. Recent literature by R. Pilossof711, A. Selby712 and J. A. 
McKenzie713 on this subject has concentrated on whites and their relationship with the 
government (both colonial and post-colonial). Such literature has laid the groundwork in 
understanding the interaction of white farmers and the state and its implications for the 
country’s politics. An earlier study by M. E. Lee714 disaggregated the settler community into 
various interest groups during the period of Company administration and how these groups 
contributed to a growing voice demanding Responsible Government. This thesis has, in this 
vein, challenged conventional wisdom on the settler debates during Company administration, 
as espoused by Lee, by highlighting that settler representatives actually wanted more 
administrative authority rather than mere representation – as presented in existing literature. A 
close analysis of debates in the Legislative Council during the period of Company 
administration reveal that settlers requested more administrative power. The thesis has also 
demonstrated the significance of revenue and taxation issues in the country’s political agenda. 
The desire by the country’s tax paying settlers to be granted effective control of the country’s 
administrative affairs has challenged M. Moore’s contention that taxation issues feature 
prominently on the political agendas of Organisation of Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD) countries than they do in the south. 
 
After the country was granted self-rule in 1923, farmers enjoyed more state support. This thesis 
thus makes a new historiographical contribution by discussing farmer-miner interaction and 
how the allegiance of the colonial state constantly shifted between the two sectors as dictated 
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by the prevailing circumstances at a given time. Using S. S. Eriksen’s analyasis of state 
formation in Southern Rhodesia, the thesis has elaborated on the nation state which emerged 
after 1923 and how it instituted various policies meant to enhance the country’s revenue 
generation capacity to improve its administrative capacity. Using miner-farmer relations as a 
lens, the thesis has therefore presented a nation state in Southern Rhodesia which evolved over 
time, beginning with a Company administration which promoted selfish commercial interests. 
This was revealed by the promotion of pro-mining legislation which triggered farmer-miner 
contestations as demonstrated in Chapter Two. The emerging settler government after 1923 
was preoccupied with ways of increasing the country’s revenue base, a move which resulted in 
its clashing with miners when it levied a Gold Premium Tax (GPT) on gold producers in 1931 
and again in 1939. This revenue was used to offset deficits in the agricultural sector instanced 
by the international economic recession that followed the Wall Street crash in 1929. The settler 
state also implemented a formal conservation policy by enacting the 1941 Natural Resources 
Act. This resulted in the promulgation of a Forest Act in 1949, which effectively incorporated 
miners within the reach of the conservation efforts. The thesis has shown that this was a move 
by the state to act as a neutral arbiter in the enduring miner-farmer dispute. The government 
made subsequent attempts to regulate property rights and succeeded in mediating successfully 
between the two sectors. The overall result of the government’s adoption of a formal 
conservation policy was a 1961 amendment of the Mines and minerals Act which significantly 
lessened miner-farmer tension. 
 
In discussing the state-farmer-miner relations the thesis began by delineating the development 
of Gold Belt reservations by the BSAC in the first decade of colonialism. This, together with 
the Company’s land policies became the basis upon which the farmer-miner contestations 
evolved as discussed in Chapter Two. The conflict between farmers and miners, which 
manifested in struggles to control land, water, grazing and timber resources, was not influenced 
by farmers or miners greed. Rather, it was a direct result of the Company administration’s 
policies which favoured the mining sector. Repeated calls from farmers, for a revision of the 
mining law, even after the adoption of a formal White Agricultural Policy in 1908, failed to 
yield the expected results. The position of the Company administration, as mirrored by the pro-
mining legislation (as well as the idiosyncrasies of key administrative and Company officials) 
culminated in the maintenance of the BSAC’s commercial interests. This sparked settler 
discontent and resulted in repeated demands for the termination of chartered rule being made 
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by the settlers themselves and their representatives in the Legislative Council as demonstrated 
in Chapter Three. 
 
Chapter Three argued that the granting of representation to the country’s settlers in the 
Legislative Council failed to provide a necessary check on the Company administrative system. 
Settlers had petitioned Rhodes to be granted political representation in the country’s legislature. 
Although this was granted, the Company Board in London still retained authority since it had 
the power to ratify all political decisions made by the administration. An analysis of Legislative 
Council debates has shown that as early as 1900 settler representatives in the Council began 
calling upon the BSAC to cede more administrative power to the elected representatives. A 
1903 Order in Council brought settler representation to seven elected and seven nominated 
members. The Administrator retained his casting vote as well as his veto power, thereby 
rendering the parity useless. The situation remained the same when settlers were granted 
majority representation in 1908 and 1914. They could not push through an amendment 
successfully and could not make any proposals related to financial matters. Legislative Council 
debates on such crucial matters as the Company’s claim to land ownership and the debate on 
the dispute over the appropriation of revenue either to the commercial or administrative 
accounts all pointed to the BSAC’s firm grip on the country’s legislature. Elected members 
were mere figureheads with no power. The chapter thus examined a growing desire by the tax 
paying settlers to be involved in decision making. The nexus of representation, administration 
and taxation was examined and the chapter argued that since the settlers were contributing 
towards the country’s revenue, they demanded real administrative authority. This desire was 
elaborated and sustained by such individuals as Charles Coghlan and his Responsible 
Government Association (RGA). This ultimately led to the granting of Responsible 
Government by the Imperial government as opposed to incorporation to the Union of South 
Africa.       
 
The advent of settler rule in 1923 was received with mixed feelings by Southern Rhodesia’s 
settlers. Farmers were optimistic that Coghlan’s government was going to improve their 
condition. Mining on the other hand feared that the new settler government was going to erase 
all benefits accumulated by the sector during the era of Company rule. Chapter Four explored 
a shifting government attitude, particularly through the lens of the criticism of the Gold Belt 
Title clause in the country’s mining law by government officials. It was also during this period 
that a law governing cutting of timber by mining companies in the reserves was promulgated 
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in 1929. A Land Apportionment Act was also enacted in 1930 and further entrenched the 
significance of settler farming interests in Southern Rhodesia. Coghlan’s Rhodesian Party had 
a majority in the Council and this worked to the advantage of settler farmers. It is not surprising 
therefore that when the farmers were affected by the economic recession in the 1930s they 
received unprecedented state support through various lending schemes. Ironically, the state 
failed to extend such aid and support to gold miners in the period 1939 to 1945 when the sector 
reeled under the effect of the Gold Premium Tax (GPT). The Minister of Mines and the Prime 
Minister stated at one point in 1941 that it was not the intention of the state to use revenue 
generated by agriculture to finance mining companies that were under strain. As demonstrated 
in Chapter Four, it was the gold mining sector which had provided fiscal stability when 
agricultural products were being sold at a loss in the 1930s. In this regard, the state’s policies 
almost “killed the goose” which had, all along “laid golden eggs.” The chapter argued that the 
fiscal policies pursued by government obstructed and ultimately halted development work at 
mining companies. Most of these ceased operations during the World War II period leading to 
a massive decline in gold production by 1945. Towards the end of the war, the Minister of 
Mines acknowledged that the country’s policies had contributed immensely towards the 
deteriorating state of gold mining. He advocated for policy changes such as the scraping of the 
GPT as an attempt to restore gold mining to its former glory. 
 
The GPT had been introduced first in 1931 following a rise in the international price of gold. 
Gold mining companies were making enormous profits and the state turned towards the sector 
as it sought ways of restoring fiscal stability in the wake of the economic recession. The price 
of gold continued to rise while agriculture, which had had a fitful experience from the early 
1920s, suffered a blow when commodity prices soured to unprecedented levels in 1929. Maize, 
tobacco and cattle farmers were operating at a loss. As illustrated in Chapter Four, losses made 
in the agriculture sector were offset by revenue from other sectors particularly gold mining 
which was still generating most of the country’s revenue. This tax reduced gold mining profits 
considerably. Mining companies contested this unfair fiscal practice. They were against the 
idea of the tax being charged on the mining sector alone while farmers, who were not being 
taxed, actually received state subsidies after promulgation of such legislation as the Maize 
Control Act (1931) and its amendment (1934). Evidence collected by Commissions of Inquiry 
(1936 and 1945) on the impact of the GPT on gold mining singled out the tax as the chief 
culprit which caused the decline in gold production, especially for companies working low 
grade ore deposits.  
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Mining companies campaigned vigorously against the GPT but they failed to convince the 
government to make a policy shift. The tax was only withdrawn in 1937 when prices for 
agricultural commodities had slightly improved. Miners got a two-year reprieve before the tax 
was reintroduced on the outbreak of World War II in 1939. Gold prices on the international 
market increased and gold was more profitable. Government responded by reintroducing the 
tax on gold produced, leaving a very small profit for the miners. Both small miners and big 
mining companies resisted and petitioned the government to lower the tax since it was 
destroying gold production. Such calls did not yield a positive result as the government was 
bent on getting money to finance the war effort. A Royalty Review Committee which had been 
formed to assess mining companies that applied to be exempted from paying the GPT failed to 
assist miners that were in real need of this exemption. It was criticised by mining companies 
and labelled as a government’s ploy to create jobs for its faithful allies. One example of an 
organisation formed to resist what it termed “gold theft” was the Freedom Press. It was vocal 
and criticised the government’s move of taxing the mining industry and failing to extend relief 
schemes as was done for the burgeoning commercial agricultural sector when it was under 
strain during the Great Depression. 
 
Using the example of the Maize Control Act, Chapter Four has thus demonstrated that miners 
were against the relief measures and subsidies extended to farmers who were under strain from 
the economic recession in the 1930s. The mining sector was a major consumer of maize and 
most big mining companies had all along produced their own maize to feed mine labourers. 
This privilege was reversed by the Maize Control Act which forced miners to buy their maize 
requirements through the newly created Maize Control Board at higher prices. This move was 
challenged by miners and they considered it as an indirect form of taxation on the mining sector 
that was intended to help farmers. Miners, especially small workers, protested against a fee that 
was levied for cattle slaughtered in the country. This was meant to keep the country’s stock 
raisers in business during the depression. 
 
The chapter has thus examined the how state policy towards the two sectors changed reactively 
(rather than proactively) as a response to prevailing circumstances. Meanwhile, the farmer-
miner dispute over timber resources raged on. Continued farmer agitation had resulted in the 
government amending the Mines and Minerals Act in 1935 awarding farmers on the Gold Belt 
50 per cent wood reservation for agricultural use. Miners and farmers’ conferences held in 
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1933, 1935 and in 1937 were characterised by heated arguments as farmers, miners and the 
state quarrelled over the manner in which the state was dealing with all the highlighted issues. 
Overall, the chapter argued that the treatment of farmers by the state had improved significantly 
when compared to the pre-1923 period. 
        
The era of formal conservation in Southern Rhodesia reshaped state-farmer-miner relations as 
demonstrated in Chapter Five. Timber remained a crucial source of fuel for the mining and 
agricultural industries alike. Although electricity generation had improved after 1945, it 
remained expensive and beyond the reach of many mining companies and tobacco farmers. 
Timber cutting by both farmers and miners therefore remained a major cause of deforestation. 
The mining law promulgated by the Company administration had set a precedent of quarrelling 
between farmers and miners. Miners were, by this time, still considering unlimited access to 
wood as a prior right. The Forest Act which was passed in 1949 in the context of the Natural 
Resources Act of 1941, created the Mining Timber Permit Board (MTPB) to regulate timber 
cutting for mining purposes. Although it faced operational constrains in the initial days, it later 
on devised a monitoring system which, for the first time in the country’s history, tried to control 
wood cutting by miners. It was surprising though that this Board did not have any farmers on 
it (yet it was intended to control wood cutting on the farms). The only existing source which 
deals directly with the MTPB and its implications for white settlers, discusses how it regulated 
wood cutting by miners. This chapter goes beyond this approach and demonstrates how its 
operations shaped the contours of contestation between these key settler groups. The 
incorporation of mining men on the Intensive Conservation Area Committees (ICACs) as well 
as the creation of the Minerals Resources Committee (MRC) were key state initiatives devised 
to deal with miner-farmer clashes. Other scholars have discussed the consequences of the 
Forest Act on Africans who lived on areas that were designated as forest reserves. The chapter 
adds a new dimension to this literature by exploring the impact of the Forest Act on Southern 
Rhodesia’s settler society, highlighting how it created a conducive atmosphere for the 
resolution of farmer-miner conflicts. 
 
Chapter Five has shown how the colonial state attempted to regulate property rights through 
trying to minimise conflicts between farmers and miners and de-escalate chief triggers like the 
refusal of right of access to miners on some farms. This had been a controversial issue since 
the early colonial period and preceding governments had failed to find a lasting solution to the 
problem. Structural changes in the country’s economy had brought new challenges that added 
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another dimension to the on-going conflicts. Base minerals mining registered significant 
growth during World War II, inspired by growing demands for base metals used in the 
manufacture of armaments. The methods of extraction and the claim sizes were all different 
from gold mining. Claims for base minerals were more extensive. Continued exploration and 
exploitation of more base minerals claims was criticised by farmers who argued that the 
practice was taking up more land that could have been used for agriculture. It therefore became 
imperative to determine the mineral or agricultural significance of a particular area before 
mining was commenced. The government created a Working Party made up of members from 
the mining and agricultural industries to draft possible remedies to this problem. It was through 
the working relationship between the two sectors and the compromises made by the Working 
Party which provided the basis of an amendment to the Mines and Minerals Act in 1961. 
 
Farmers and miners did not clash over the exploitation of land and timber resources alone. 
Chapter Six has sought to demonstrate that the two groups also clashed over access to African 
labour. By discussing this conflict over labour, the thesis has brought Africans, who all along 
were missing from the scene. As discussed in Chapter Three, settlers (mostly famers and 
traders) requested administrative authority to be extended to them since they were contributing 
towards the country’s revenue. Africans also paid different taxes but were not even granted any 
form of political representation. Rather, they were used as labourers to prop up the mining, 
agriculture as well as secondary industry development in the country. Chapter Six 
demonstrated how funding for the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) became a source 
of conflict between the farmers and miners until it was terminated in 1933. In this regard, the 
chapter has shown how taxation had the capacity to spark revolt even amongst settlers. The 
chapter has used the 1925 conference as a case-study to demonstrate the divisions between 
farmers and miners over use and access to labour. More labour came from the northern 
territories and it was a difficult task to channel it to areas where it was needed most because of 
a combination of factors discussed in the chapter. The direction and distribution of labour was 
considered until 1953. Circumstances had changed during the Federation period. Labour was 
no longer in short supply as shown by influx control measures that were put in place to limit 
the influx of labour from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
 
The thesis has thus provided a broader yet more nuanced coverage of state-farmer miner 
relations in Southern Rhodesia. In this regard, the thesis has made a useful contribution, to 
prior histories on Southern Rhodesia on this period and topic which privilege political economy 
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and environmental concerns, by focusing on the centrality of taxation and offering new insights 
on intra-settler studies. It has shown that the relationship of the three was not static but was 
ever-changing as dictated by political and economic circumstances at particular moments. 
Further research on the subject should be conducted for the period starting from 1961 to 1980. 
Research of this nature is crucial since it would cover the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) period and the rule of Ian Smith's party. The British Government sought 
non-violent ways to end UDI and adopted a policy of economic sanctions. These were 
calculated to disrupt economic activity, so as to breed dissension and dissatisfaction in the 
white demographic, who would then compel a return to the negotiating table to move towards 
a more mutually tolerable form of self-government. Under such sanctions, however, 
Rhodesia’s minerals still found their way onto the international market.715 Research on how 
farmers and miners were involved in sanctions busting and the position of the state will make 
a useful contribution to historiography. Again, this was the time of the liberation war in the 
country. Many European farmers died in the war, and some areas were cordoned off, halting 
farming and mining enterprise in the process. Research of the subject in this period will surely 
break ground on new historical seams.  
 
  
                                                            
715 R. Coggins, “Wilson and Rhodesia: UDI and British policy towards Africa”, Contemporary British History, 
20, 3, 2006, 363-381. 
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